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Abstract
Unlike wired networks, wireless networks cannot be physically protected, mak-
ing them greatly at risk. This study looks into advanced ways of implementing
security techniques in wireless networks. It proposes using model checking and the-
orem proving to prove and validate a security protocol of data transmission over
multi-channel in Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs) between two sources.
This can help to reduce the risk of wireless networks being vulnerable to Man
in the Middle (MitM) attacks. We model secure transmission over a two-host
two-channel wireless network and consider the transmission in the presence of a
MitM attack. The main goal of adding an extra channel to the main channel is
to provide security by stopping MitM from getting any readable data once one of
these channels has been attacked.
We analyse the model for vulnerabilities and specify assertions for secure data
transmission over a multi-channel WLAN. Our approach uses the model analyser
Alloy which uses a Satisfiability (SAT) solver to find a model of a Boolean formula.
Alloy characterizations of security models are written to analyse and verify that the
implementation of a system is correct and achieves security relative to assertions
about the model of our security protocol. Further, we use the Z3 theorem prover
to check satisfiability using the Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver to
generate results. Using Z3 does not involve high costs and can help with providing
reliable results that are accurate and practical for complex designs.
We conclude that, based on the results we achieved from analysing our pro-
tocol using Alloy and Z3 SMT solver, the solvers complement each other in their
strengths and weaknesses. The common weakness is that neither can tell us why
the model is inconsistent, if it is inconsistent. We suggest that an approach of be-
ginning with modelling a problem using Alloy and then turning to prove it using
Z3, increases overall confidence in a model.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Software systems have become increasingly important in our daily lives, which
increases the demand for ensuring correctness of their behaviour. This applies
not just to safety critical domains such as medical and traffic systems; software
failures also have a detrimental effect on the economy as a whole.
The size and the complexity of software systems have grown in recent years [105].
Recently, developers have become able to achieve the goal of building systems that
implement reliably in spite of their complexity, by using methods that are required
to provide an accurate specification of the system and its validity properties. To
achieve this goal, formal methods, which are mathematically based languages,
techniques, and tools for specifying and verifying a system are utilized [89]. Formal
methods, when utilized in the design stages of a system’s development, provide
more accurate results at a lower cost [97] than traditional techniques.
The formal method approach has gained more and more acceptance in industry
over the last few years and this is shown clearly, for instance, by the last standard
of the European Committee Standardization for railway control and protection
systems, where formal methods are "highly recommended" for the safety integra-
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tion [3].
Moreover, a formal approach is strongly affected as well by the nature and
expressive power of the specification language. Its underlying logic is that the
more the required behaviour, which is naturally on a higher abstraction level,
can be expressed directly, the more specification errors can be avoided, and the
properties can be captured and verified.
Formal methods are required to check the behaviour of software. Formal se-
mantics is used for the formulation of the expected behaviour as well as for the
description of the software system itself; a framework and a methodology are used
for gaining confidence about software correctness, which can range from random
checks to a complete proof of correctness.
This thesis uses formal methods to transform software system together with the
required behaviour into a logical formula proof in a formal language, such that
the formula is valid if the software properties satisfy the required behaviour. The
approach in which the software system is checked against a finite number of tests
has an ability to give (mathematical) proofs of correctness and is thus the method
of choice for safety critical systems.
In this thesis, we explore the use of typed first-order logic (FOL) to model and
analyse a multichannel wireless protocol using the model analyser Alloy. Further
we use the Z3 SMT solve to prove satisfiability of the properties of the multi-
channel wireless protocol. We provide two complementary approaches in our case
study which uses Alloy and Z3 and validate the proposed methodology of our
multichannel security protocol.
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Alloy provides a suitable set of methods to easily and directly describe software
systems together with their desired behaviours. Alloy descriptions of software
systems are called models, while Alloy descriptions of required behaviours are
called assertions. In the verification context, we refer to an Alloy model together
with an Alloy assertion as an Alloy specification.
The main significant reason for the success and popularity of Alloy is the fully
automatic Alloy Analyser. It checks Alloy specifications by looking for a coun-
terexample. The models analysed by Alloy are small. Their default scope is three
[83]. This gives the user the ability to check the specification of a model in small
scope to detect any errors simply before developing the model to be complex with
increasing the number of scopes gradually. However, checking is implemented with
respect to a bounded scope in which only a small number of values is considered
for each type. Thus, despite the Alloy Analyser’s ability to find counterexamples
effectively, it has no ability to establish the validity of the proof. Thus we need a
complementary formal method such, as an SMT solver, choosing Z3.
According to [22] Z3 is a state-of-the art theorem prover from Microsoft Re-
search. It can be used to verify the satisfiability is logical formulas automatically
over more than one theory. Z3 provides a good match for verification components
and software analysis since many similar constructs of software map directly into
its supported theories. Z3 is used efficiently for logical solving and modelling.
1.2 Aims And Objectives
The principal goal is to compare the techniques of Alloy and Z3 for specifying
properties of wireless network protocols through the analysis of Man in the Mid-
dle Attacks over a single channel and then an alternative multichannel protocol.
Considering this main aim of the study, the objectives are as follows:
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• Propose and build a modelling and verification approach using typed first-
order logic as a specification language for data transmission over a WLAN.
• Find a model for a given principal goal using the Alloy Analyser [92]. Alloy
allows us to specify the flow of communication, characterise the participants
in the communication, formulate assertions which would guarantee security,
and check the validity and security of the protocol.
• Prove the modelling and verification properties utilising a theorem prover.
For the purpose of this study, Z3 will be used to find a proof for a given
principal goal using SMT to generate its results.
• Explore out how model analysis compares with theorem proving.
• Make a detailed comparison of both Alloy and Z3 including this relative
strength and limitations.
1.3 Thesis Structure
• Chapter 1: The Introduction
This chapter provides the context for our case study. It also describes the main
objectives that led to this work being conducted in the Wireless Networks field,
using the Alloy and Z3.
• Chapter 2: General Background and Related Work in Multichannel Wireless
Security Protocol and Formal Methods
In this chapter, we discuss studies of using multichannel wireless networks for
transmitting data securely, the strength, issues and applicability of Alloy for im-
proving models, and the accurate use of Z3 to prove the satisfiabilities of theories.
In addition, the chapter gives research results on the strength, efficiency, and the
accuracy of results when using formal methods.
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• Chapter 3: Foundations: Alloy
This first foundation chapter provides a general introduction to the Alloy spec-
ification language and its analysis using the Alloy Analyser to model an ATM
system as an example.
• Chapter 4: Foundations: Z3 SMT Solver
This second foundation chapter provides a general introduction to the Z3 SMT
solver using the same ATM system as an example. At the end of chapter 4, a
comparison between SAT and SMT results, and SAT and SMT tools is provided.
These comparisons include decidability, time, limitations, accuracy, counterexam-
ple, capabilities, and quantifiers.
• Chapter 5: Problem Specification and Case Study, and Multichannel Secu-
rity Protocol Modelling and Analysis
This chapter considers work related to the case study in the area of securing data
transmission over a multichannel. It also looks into the details of the particular
issues that have been chosen for this study. Further, this chapter discusses the
reason behind presenting the model for our case and how it can help with achieving
secure communication over wireless networks. This chapter also discusses how
data being transmitted over wireless networks can be secured and safeguarded
from MitM attacks by making use of a multichannel instead of a single channel for
data transfer. The security of a multichannel protocol depends on analysing the
transmitted message into two parts, random letters and the indices for each letter,
and then transmitting each part over different wireless networks, and changing
the MAC address for each channel. This chapter finally gives a description of the
proposed model that has been developed.
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• Chapter 6: Multichannel Security Protocol Modelling Using Alloy
This chapter presents the Alloy framework for modelling and checking the va-
lidity of properties of the provided protocols using: (i) predicate-running which
is applied to Alloy problems with a predicate and results in a visualization if
the model is consistence, and (ii) assertion-checking, which is applied to Alloy
specifications in which properties have been constrained as facts.
• Chapter 7: Multichannel Security Protocol Proving Using Z3
In this chapter, we present the results that we found after proving the satisfia-
bility of the properties of the protocols using Z3. Then we compare and discuss
the results, and how Alloy and Z3 complement each other in terms of strengths
and weaknesses and whether working together strengthens the capacity of them in
terms of automation and scalability. We also explore whether both model check-
ing and theorem proving could provide the validity and the satisfiability of the
security of our protocol for the same property. In chapter 7, we noticed that,
after making the corresponding transformation of model from Alloy into Z3, when
checking the assertion results a counterexample in Alloy, it also results in a coun-
terexample in Z3 under the same properties. Also, when checking the assertion
results in no counterexample in Alloy, it also results in the same in Z3 under the
same constraints on properties .
• Chapter 8: Systematic Translation Rules A First Step Towards An Auto-
mated Translator
In chapter 8 we show how small and simple model in Alloy maybe translated
manually into a large and complex (less readable) formulas in Z3 including declar-
ing types, subtypes, abstraction, extension, multiplicity constraints, relations,
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facts, assertions, formulas, and analysis. This chapter presents and discusses ab-
stract syntax for the core Alloy logic and SMT2 language; the tool integration
and methodology that we have worked on with the Alloy Z3 hybrid for verifica-
tion; and systematic translation rules to describe how each piece of Alloy syntax
is translated into Z3.
In this chapter we show how to translate a specification that is written in the
Alloy specification language into a satisfiability-equivalent SMT problem using Z3
SMT logic (FOL) and solved by an SMT solver such that if there is a counterex-
ample in Alloy in finite scopes, it maybe supposed to be a counterexample in Z3
in infinite scopes and vice versa.
• Chapter 9: Conclusion and Future Work
In this final chapter we present conclusions of our approach and future work.
1.4 Contributions
Our contributions in this thesis include:
• A model of a multichannel protocol built using Alloy.
• A model of the protocol using Z3 including all of the aspects that were
included in Alloy.
• A comparative analysis of the the results found through Alloy and Z3.
• Identifying and comparing the strengths, limitations, and advantages of us-
ing theorem proving and model analysis.
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General Background and Related
Work for Security Protocol in
Multichannel Wireless and
Formal Methods
2.1 Context
Within the last ten years, the software engineering industry has seen globally
a growing amount of susceptible information being produced, used, and accessed
by web-based applications using wide area networks and wireless technology from
financial institutions, healthcare organizations, online payment agencies among
other transactions conducted online [16]. Transactions conducted online and per-
sonal security now depend on the safety and protection that are incorporated into
web-based software programs. It is important to note that even one design flaw
or execution error in a program can be used by malicious criminals to embezzle,
change, or falsify the confidential information of guiltless system end-users. Such
network and web application attacks are now a common problem and are having
a negative impact on a number of organizations and system users [16].
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The dangers of installing software with security issues are too big to accept
with no assurance, but programs are getting extremely big for security engineers
and professional experts to scrutinize manually, and computerized verification and
validation programs are not able to scale. At the moment, we don’t have any
single extensively used online program or network that can be certified as safe
and with a high level of security, even alongside a small group of hacks. In fact,
development and execution faults are still established in commonly disseminated
and comprehensively examined protection systems and network operating systems
developed by excellent professionals and executed by specialists [13].
2.1.1 Wireless Protocol
Wireless is a technology that facilitates networking by linking many computer
users to share resources in a home or business environment simultaneously over
a single channel with no need for any additional wiring or cabling. Wireless net-
works have become pervasive. They allow millions of users across the globe to
exchange information, conveniently and flexibly, among a variety of devices in-
cluding notebook computers, PDAs, tablet PCs, mobile phones, digital cameras,
and hand-held games. The intensive use of wireless networks over single-channel
wireless networks reveal various vulnerabilities: the wireless channel can be eaves-
dropped; the data transmitted over the network can be altered; the identities of
the communicated parties can be impersonated; and the communication channel
can be overused or jammed [27, 70, 136, 68].
The rapid commercialisation of new products and services that use wireless net-
works does not allow enough time for the design of robust security architectures
[132]. Consequently, the risk of losing and misusing data transmitted over a wire-
less network is high [2, 31]. As a result, an investigation to ensure information
security on a wireless network by using a strong key or transmitting data over
pairs of nodes and encryption has been identified as a critical need. [124].
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In the context of wireless networks, preserving information security has three
main goals [132]:
• Confidentiality : ensuring that nobody but the receiver can see the informa-
tion.
• Integrity : ensuring that the information has not been modified.
• Availability : ensuring that the information is available whenever it is needed.
One type of threat to a single channel wireless networks is known as Man in
the Middle (MitM). In MitM over a single channel, the attacker takes advantage
of weak network communication protocols in order to convince a host to route
the information through the attacker instead of through the normal router. The
attacker intercepts messages in a public key exchange and then resends messages
after substituting their own public key for the requested public key [133]. Hence,
the attacker makes two hosts believe that they are communicating with one an-
other, while the attacker controls and modifies the communicated messages.
The attacker attacks in real time by splitting the original Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) connection into two new connections and acting as a proxy where
they can read, insert, and modify the data in the intercepted communication [120].
Our work focuses on modelling a multichannel wireless network communication
protocol using two formal methods Alloy and Z3. Our challenge is to compare the
technique of Alloy and Z3 for specifying properties of wireless network protocols
through the analysis of Man in the Middle Attacks over a single channel and then
a multichannel alternative protocol.
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2.1.2 Security Protocols
Today, active information and communicating like e-commerce, mobile tech-
nologies, and the Internet, have made the use of security protocols an absolute
necessity. It is therefore essential for systems designers to have confidence in the
security protocols they use [97].
The main purpose of security protocols is securing communications on insecure
networks, such as the Internet. Security protocols are required to be used ev-
erywhere, such as in electronic commerce (e.g., the protocol TLS [46], used for
https:// URLs), bank transactions, mobile phone, and wireless networks. How-
ever, the design of security protocols is error-prone; this was clearly demonstrated
by the famous Needham-Schroeder public-key protocol [118], when the design flaw
of its security protocol was detected 17 years after its publication [103]. Thus,
security flaws cannot necessarily be discovered using functional software testing
because they appear just in the presence of a malicious attack. For this reason
automatic tools such as formal methods are required for ensuring that security
protocols are correct during the earlier stages of development. Research in the
verification of security protocols has been very active since the 1990s, and is still
very active [109].
2.1.3 Multichannel Protocols
The concept of using multichannel protocols is not new. In cryptography, the
initial idea of using multichannel protocols was to use two channels: one providing
more security during sending and receiving the symmetric key, and the other
sending the ciphertext. Transmitting data over multichannel has been used to
transmit Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) fingerprints, which are attested through
authentic channels with another channel that is used to send and receive a PGP
public key [156].
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Today there are many viewpoints about research directed towards multichannel
because it helps with avoiding protocol design defects and it is the main approach
to resolving security requirements, channel properties, and the attacker model
[156]. Keeping a multichannel communication secure is essential and is of particu-
lar interest for pervasive computing [156]. The multichannel data communication
concept aims to make multiple-paths appear as a strong single path, secure and
authoritative communication link between at least two parties.
A multichannel protocol facilitates data transmission securely and effectively
in WLANs, especially in the presence of a Man in the Middle [156]. However,
using software to build such a security protocol increases the need to combine
verification techniques such as model checking and theorem proving.
2.2 Background in Security Protocols to Trans-
mit Data Securely Over Multichannel Wire-
less Networks
2.2.1 Introduction
Data confidentiality over mobile devices is not easy to secure due to a lack of
strong encryption components. However, new devices have multi wireless inter-
faces with a variety of channel capacities and security components [158]. Data
confidentiality is the main priority of security solutions for mobile environments
and wireless networks are in particular amenable to threats such as eavesdropping
[158].
As it is known [158], the traditional solution for protection is through data
encryption. However, many link layer encryption schemes are weak, such as WEP
[45] in WiFi home or small business networks. Even strong end-to-end encryption
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techniques such as TLS [47] are not considered an adequate protection solution
because many web sites do not support them, and they might be too difficult for
deployment and too expensive for maintenance [158].
The research below in wireless security addressed the vulnerabilities in WLANs
as follow.
2.2.2 Security Protocols for Data Transmission Over Mul-
tichannel Wireless Networks
Interest in multichannel security protocols is growing [156, 73]. For example,
the multichannel MAC Protocol has been studied by [159]. This protocol uses a
technique called Cognitive Radio (CR) to prevent Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks
by radio jamming in a wireless network. This kind of attack takes place if the
device uses single channel communication, making it easy for eavesdroppers to
send and receive radio signals or packets to confuse the original client transmission,
which leads to DoS. The multichannel MAC protocol is one of the suggested
solutions for that problem. It utilises CR which has two technologies that are
responsible for obstructing the jamming attack. The first is real time spectrum
sensing and the second is fast channels switching. The disadvantage is that using
many channels in this protocol can cause a higher channel sensing time [159].
Multi-hop communication with access to the multichannel MAC (medium access
control) protocol was used by [157] to reduce the problems in a Wireless Mobile
Ad hoc Network (MANET), such as conflict and collision caused by increasing the
number of mobile hosts quickly and decreasing the performance of the network.
This protocol was designed for wireless networks, which assume a joint channel
exchanged by mobile hosts. The protocol works by utilising static channel activity
and applying IEEE 802.11 in the sending and receiving operations on every chan-
nel. This protocol faced problems with hidden terminals and exposed terminals
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[157].
A hidden terminal, as defined in [157] is when there are two hosts X and Y, and
host X is sending to host Y. Y’s receiving activity could be destroyed when another
host Z cannot sense the signals from host X which leads to Z’s transmission activity
being mathematically overheard by host Y. An exposed terminal, as defined in
[157] is, host X is sending to Y. Later, host Z plans to send to host D, but because Z
can sense X’s signals, Z will wait until X’s transmission activity terminates. In fact,
the communications from X to Y and from Z to D can happen simultaneously.
To eliminate these problems, in the multichannel MAC protocol called dynamic
channel assignment (DCA) [157], bandwidth is separated into two types of channel.
A single control channel (control transceiver) is used to solve connection prob-
lems and to allocate data channels to mobile hosts. Then a number of data
channels (data transceivers) are used to submit data packets and acknowledge-
ment through switching between data channels. This protocol has the ability to
support mobile communication between two hosts and has comparable simplicity
to our approach which is transmitting data over two different channels with the
message separated into two parts and each part transmitted over a channel.
A multichannel technique is also used to prevent Wireless Mobile Ad hoc Net-
works from jamming attacks using a protocol called Multi-path Multi-Channel
Protocol. The goal behind using multichannel in this protocol is to prevent jam-
ming attacks [153], especially jamming attacks focusing on the transmitted chan-
nel itself. This protocol depends on designing the transmitted channels to start
as a single channel, with the ability to add more channels if a jamming detection
system detects a jamming attack.
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The technique of Multi-path Multi-Channel Protocol starts in the MAC layer
with 802.11 control traffic sent to each node: each node at each configurable W
second calculates the average control traffic (CT) sent of neighbour nodes. If CT
is greater than T, which is the total average of submitted control traffic from
adjoining nodes, then an alarm packet will be generated and broadcast to warn
other nodes to change their common control channel and increase the number of
transmitted channels [153].
Relay attacks are studied by [149, 44, 23]. A relay attack is a kind of MitM
attack. The attacker captures some of the data packets on their way to the in-
tended destination and then attempts to re-use this information to attack the
victim’s network without modifying data. MitM has ability to observe, modify,
and/or block data after intercepting the data, making the parties think they are
connecting to each other.
According to [149], encryption alone may not protect all communication be-
tween two parties from MitM attacks. They propose multichannel protocols. One
solution for preventing relay attacks is to add another channel so two endpoints
can establish if they are connecting to each other securely or if there is a MitM
intercepting them. The main characteristic of this extra channel is that it is diffi-
cult for it to be relayed. The technique is based on a distance bounding protocol
to provide connection approval with a low force security guarantee, provided there
are no other principals within a specified distance of the verifier. The main goal
of the distance bounding protocol is to give only the genuine provider the ability
to respond to the challenge, whereas the MitM never responds to the challenge
because MitM does not have any idea about the shared secret.
Our approach is similar; also we model secure message exchange over a mul-
tichannel network that makes similar assumptions to [5]. These assumptions are
that we should not depend entirely on encryption to guarantee the security, and
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that adding another channel to transmit a message may increase the security of
the transmitted message, which in turn prevents MitM.
An analysis of a relay attack [44] based on speed, and calculating how much time
sending and receiving data takes, depends on the theory of the speed of light. This
defensive technique is limited and works by establishing whether the provider is
further away than predicted. An analysis of a relay attack is reported by [23] but
with a high security low level protocol with a pre-calculation of a one bit challenge
and a response which transmits as fast as the channel allows. In contrast, we are
not concerned with the speed of the message exchange. Instead we only capture
the intended sender and receiver and the relevant properties of description for a
secure exchange to take place.
In a multichannel key agreement, using an encrypted public key exchange, se-
cure communication is achieved by sending and receiving messages that are easy
to eavesdrop or change through public channels. To make a fresh strong cryp-
tographic key agreement between two PDAs, Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange
may be used to guarantee security, confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity in
data transition [100, 48].
The DH key exchange [58] is a method that provides security when symmetric
cryptography cannot eliminate eavesdropping. The protocol provides robust se-
curity for data transmission over two channels. Its technique works by merging
long values submitted via radio channel with short values submitted via the data
origin authentication channel.
The DH key agreement protocol accomplishes similar goals to those achieved by
[58], but there are further goals that this protocol has achieved, such as neglecting
for how long the hacker tries to hack the second channel. This protocol could
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decrease the ability to hack the second channel data transition to less than 1 in
1,000,000 by taking into account the use of the bandwidth of the second channel.
Another goal is that the protocol requires the data transferred over the second
channel to be utilized in calculating subsequent protocol values, instead of merely
to be checked for equality [30]. This is another difference to [58].
A new security protocol called Multichannel Encryption Overlay (MEO) using
multiple channels to transmit data securely has been introduced by [158]. This
protocol is similar to ours in terms of increasing the number of options for wireless
broadband. However, in this protocol the options for wireless broadband can
be used simultaneously with no need to disconnect from one and reconnect to
the other. Our protocol requires this disconnection and reconnection to change
the MAC addresses using "Technitium MAC Address Changer" software, which
strengthens the security.
The goal of the MEO protocol is to increase data confidentiality by splitting
data transmission over multiple channels. This protocol is based on two ideas:
first, removing any information to frustrate decryption; and second, to reduce the
rate of the information, helping to increase the time available to stop those attacks
which rely on sniffing encrypted text. These goals are achieved by, splitting the
source into two or more channels. The majority of the data is carried by the first
channel, and the rest, after some additional encryption, on the second channel.
The first channel essentially carries the first part of data, and data on the second
channel is low rate, and encrypted. Before reaching the final destination, the split
data can be reassembled at a network proxy location [158].
The MEO protocol is similar to our protocol in terms of its technique of splitting
data into two parts and transmitting each part over different channel; however, we
think our protocol is stronger because it uses different channels at different times,
changing the MAC address for each channel using "Technitium MAC Address
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Changer" software. It also does not depend on submitting the data itself but just
random letters and indices.
2.3 Specification and Verification
Verification is the process of identifying whether a system meets its specifica-
tions. In the past, the goal of this process has been to verify after a development
project’s completion whether the implementation of a program (what we got) is
equal to the specifications (what we wanted). Now, however, verification occurs in
the early stages of the software development cycle, with the goal of verifying the
validity of the theoretical model. Verification here has the advantage of evaluating
early on whether the product will satisfy system requirements and whether the
system will implement as required. It also allows for the detection of errors before
they’ve spread and become more complex [89].
Specifications frequently rely on semantics to understand the system to be de-
veloped. Because of the ambiguity of the natural language that is used to specify
the software development, it is hard to verify the validity of the system and the
verification process becomes less efficient when the software development becomes
bigger and more complex. The automation of the procedure is difficult as well
because of the informal specifications [89].
2.3.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods are a particular kind of mathematically based technique for
the specification, development, and verification of software and hardware systems.
They enable accurate verification of specifications and their realization. Moreover,
they facilitate the automation of verification and refine its efficiency. Therefore,
the utilization of formal methods is expected to raise the quality, reliability, and
accuracy of software.
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Formal methods are introduced as a method to convert a problem from the
informal space into the formal space, where it is easier for computational methods
and technologies to be applied. Formal methods are used to represent methods
that are used in process or system engineering, and allow for the description of a
problem using a method that assists in discovering the solution. Formal methods
were utilized on a large scale with software engineering to first determine the goal
of the system, and then to design, develop, and to validate the fundamental system
[141].
Until formal methods were included in the development process, security solu-
tions were verified via human analysts. On several occasions, some traces were
not conducted in the analysis. Thus, relevant errors were not discovered. Formal
methods for security protocol analysis as illustrated by [109] represent a mathe-
matical or logical modelling of a system and properties to be proven, together with
an efficient procedure for determining whether a model satisfies these properties.
There are two kinds of formal methods: formal specification and formal verifi-
cation [89].
2.3.1.1 Formal Specification
Formal specifications are utilized to describe a system, to analyse its behaviour,
and to help its design by verifying system properties such as functional behaviour,
timing behaviour, performance characteristics, or internal structure through strict
and efficient reasoning tools [72]. Most analysts and programmers have not been
trained in formal specification techniques because formal specifications can take a
very long time and it may be impossible to make changes to the specifications once
design and implementation has begun. Also, formal specifications describe what
a system should do, not how the system should do it, and maybe used to detect
errors but do not help solve those errors. Moreover, they are complex because they
require a high level of mathematical expertise and analytical skills to understand
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and apply them efficiently [72]. Even in a relatively simple system, they might
include formulas ranging over 100 pages [139].
2.3.1.2 Formal Verification
Detecting errors manually is very difficult, and the software engineering pro-
cess is very complex. For those reasons, the trend is moving toward verification
techniques to discover design errors.
Since the 1990s, formal verifications are increasingly helpful in proving the cor-
rectness of systems such as security and cryptographic protocols, combinational
circuits, and digital circuits with internal memory [141, 51, 19].
The goal of much of the research in formal verification is designing decidable
formalisms in which targeted properties of computing systems can be formulated,
so that the truth and falsity of such formulas can be checked through decision
procedures [89, 141].
2.3.1.3 Distinction Between Formal Specification and Formal Verifica-
tion
In computer science, both formal specification and verification are examples
of formal methods which use mathematical techniques to help document, specify,
design, analyze, or certify software and hardware. Formal verification is concerned
with mathematical models of both: a system and its requirements [143].
For a complex system both formal specification and verification can be utilized to
manage its complexity. At the beginning, the system is modelled utilizing formal
techniques to get a specification. And then, for this specification, verification
techniques are applied to verify the correctness of the system [102].
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For example the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) is a complex system and
its specification is complex. For the verification of ‘the TCP protocol, [102] first
developed a formal specification of TCP protocol and its extension. After that,
he applied verification techniques to prove the correctness of the protocol.
Formal specification and verification techniques may be required together for
different reasons: under all circumstances a formal specification serves as an un-
ambiguous reference for the system’s behaviour because of its formal nature. The
reliability of a system can be improved when using verification to detect its er-
rors; a process that requires detailed knowledge of both the proof system that is
utilized and the axioms that are applied may be helpful through the development
of a system [102].
2.4 Formal Verifications Techniques
The requirement of formal verification has become prevalent [160], especially in
hardware verification [26], network protocol analysis [93, 96], and critical security
system validation [160].
Formal verification has the advantage of providing a systematic method to ex-
plore protocol flaws [139]. It can be applied to designs described at many different
levels of abstraction from the first level through implementation [97].
2.5 Motivation for Using Formal Verification Tech-
niques
The formal verification of hardware and software systems has increased in pop-
ularity [35] using both model checkers and theorem provers [91, 24]. Model check-
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ers generally are used on systems of manageable size, whilst theorem provers may
eventually be used on huge systems [74].
Formal verification works by proving characteristics of the mathematical models
of given systems. Interactive systems consist of a general model and an environ-
ment that interact with each other to give the result. Some systems do not need
to terminate and in this case modelling their calculations as infinite sequences of
states and determining their characteristics utilising temporal logic is necessary
[130].
For interactive systems there are two main approaches to formal verification:
model checking (algorithmic verification) and theorem proving (deductive veri-
fication). Model checking and theorem proving complement each other in their
strengths and weaknesses. At this point, we could say that Alloy and Z3 have a rel-
ative strengths in complementing each other as Alloy may show a counterexample
and Z3 may prove it.
However, model checking is automatic; theorem proving is not. Theorem prov-
ing can handle complex formalisms; model checking cannot. Due to propositional
logic being decidable, model checking is fully automated. Any formula of a logic
with only limited types can be translated into propositional logic b cut this causes
an explosion in the size of the translated formula. Often this makes the proposi-
tional decision procedures take an unacceptable amount of time or space and as
a result expressive system logic in propositional logic will not work. So, model
checkers are not used as decision procedures. Instead, researchers have utilized
theorem provers by dividing a problem into model checkable parts whose correct-
ness results are then reconstituted in the prover. Or, researchers have utilized the
decision procedures in theorem provers to support abstract models of a checkable
size [7].
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Alloy gives us the option to visualize the model and related counterexamples
(if any) using either the standard visualization form or the tree structure of the
model which would include counterexamples if they exist [12]. In our models, we
have chosen to display the counterexamples that were found by Alloy using the
standard visualization as it is easy for us to understand and trace the problem [7].
2.6 Model Checking of Protocols
Models of security are used to provide a formal statement of a system’s integrity,
availability, and confidentiality needs. Models of security offer a precise and brief
means of formally explaining security policies and assuring their validity. Since a
system must not only be protective, formal models of security offer system design-
ers assurance that they are building a consistent system, and with a foundation for
future explanations that the system as established attains its specifications [108].
For example, in [106] the wireless authentication protocol is validated and in
[107] the security protocol is modelled and validated.
An enormous collection of model-checking approaches has been developed for
analysing security protocols, such as [6, 20, 53, 110, 112, 148, 144]. The general
security problem is undecidable and, even under the assumption of perfect cryp-
tography, verification of such properties is undecidable if the size (scope) of the
problem of a model unbounded [111].
The biggest concerns for security is attacks such as: man-in-the-middle attacks
where an attacker is involved in two parallel executing sessions and passes messages
between them; replay attacks, where messages recorded from previous sessions are
played in subsequent ones; reflection attacks where transmitted information is
sent back to the originator; and type flaw (confusion) attacks, where messages of
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different types are substituted into a protocol (e.g., replacing a name with a key)
[37]. The attacks problem is undecidable if the number of scopes of modelling the
specification of an attack is unbounded since undecidability results show that a
modelled case is too complex to detect the flaws of a protocol against an attack
[111].
Model checking has been utilized in hardware, communication, and protocol
verification [88]; recently, the trend is to apply model checking to analyse specifi-
cations of software systems.
Model checking has the advantage that the counterexamples find visualizations
of actual attacks on the protocol. This gives insight into protocol vulnerabilities,
and how they can be fixed. When the system has a defect and its required prop-
erties are not theorems, a decision procedure (model checking) can introduce a
counterexample which can be invaluable in following the source of such errors in
the system execution.
Under a model checking approach, a system implementing a security protocol
is represented as a transition system with limited but numerous states. After
that, the model checker utilizes many effective state detection techniques to detect
whether the system can be in a state concerning a security infringement.
A model checker has been used to check the ABP (Alternating Bit Protocol)
which is used to transfer messages in one direction between a pair of protocol
entities [160]. Pagination messages that the client sends to the receiver and the
acknowledgement pages that the receiver sends to the client using either zero or
one are very simple to describe in the model checker [160]. As [160] reported, when
the pagination is not limited to zero or one, i.e. in the sliding window protocol,
the page number, acknowledgement number, and size of the sliding window may
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be any number, and that make it difficult for it to be modelled by model checking.
Thus it is necessary to use an abstract model to solve this problem. Model checking
has been applied widely and successfully in the analysis of security protocols [104].
There are many model checkers that have been used to verify security protocols
as seen below.
2.6.1 Model Checking Using Spin
Simple Promela Interpreter (SPIN) [75] is an open-source model checking tool
and is especially appropriate for synchronous systems. The models in SPIN are
specified utilizing the Promela language and are also executable. The model
checker allows both the simulation and exhaustive analysis of the behaviours spec-
ified.
The SPIN model checker is used in [129] to check the security protocols for sensor
networks by building an authenticated routing application, and using a two-party
key agreement protocol. As a result, SPIN has the ability to achieve data integrity
during data authentication, which is a stronger property in the protocol.
2.6.2 Model Checking Using Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
The model checking LTL is a modal temporal logic with modalities pointing to
time. In LTL, the user encodes formula according to the future of path formula.
For instance, the correctness of a condition at the end depends on the correctness
of the initial fact. It enables both branching time and quantifiers [59].
LTL requires a reduction in the number of states and transitions and number
of the accepting states to detect counterexamples efficiently. Its connected com-
ponents are weak and costly, the automaton is commonly small, and the saving
over verification can be very high [99]. However, our models such as transmitting
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data over single and multichannel in WLANs requires the number of states to be
increased for detecting a counterexample, and connecting between signatures to
be strong, to achieve the strong relation which lead to effective instances.
The security protocol that has been established by [29] depends on an insecure
channel. For example, getting a confidential security protocol begins from mod-
elling the properties of that protocol to detect its security flaws. Writing formula
that utilize LTL, enables for the specification of assumptions on basis and com-
munication channels beside to complex security properties. That are commonly
not handled via state-of-the-art protocol analysers to discover of a critical security
flaw in Google’s SAML-based SSO for Google Apps. Also to discover a new attack
on a patched version of the Asokan, Shoup, and Waidner (ASW) contract signing
protocol.
2.6.3 Model Checking Using Alloy
Alloy is a tool for modelling and analysing systems. Modelling in Alloy is
structural, logical, and intuitive. The specification language is based on typed
first-order logic and as such, expressive enough to enable us to capture complex
behaviour and specify and analyse interesting security properties such as confi-
dentiality, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation. If a system can perform
these four interesting properties at all times, then we can ensure that the system
is secure.
Alloy is a lightweight language. Its specification language is based on first order
related logics. It is designed for software design. When using Alloy to support
program construction, developers may begin from simple and small models of the
systems and expand slowly. At every stage, the Alloy Analyser will routinely offer
the developer an instant response. Alloy is very helpful in sensing errors and de-
fective parts of a system, reporting them to the developers and thus accomplishing
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an improved understanding of end user needs [80].
The Alloy tool provides a software design framework for modelling of critical
design properties just like checking them [131].
2.6.4 Alloy and Security
Alloy is used in network systems and web based applications to check for security
holes [83]. In the context of security, Alloy and the Alloy Analyser can be used
to model network protocols and identify security loopholes that will make the
application vulnerable to attacks. Some trials [145, 42, 76] have been made in the
past to automate reasoning about web applications and network systems focusing
mainly on security issues such as the correctness of access control that affected
the users. Alloy and the Alloy Analyser tool are now the language that can be
used by application and web application software engineers to identify and report
security problems [134, 54].
2.6.5 Alloy and Security Definitions
In network communication and web-based applications, security is the most
important aspect. In this project, analysing the security of network systems and
web applications using Alloy is framed by the following benefits and features that
the user will receive.
• Confidentiality
Confidentiality is the perception that communication made in network systems
and through web application can only be received by the intended person. There
should be no other reader or listener when this information is passed through
networks and other application networks. For cryptography oriented applications,
this signifies that those not intended to read or listen to this communication that
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is, anybody who does not have the decryption key, cannot access the plain text
communication message in the encrypted text [125].
The Alloy language has been used to model security requirements for secure
communications [125], where predicates were specified for secure message confi-
dentiality, integrity, authenticity and non-repudiation. The work was successful
in designing a general, reusable model for communication security properties.
• Integrity
Once a message is protected, it cannot be modified by a process. Changing a
message requires accessing the protected contents of a secured message to read
it, modify the contents while they are unprotected, and then re-securing them
using the same policy. Thus, it cannot be differentiated between the original and
the modified messages. We require that attempts to change the original message
without write permission destroy the integrity of the protected message, so that
after reading the contents of the message, it is easy to determine the modification
[125].
• Authenticity
Authentication is an approach which identifies what was done from where, what
was said, and particularly, which processes produced a certain communication. To
do this, we use several built-in practical methods to identify the areas that may
leak communications in network systems and web-based applications, and report
them.
The first is an idea like a personal identification number for an automated
banking system. The ATM system will do a checking of the customer entered PIN
code with what the system stores to determine whether the PIN is the same as
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what the system stores, and then the client is logged in to transact. Alloy can
model that by connecting two possible states (pin, pin for before and after states
respectively) of an ATM system. In our ATM model we define the relationship
between two states: before, when then ATM is waiting for PIN, and after when the
PIN is typed. In our model we suppose the PIN always valid in any ATM. In open
or confidential key encoding system, the personal key is an undisclosed code known
by the sender, and every open key owner that read a legitimate communication
message may understand who sent it.
In this research, we make use of a method related to the open confidential key
encoding technique, although it does not use encoding as a protection strategy,
but rather uses the idea of authenticity to recognize who sent the communication.
In Alloy and the Alloy Analyser, a collection of practices can have write authenti-
cation, so the definitions simply narrow the recognition of the communication to
an entity within the group. In circumstances providing only a single procedure,
an Alloy description offers precise authentication [125].
• Non Repudiation
Non repudiation means the incapability of a process to deny passing commu-
nication it receives or to refuse to receive a communication. Non repudiation is
tricky to use in network systems and web-based applications because information
about communication must be passed and received at the local sender and the
receiver correspondingly. To articulate non repudiation in network systems and
web-based applications we need to check the security status of the systems. In
this context the systems will be checked to make sure that they are secure and
safe to receive and send information across the networks.
For Alloy to be efficient and effective here it must know the sending and the
receiving system internet protocol, file transfer protocol, and hypertext transfer
protocol so that it may analyse the validity of data packets that are received and
29
Chapter 2: General Background and Related Work for Security Protocol in
Multichannel Wireless and Formal Methods
sent. In [125], the system does not permit any instance to be sent or received
unless it is valid, secure, and authenticated [125].
2.6.6 The Importance of Alloy for Detecting Flaws Using
Small Scope
The general problem of determining whether a model meets its specification is
undecidable, so automation can only be obtained in return for some compromise.
In our case, we want to detect as many errors as possible before developing and ex-
ecuting our protocol, so we have compromised completeness. The problem of state
explosion with model checking [33] is one that [81] suggests requires a pragmatic
approach to solve [28], by using the Alloy language in a small scope hypothesis,
which conjectures that many flaws in models can be detected in small instances.
Our work assumes the small scope hypothesis for detecting security flow tracing,
making examples of instances easy to be examined and Alloy problems easy to be
checked, as a limited small scope can be easy to compute [113]. With our current
work, a limited scope was sufficient. The impact of limiting scopes to be small
in our work to accelerate detecting flaws and generating a counterexample if one
exists.
2.6.7 Further Alloy Applications
Alloy has recently been utilised in the context of security assessment, for exam-
ple to model the Java Virtual Machine (JVM) security constraints [140], access
control policies [152], or attacks in cryptographic protocols [101].
Alloy is characterized as easily defining the meta-model, as [25] found when
analysing avionic architectures characterised as models in first-order logic to facil-
itate specification of the relational properties expression to be checked. Both [25]
and [101] expressed the specific architecture of a case study in Alloy.
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Moreover, [101] has chosen the Alloy modelling language and its related au-
tomated reasoning tool because their powerful support for sets proved worthy
when they tried to model and simulate the PIN decimalisation attack on IBM’s
architecture.
Alloy has proved its success in checking designs of diverse applications, such as
the Intentional Naming System for resource discovery in mobile networks [4], and
avionics systems [43], as well as designs of cancer therapy machines [85].
The Alloy Analyser has become increasingly popular and is applicable in a
variety of different applications. For example, in [119] a design visualising the
possibilities of detecting a MitM attack while using a credit card online is in-
vestigated. Alloy has been used to model the efficient and Secure Card-based
Payment System (ESCPS) with no counterexample found. In [116] Alloy is used
to automate the specification and verification of an Aspect UML model used in
Aspect oriented (A-O) programming. In [8] the Alloy analyser is used to explore
design weaknesses in the early stages of software development in an e-commerce
application that is vulnerable to MitM.
Alloy has also been used for the modelling and analysis of protocols in networks
[61] and distributed systems [150], and to model and emulate partial and complete
attacks [101].
2.7 Theorem Proving for Proving System Satis-
fiability
2.7.1 Introduction
Theorem proving is a technique that is used to support software development
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and can help with automating the process of validating large sized codes with
optimal cost [154, 71]. To achieve verification of secure systems in security appli-
cations, proving whether a specification satisfies security models may be achieved
by using a theorem prover for automated support [14, 154].
Theorem proving is a tool composed of strong combinations of inference steps.
It is one of many methods which are used for verification of specifications of
system models and to produce new properties of concerns [38]. Theorem proving is
undecidable and one of the key approaches to formal verification. It is a technique
wherein the system and its required properties are expressed as formulas using
mathematical logic which is provided via formal system, which defines a set of
both axioms and inference rules [141].
Under a theorem proving approach, the system and its properties are discussed
via logical formula and the formal proof is found via proving theorems that state
that the provided properties hold in the system.
A theorem prover has the advantage of checking a proof mechanically, or ver-
ifying that a series of formulas does not comply with a legal derivation in the
proof system. To do this, it needs to check that every derivation in the series is
either an axiom or follows from the prior ones via a legal application of the rules
of inference. Moreover, it can help the user in the building a proof by performing
many heuristics. In addition, it is able to remember the decision steps for the
part to determine if the part is a theorem or not [139]. Also, if a goal needs to be
verified, the theorem prover divides it into sub-goals, and each step of the prover
proves each sub goal automatically [38].
There are many theorem provers in active use today. The popular ones include
ACL2 [90], Coq [57], HOL [66], Isabelle [127], NuPrl [36], and PVS [121].
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In our work, theorem proving has been chosen for analysing, checking, and
proving properties of our system.
2.7.2 Difficulties and Advantages of Using Theorem Prov-
ing
Theorem proving is a very general approach and one of its advantages is that
it is easily applied to a wide variety of systems, especially infinite-state and
parametrised systems. However, one of its disadvantages is that a high degree of
highly skilled work is required, even when proof tools are utilized. The difficulty
with a theorem prover is that the user needs to be very familiar with technology
and have good knowledge of the specification.
However,program verification techniques such as the B-method and theorem
provers such as HOL have become widely accepted [142]. Recently, new versions
of HOL theorem provers such as HOL-light and Isabelle HOL have been introduced
[142]. These provers need numerous human interventions and wide, manual guid-
ance while the proof is running. Faster provers are required, especially for massive
programs with thousands of invariants with minimum human intervention within
a minimum period of time [11].
Theorem proving has an advantage in giving the user control of the proofs and
it is flexible in dealing with proofs. Another advantage is that if there is a model
that the model checker cannot verify because of the size of the state space is
too large, a theorem prover may be able to prove it without have to take into
account the size. Regardless of the size of the state space, it is not a problem for a
theorem prover because it does not need to use abstraction techniques which make
verification easy to be implemented on the whole ready model. This makes using
a theorem prover required for verifying any size of code with law cost [154, 71].
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Another advantage of using the theorem prover besides reducing the cost of
verifying codes, as [154] mentioned, is that it helps to develop numerous prob-
lem theories, by being used either in subsequent analysis or as guidelines, which
appears in its ability to detect an ambiguous problem. [128] confirmed this prop-
erty when he used Isabelle to prove and discover a problem with the security of
cryptographic protocols in the massive theory that was built up.
Also, [128] added another benefit which is that using a theorem prover can save
time and reduce the analysing and verification protocol procedure from weeks to
minutes.
2.7.3 Theorem Proving and Security
There are many theorem provers that have been used to prove security protocols
as seen below. Theorem provers are increasingly being used today in the mechani-
cal verification of safety-critical properties of hardware and software designs [141].
To achieve verification of secure systems in security applications, proving whether
a specification satisfies security models or not is required by using a theorem prover
for automated support and evaluation of any system [14, 154].
2.7.4 Theorem Proving Using Isabelle and Coq
Isabelle and Coq are generic theorem provers. Isabelle is equipped with com-
paratively robust automation, while Coq depends on a theory called Calculus of
Inductive Construction and enables one to extract certified programs from proofs.
[126] utilized Isabelle with higher order logic (HOL) to prove three basic security
properties of a Transport Layer Security (TLS). This is a protocol that guarantees
a secure connection over transport protocols such as TCP and under application
protocols like HTTP and SMTP with HTTPS which support them by the secure
connection version. The three basic properties are: (1) every client, after sending
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its completed message, and receiving a matching completed message from its peer,
records the session parameters to enable sending and receiving again. The peer’s
identity can be authenticated utilizing public key cryptography, (2) neither the
eavesdroppers nor any authenticated connection can get a negotiated secret, and
(3) any message communication modification that can be made by the attacker
can be discovered by the connected parties.
In proving these three basic security properties of a Transport Layer Security
(TLS) above, the use of Isabelle failed to detect whether the connection between
parties is secure, especially in the prescience of passive eavesdroppers because the
model does not support unauthenticated connections. After that [151] has trans-
lated the formal model of Isabelle into the Coq syntax and built the proof in the
Coq system. Despite Isabelle and Coq theorem provers sharing many common
principles, their utilization and their techniques differ dramatically, and conse-
quently, the resulting proofs using Coq are more clearly built than those done in
Isabelle.
2.7.5 Theorem Proving using Z3
Our approach uses the Z3 SMT solver, which is a high performance theorem
prover developed at Microsoft Research and an automated satisfiability checker
[22]. Z3 checks whether the set of formulas are satisfiable in the built-in theories
of Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) [147].
Z3 has several facilities of application programming interface to make it straight
forward for components to map into Z3, but there are no user centric facilities or
stand-alone editors for interacting with Z3 [16]. Here, we used Z3 directly online
using the URL ”http://rise4fun.com/z3”
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2.7.6 Security Protocols using Z3
According to [15], web application and networks are experiencing calamities. A
carefully considered attempt is required if safety, and secure development, coding,
and scrutiny methods are to be merged with the swift design and installation of
significant safety and security disseminated web-based programs and networks.
Z3 has been used to protect users, companies, and their information by proving
safety and security. For instance, consider an online banking system installed in
the server at the bank head office from which users access all the services they
need. However, before the bank web application is installed, Z3 must be used to
prove satisfiability and to verify security and safety before implementation.
[17] says studies on safe and protected web-based applications and secure net-
works systems and protocols are making good progress now when Z3 is being used
to check any bugs or security pitfalls, and to make sure that no application will
allow unauthorized persons to access confidential information. Studies on applica-
tion authentication are also progressing quickly, and the outcome is a set of tools
that can now locate errors in complex programs.
2.8 Existing Approaches Combining Model Check-
ing and Theorem Proving
Using formal techniques raising two main questions about the connection be-
tween a system and its formal description: [98]
• Does the model description visualise the specific behaviour of the system? To
answer this question, the model needs to be checked using a model checker
methodology.
• How can we get an implementation that satisfies its specification? To answer
this question, the implementation needs to be proved using theorem prover
methodology.
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We have described the two main approaches to formal verification, model check-
ing, and theorem proving. Both of these approaches have different strengths and
weaknesses, and there has been much work in trying to combine them to be able
to verify larger and more complex examples faster, more conveniently, and with
less user time required. Below we discuss briefly a few of the most well-known
techniques that combine model checking and theorem proving.
There are several examples of combinations of theorem provers and model check-
ers [49, 95]. Usually, the theorem prover is utilized to divide the proof into different
sub-goals to be small enough to be verified by a separate model checker. There
is no actual combination so the translation between the languages of the theorem
prover and the model checker is done manually. In our work we translate from
model checking into theorem prover manually.
Usually, integrations of theorem provers with model checkers make the theo-
rem prover able to call upon the model checker as a black-box decision procedure
provided as an atomic proof rule [122, 137]. The prover converts expressions be-
longing to values over finite domains into propositional expressions. This enables
utilisation of the result as a theorem (as in our framework with the reverse direc-
tion) but this does not extend easily to a fully expansive approach. It achieves
better efficiency at the cost of complex integration and lower assurance of safety.
Theorem provers have been utilized to help with abstraction (used to reduce the
size of the model) [34, 67, 146] for model checking. Model checking in the theorem
prover is utilised to provide assumptions to refine an abstraction that appeared to
be too complex and which adds too much non-determinism to the system which
led to the prevention of pseudo counterexamples.
Traditional formal approaches like model checking and theorem proving have
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been used widely in the field of security protocols. Here the data communication is
trusted and requires the user to decide on authentication aims in advance. Model
checking and theorem proving are used to model the behaviour of a protocol and
mathematically verify that the design and implementation satisfy requirements of
the protocol successfully [52].
Model checking discovers a path that leads to a state where the properties are
not hold and focuses on searching incorrect traces, while theorem proving uses
theorems in order to prove the satisfiability of the protocol properties and focuses
on proving the correctness of the protocol according to the properties.
In order to utilise theorem proving, we need to convert our model verification
into a theorem prover which requires encoding both the design and the specifica-
tion into the logic of a theorem prover.
In the Nimbus Toolset [38, 87], there is a translator to enable verification as well
as a translator to the NuSMV model checker. In the Prototype Verification System
(PVS) theorem prover, this translator is responsible for interpreting requirements
specifications from the Requirements State Machine Language (RSML) specifica-
tion language into the input language. This enables the user to verify interpreted
requirements specifications easily via theorem proving and model checking tech-
niques. Verifying the safety properties of systems using models specified in RSML
using theorem proving has been done by [87] with both the PVS theorem prover
and the NuSMV model checker to analyse the Flight Guidance System (FGS)
model for Mode confusion [87].
[56] describe a case study in which the Alloy address book problem is analysed
using the Yices SMT solver. In this case study the Alloy language is translated
to Yices and analysed utilizing the bounded Yices SMT solver rather than the
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bounded SAT solver. They concluded that whenever the Alloy Analyser returns
a counterexample, Yices returns a valid counterexample as well, and when Alloy
cannot find a counterexample in a finite scope, Yices does not find any in that
scope either. Also, analysing problems using the SMT solver is faster than using
the SAT solver. Our case studies have been translated from Alloy to the Z3 and
analysed using the unbounded Z3 SMT solver rather than the bounded SAT solver
and we conclude the same as[56]. However, the difference between our results and
theirs is that we use the unbounded SMT solver while [56] used the bounded SMT
solver.
In our case study, we try to create a balance between the expressiveness of
theorem proving and performance as well as the efficiency and automation of model
checking. Representing the requirements of a case study is the main problem in
theorem proving formulation and is one of the main contributors towards success
or failure in model checking.
2.9 Discussion
According to our study of the literature above, it is not clear whether model
checking or theorem proving is better for establishing properties of communica-
tions protocols. We cannot determine which formal method is better unless we
determine the goal of using them. If the the goal is finding mistakes and just
checking not proofing, and the domains are restricted to be finite (using scope),
then we need to use a decidable model checker because the first period for realising
a scenario is modelling and seeing the result, and in this period lots of mistakes
may occur.
In contrast, an SMT solver like Z3 is undecidable. Decidable means that a
model checker like Alloy should provides the result even it takes very long time
with finite states, while undecidable means that a theorem prover like Z3 may
run forever and not provide the result or even time is out, and just provides
"unknown". However, if we need to prove the correctness of the result that has
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been got from model checking for more confidence, we need a theorem prover.
Z3 supports unbounded verification and the SMT solver tries to find the coun-
terexample (CE) for unlimited scope. When it gives the result as "there is no CE",
it guarantees that the assertion is 100% valid because it covers all possible scopes,
even if it may take a longer time to prove the validity of the assertion. However,
Z3 does not guarantee a complete analysis: it may find a counterexample preceded
by the keyword unknown, implying that the property may or may not be valid,
or time out.
On the other hand, Alloy supports bounded verification and when it says there
is no CE, then the assertion may be valid, i.e, the Alloy Analyser checks the
existence of the CE based on a finite scope. In this case the assertion is valid and
there is no CE within a finite scope which means the number of atoms for each
type do not exceed the number of scopes and the maximum that the assertion
can take is the number of scopes we specified. However, it may be invalid (not
guaranteed) in the larger scope when we increase the number of scopes.
Also, Z3 proves the assertion, while Alloy just checks a model and does not prove
analysing, and proof is stronger than modelling. However, Alloy could be stronger
than Z3 in controlling the number of scopes to find the problem for the model if the
goal is just finding a counterexample to limit the problem. For example, limiting
the length of the key for encryption to guarantee it is not able to be broken.
Consequently, our work focuses on proposing a substantial experiment to evalu-
ate both model checking and theorem proving in understanding and characterising
MitM, and exploring solutions to MitM.
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So, for developing a solution we need both model checking and theorem prover.
In the case when a theorem prover fails to prove a theorem, it can be difficult
to tell what’s gone wrong: whether the theorem is invalid, or whether the proof
strategy failed. On the other hand, if the model checker finds no counterexample,
the assertion may still be invalid unless we increase to a large enough scope. In
our case study, increasing scopes are required by extending the complexity of the
proposed solution such as the communicated parties, number of MitMs, and the
procedure of the solution.
We use Alloy to generate counterexamples which help in detecting flaws in the
proposed solution (transmit data securely over multichannel) compared to the
existed solution (transmit data securely over single channel).
We use Alloy to explore axioms which help in reducing the appearance of coun-
terexamples. Moreover, we develop the properties to be applied in the predicates
of the model based on the explored axioms.
The Alloy analyser is a refuter rather than a prover [79]. It can falsify a model
but not verify it. It can prove that an assertion does not hold for all instances of a
model by finding a counterexample, but it cannot prove that an assertion holds in
all instances of a model. It can only prove that an assertion holds for all instances
up to a bounded size. Consequently, we need to the Z3 SMT unbounded verifica-
tion to prove that an assertion holds in all instances of a model with confidence
in the correctness of the property.
It is difficult to compare the techniques of Alloy and Z3 because both of them
work with different mechanisms. Alloy transfers the model into first order logic
and then the Alloy Analyser translates the model with its constraints to proposi-
tional logic, while Z3 transfers the model into first order predicate logic. The main
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feature of the Alloy to Z3 SMT translation is that it guarantees equisatisfiability
of the produced FOL proof obligation with respect to its Alloy counterpart. Con-
sequently, the result of analysing the FOL proof obligation of an Alloy problem
with an SMT solver, whether showing validity or providing a counterexample, is
faithful. However, as we will show in the evaluation section, this is done at the
expense of efficiency.
The next two chapters provide detailed information of the frameworks and tools
used in this dissertation. We begin with Alloy followed by Z3, using an ATM
system as an example in both frameworks.
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Foundations: Alloy
This chapter provides detailed information about the framework of Alloy, the
Alloy modelling language and its supporter verification tool the Alloy Analyser.
This can be used to automatically analyse properties of Alloy models. The chapter
provides a foundation in using Alloy to model a system and the Alloy Analyser to
check the validity of the properties up to the limited scope using an Automated
Teller Machine (ATM) as an example.
3.1 Alloy Definition and Process
Alloy is a tool for modelling and analysing systems. It consists of two parts, the
Alloy language and the Alloy Analyser. The Alloy language is a tiny modelling
language used for the expression of the fundamental structure of a system, as well
as restrictions and operations to determine how the system may change. The
Alloy language consists of Boolean algebra, set theory, quantifiers, and first-order
relational logic. In general, Alloy is a combination of logic, language, and analysis:
logic because it depends on both first order logic and relational calculus, language
because it has syntax for structuring specifications in the logic, and analysis be-
cause it uses bounded exhaustive search for counterexample to a required property
utilising a SAT solver to analyse Boolean expression automatically [81].
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We have chosen to use Alloy because it has the ability to make a fully automatic
semantic analysis, which can provide checking of consequences and consistency,
and simulated execution [86]. It also has the ability to generate sample transitions
of an operation described implicitly, utilising negation and conjunction without
sacrificing abstraction to achieve executability [84]. Moreover, it tries to find
counterexamples, within a bounded scope, which violate the restrictions of the
system [78]. Also, Alloy has an advantage for exploring design ideas gradually
from a small model which is then developed to a larger scale; Alloy can analyse
the model at any level.
The Alloy process passes through three steps. First one specifies the logic of
theory which is a meta-model and constraints. Second one bounds the number of
instances of each object in the meta-model to search and model (build). Third,
the Alloy Analyser (AA) is used analyse the specifications to generate instances of
the meta-model that satisfy the constraints based on the second step. AA provides
a model for a given logic of theory after doing inclusive verification for all models
that have up to a bounded number of instances [50].
3.2 Alloy Analyser
The Alloy Analyser (AA) is the original analysis tool for Alloy. It can be used
to edit, build, and test specifications written in the Alloy language. The goal of
the analysis is to check if the property holds in the system, within a given scope.
It provides two main forms of analysis: [81]
The first analysis, called predicate-running provides a simulation of the specifi-
cation. It checks the consistency of a model, by finding an instance that satisfies
the model. It is applied to Alloy problems with a predicate providing results as
a visualization which shows satisfying structures called instances that satisfy the
predicate and the Alloy model if the model is consistent. No instances will be
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visualized if the model is inconsistent.
The second analysis, called assertion-checking refutes the specification’s correct-
ness. It checks the properties of the model. It is applied to Alloy problems with
an assertion providing results as a visualization which shows a structure (called a
counterexample (CE)) that falsifies the implication of the assertion from the Alloy
model. Otherwise, there is no counterexample found.
The Alloy Analyser is a GUI application that includes three main parts: for
editing and adjusting specifications, for displaying information about solutions
that the analyser generated, and for providing information about the internal
data structures used by the tool during analysis. It is able to represent solutions
in a graphical format.
Bounding a small number of instances of each object in the meta-model is better
than bounding a large number because it makes it easier, faster, and accurate for
AA to detect a problem in the theory if there is any. Moreover, if the model is
getting huge and the bounded instances is getting large, then a number of instances
may be lost and not investigated [50].
The Alloy Analyser works as a compiler and starts its process by implementing
its analysis. Its analysis lies in using a translator called "KodKod" as a model
finder to translate the Alloy problem (verification queries) expressed in relational
logic formula from FOL into a corresponding propositional logic formula (Boolean
logic formula). It is then delivered with the scopes (that a user provided to bound
the size of Alloy problem types) to the SAT solver to check its satisfiability by
checking the negation of the checked property and find a solution by answering
verification queries. After that, if a solution to the Boolean formula is found, it
is translated back into an instance of the corresponding relational formula. This
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involves binding the formula’s relational variables to constants. The problems that
are solved do not exceed the scope that the user specified to bound the size of the
domains, which has the advantage of making the problem finite [83]. Consequently,
the Alloy Analyser has no ability to prove the correctness of an Alloy assertion.
Figure 3.1 shows the internal Alloy analysis process of checking an assertion.
Figure 3.1: An Abstract View Of The Alloy Analysis Process of Checking An
Assertion [62]
3.3 Motivation of Using Alloy
One of the motivations for the development of the Alloy language, according
to [81], was the lack of tools with automated analysis capabilities. In Alloy, the
proposed approach can be modelled in the early phases of the software development
life cycle.
Another motivation for using Alloy is the use of fact to analyse and restrict Alloy
models automatically, and also generate a counterexample which is considered as
a solution [82].
While there are many model checker tools available at present, the Alloy spec-
ification language has been chosen for use primarily because of its simplicity to
represent program language abstractions and its ability to explore their semantics
with a well-integrated analysis tool. As [81] points out, according to his approach
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as "lightweight" formal methods, Alloy models can be created simply and tested
early during the development process, and then extended gradually. In addition,
[81] illustrates that the aim of Alloy was to get the benefits of traditional formal
methods in a short time with less effort.
3.4 Alloy Problem
As seen in Figure 3.2, an Alloy problem is composed of a combination of type
declarations, relation declarations, relational first order formulas marked as fact,
and another formula (if required) marked as assertion to check or as predicate to
run [81]. Each component will be explained later.
Figure 3.2: Abstract Syntax For The Core Alloy Logic [62]
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3.4.1 Type Declarations and Relation Declarations
The type declarations introduce the global types (called signatures) which are
a central part of Alloy’s modelling specification. Signatures are the entities of
systems which represent sets of atoms. Each atom (or scalar) is a unity and
includes three main properties: it is indivisible (are not able to be split into smaller
parts), immutable (their properties do not change), and uninterpreted (there are
no inherent properties) [9].
Signatures are utilised to define the existence of a unary, binary, or ternary
relation while fields are utilised to define other relations of those signatures.
Each signature declaration, such as signatures A and B below:
sig A{}
sig B{}
sig C{r:B m -> n A}
declares a top-level type, here named A and B. The identifier A and B always
refers to the set and does not include number of relation declarations (called fields
of signatures).
The identifier C refers to a set including the number of relation declarations
(called fields of signatures) which represent sets of n-arity tuples depending of the
relation arity, for example r: C->B ->A declares a ternary relation named r ⊆ C
× B × A.
These may also be constraints on field values such as n and m. n and m restrict
that for each c ∈ C the binary relation c.r maps each tuple in B to n tuples of A,
and each tuple in A to m tuples of B.
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Signatures such as A and B, called top-level signatures, are not a subset of
another signature and they will be implicitly disjoint unless they show the relation
(field) between them such as relation r between A, and B below.
Each top-level signature limits a maximum set of three atoms by default.
sig A{}
sig B{r:A}
A signature can contain at least zero relation declarations, separated by commas.
Each declaration indicates a (unary, binary [relates two atoms], or ternary [relates
three atoms]) relation or maybe more than 3 relations between the set defined by
the signature as seen in Table 3.1 below.
A relation is a set of ordered tuples (vectors of atoms); every tuple is an or-
dered sequence of atoms, and each tuple lists atoms (entities) that are related to
each other. Each pair represent a tuple. For example: in Table 3.1 below, the
binary relation represents 2 tuples (a0,b0),(a1,b1), the ternary relation represents
3 tuples (a0,b0,c0),(a0,b1,c1),(a1,b1,c2), while the 4-relation represents 4 tuples
(a0,b0,c0,d0),(a0,b1,c1,d2),(a1,b2,c0,d3),(a2,b1,c1,d3). Moreover, each element in
each tuple is called an atom.
Each relation has a size equal to the number of tuples per pair in this relation.
The arity of a relation is the number of atoms in each tuple of the relation and it
is greater than zero. Some signatures may extend or include other signatures and
constraints using multiplicities as seen in the next section.
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Signature and Relations Related atoms (Type/size) of relation
sig A none Unary (set of a’s), f={(a0),(a1),(a2)}
sig A f: B (a, b) Binary (from A to B),
f={(a0,b0),(a1,b1)}
f ⊆ A×B
sig A f: B ->C (a, b, c) Ternary (from A to B to C),
f={(a0,b0,c0),(a0,b1,c1),(a1,b1,c2)}
f ⊆ A×B × C
sig A f: B ->C ->D (a, b, c, d) 4-relation (from A to B to C to D),
f= {(a0,b0,c0,d0),(a0,b1,c1,d2),
(a1,b2,c0,d3),(a2,b1,c1,d3)}
f ⊆ A×B × C ×D
Table 3.1: Relations And Their Types
3.4.2 Signature Extension, Inclusion, and Abstraction
The signature declaration
sig B (in | extends) A{...}
declares a subtype of A named B. Signature extension and signature inclusion
define new signatures B as subsets of a main signature (its parent) called sub
signatures. This serves as sub-typing and is utilised to support pyramidal specifi-
cation. The key word extends indicates disjoint subsets if more than one signature
extends a top level signature, while the key word in indicates not disjoint subsets
if there are more than one signature in a top level signature
The type signatures therefore form a type hierarchy whose structure is a forest: a
collection of trees rooted in the top-level types, while signatures that do not extend
another signature are said to be a type signature that is a top-level signature, and
their type is a top-level type. Top-level signatures represent mutually disjoint
sets, while sub-signatures of a signature are mutually disjoint. A subtype (subset)
signature inherits the fields of the signature it extends, along with any fields that
signature inherits.
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Using the extension mechanism makes the model clearer and more modular by
separating the main signature aspect of the model into separate paragraphs. The
extended signature must be a top-level signature. A signature may not extend
itself, directly or indirectly.
An abstract signature, marked abstract, is restricted to hold only those elements
that belong to the signatures that extend it. If there are no extensions, then the
marking abstract has no effect. An abstract signature represents a classification of
elements that is refined further by more concrete signatures. If it has no extensions,
the abstract keyword is likely an indication that the model is incomplete.
3.4.3 Multiplicity
Multiplicity constrains the sizes of sets. In a relation, multiplicity is how many
atoms on one side are related with an atom on the other side. Multiplicities
can be applied to the domain, range or both of a relation. Depending on where
multiplicity keywords are placed they induce different constraints as seen in Table
3.2. Relation may be restricted by multiplicity key words lone which means only
one or zero, set, which means any number, one, which means exactly one, and
some, which means at least one. The default multiplicity keyword for unary
relations is one and for multiple-arity relations is set.
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Multiplicity Constrains Meaning
r: A ->B some ->one C, It constrains for each a: A the
expression a.r to associate each tuple
in B with exactly one tuple in C and
each tuple in C with at least one tuple
in B.
r: A ->B lone ->some C, It constrains for each a: A the
expression a.r to associate each tuple
in B with at least one tuple in C and
each tuple in C with at most one tuple
in B.
r: X ->A lone ->B some ->set C, It constrains for each x: X the expression
x.r to associate each tuple in A with at
least one tuple in B and each tuple in
B with at most one tuple in A, and each
tuple in B with any number of tuples in C
and each tuple in C with at least one
tuple in B.
Table 3.2: Multiplicity Constrains Meaning
3.4.4 General Example to Apply Type Declarations, Re-
lation Declarations, Signature Extension, Inclusion,
Abstraction, and Multiplicity
The example bellow models the relations between men and women as persons
showing the difference between in and extends :
abstract sig Person
{
father: lone Man,
mother: lone Woman
}
sig Man extends Person
{
wife: lone Woman
}
sig Woman extends Person
{
husband: lone Man
}
sig Married in Person { }
sig Divorced in Person { }
In the example above, Person is a top-level signature that includes two fields,
father and mother, to relate signatures Man and Woman with signature Person.
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Each Man in Person could or could not be a father, and each Woman in Person
could or could not be a mother, thus, the relation is restricted by multiplicity lone
which means only one or zero.
Extends indicates that Man and Woman are subset of Person i.e, every Man is
Person and every Woman is Person but Man cannot be Woman and vice versa.
Therefore, Man and Woman are disjoint.
In the example above as seen in structure (1), in indicates that Married and
Divorced are subset of Person, i,e: every Married is Person and every Divorced is
Person, however Married can be Divorced and Divorced can be Married. There-
fore, Married and Divorced are not disjoint
Divorced Married
Person
Man Woman
in
in
extends
extends
Flowchart (1): General Example for Type Declarations, Relation Declarations,
Signature Extension, Inclusion, Abstraction, and Multiplicity
3.4.5 Fact, Predicate, and Assertion
Facts describe invariants and are always true.
Predicates in Alloy are declared utilizing the keyword pred. Predicates define
and control operations as formulas and describe state changes. Predicates make
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Alloy produce instances that satisfy with its restriction on each state. Predicates
are composed of at least one constraint and are used to represent operations.
The command run is used to ask Alloy to search for instances that satisfy a
predicate. It is applied to the signatures and relations and always gives a result of
"consistent" or "may be inconsistent" depending on whether a model was found.
The difference between a fact and a predicate is that a fact always holds whereas
a predicate only holds when called an appropriate arguments.
Assertions in Alloy are declared utilising the keyword assert. Assertions are
statements that must be true about the system. Assertions serve as checks to
guarantee that the system is behaving correctly. Assertions are utilized to check
specifications. An assertions is a formula whose validity is checked, taking into
account the facts in the model. From assertion, the Alloy Analyser is asked to
search for possible (finite) counterexamples based on the constraints assumed in
the specification. The check command is given to the Alloy Analyser to search for
counterexamples of an assertion. It enables the expression of properties that are
anticipated to hold as the result of determined facts [62].
3.4.6 Expressions
Alloy expressions represent the fundamental buildings blocks of Alloy formula;
they always evaluate to relations. There are two kinds of relational expressions,
basic and complex. Basic Alloy expressions are constant relations; this includes
all declared signatures and relations as well as the built-in constants: none for the
unary empty set. Complex Alloy expressions are generated from basic expressions
using Alloy’s relational operators such as r + s (union), r++s (override), r & s
(intersection), and r - s (difference) for same arity relations r and s. Also, r ->s is
used for Cartesian product and r.s for relational join of arbitrary relations r and
s as seen in Table 3.2.
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Alloy provides integer expressions. An integer expression is different from a
relational expression. An integer value is not considered as an atom; however, uti-
lizing an integer in a relational expression, Alloy provides for every integer value x,
Int contains exactly one atom that identifies that value [60]. It indicates rudimen-
tary integers. The type Int represents the set of all atoms carrying rudimentary
integers. The expression Int x denotes the atom carrying the integer denoted
by the integer expression x, whereas int y denotes the integer value of the atom
represented by the variable y. Integer expressions are obtained from an infinite set
Z of numbers (. . . , -1, 0, 1, . . . ), and are combined using standard arithmetic
operators ( + , - ).
3.4.7 Formulas
Fundamental Alloy formulas are formed from Alloy expressions utilizing the
subset operator in, the equality operator =, the integer comparison operators
less than < and greater than >, and integer equality =. Fundamental formulas
can be merged using logical connectivities including conjunction (and or && ),
disjunction (or or |), implication (implies or => ), and negation (not or ¬).
Complex Alloy formulas are created utilizing quantifiers. Quantified Alloy for-
mulas take the form Q x: exp ‖ F where Q is one of the Alloy quantifier: all,
some, no, one, lone , x is a variable (usually) occurring in F and bounded by the
Alloy expression exp.
However the expression b may not begin with a multiplicity keyword. This
called a first order quantification, so x points to a single element of b. However,
every Alloy expressions is considered relational, meaning that x is a singleton
subset of b. The meanings of quantifiers are as follow: [60]
all a : A | of holds when Formula holds for every a in A, some a : A | of holds
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when Formula holds for at least one a in A, no a : A | of holds when there is no a
in A such that Formula holds, lone a : A | of holds when Formula holds at most
one a in A, one a : A | of holds when Formula holds for exactly one a in A.
However, if there is a formula of the form r in e, this says r is a subset of e. So, e
can be prefixed with multiplicity keyword to restrict the value of r. The meaning
of restrictions are as follow: [60]
r in (set e) does not induce any restriction and holds when r is a subset of e, r
in (one e) holds when r is a singleton subset of e, r in (lone e) holds when r is a
subset of e that contains at most one element, r in (some e) holds when r is none
empty subset of e.
3.5 Counterexample, Scopes and Inconsistency
The counterexample explains (using visualization) why a model has not satisfied
a specification. By following the counterexample we can determine the source of
the error in the model and then correct it and repeat the process again as shown
in [32, 123].
A scope is specified as a positive integer number to bound the domain (the
number of atoms in each instance of each model element) in an instance of the
system that the SAT solver analyses [78].
Checking Properties for the Alloy Analyzer are expressed as either predicates
or assertions. For properties that are required should be expressed as predicates,
Alloy tries to find an instance that satisfies the property. For properties that
are required to be expressed as assertions, the Alloy Analyzer tries to find a
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counterexample that violates the property. The Alloy Analyzer finds the example
or counterexample within a scope that is limited by the number of instances of
each entity in the system [78].
A model checker either asserts that the properties holds or otherwise reports
that they are violated, providing a counterexample which is a run that violate the
property. Such a run can give valuable feedback and points to design errors.
3.6 Instances
Any instance of an Alloy model is regarded as an assignment of sets and relations
to the signatures and fields [60]. The instance can be acceptable if its assignment
corresponds with the declarations of the fields and signatures. Instances that
satisfy the predicate and the model will be visualized if the model is consistent.
No instances will be visualized if the model is inconsistent [81].
3.7 An Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Ex-
ample
The motivation for choosing the ATM system and specifically the withdrawal
transaction is that it is an example of privacy, integrity, and security in a system,
and any mistake in its functioning may cause a disruption of economic balance
[94].
3.7.1 ATM System Description
An ATM system [10] is an electronic machine which allows customers to access
their bank accounts in order to perform certain transactions, such as withdrawing
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money, making a balance enquiry, and transferring money securely. These ser-
vices depend on the accuracy of the ATM process. Thus, visualization of these
transactions is necessary.
In this section, we will describe, analyse, determine the properties and require-
ments of ATM system, and model ATM using Alloy. Consider the interaction
between a bank customer and an ATM cash machine. The ATM main function
is providing limited amounts of money through withdrawal transactions to cor-
rectly authenticated users. Users use a card and PIN as authenticated tools [21].
However, the ATM may provide extra functionality such as balance enquiry and
money transfer that are not included in our model. We only focus on withdrawal
transactions.
An ATM system has modelled, analysed and visualized both balance enquiry
and withdrawal transactions by [21]. The difference between our model and the
system modelled by [21] is that their model depends on examining the behavioural
properties of the ATM, to visualize the interaction between a customer and an
ATM user interface. This is to solve a common user error with an interactive
system, when users forgot their cash card after withdrawing cash.
Our model examines the behavioural properties of an ATM to visualize the
interaction between a customer and the ATM processes during two sequential
operations:
• The first operation is similar to [21]; the user inserts a card and types a PIN,
and then the ATM reads the card to continue with the withdrawal.
• The second operation, occurs when the user requests an amount of money to
withdraw. The ATM checks whether the requested amount is available, and
if so, reduces the account balance and dispenses the money. If the amount
58
Chapter 3: Foundations: Alloy
requested is not available, the card is returned and the balance remains the
same.
3.7.2 ATM System Analysis
The withdrawal transaction requires a sequence of six statuses and operations.
Its process passes through five procedures. The ATM status begins with, Wait-
ingCard for a (bank card) to be inserted, followed by the required operation which
is EnterCard.
The second status is WaitingPin, followed by the required operation for this
status, TypePin. During these statuses the balance remains the same.
The third status is WaitingMoney which requires the desired amount of money
to be typed, followed by the required operation for this status, RequestCash.
The next status is either the fourth or the fifth status. The fourth, WaitingRe-
ceiveCashAndCard, is achieved if the result of the previous operation, RequestCash,
is less than or equal to the balance of the account. The equivalent operation for
this status, ReceiveCashAndCard, follows, reducing the balance by the requested
amount.
If the main property of RequestCash is not achieved, meaning the RequestCash
operation is greater than the balance, the fifth status, WaitingReceiveCard, is
activated and followed by its equivalent operation, ReceivedCard. The balance of
the account remains the same.
The final status is Update, which returns the system to its first status, Waiting-
Card. ATM model has system properties and system requirements which will be
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detailed next.
3.7.3 ATM Model Properties and Requirements
In the ATM system above there are system requirements and system properties.
The ATM system achieves its function correctly when the system properties satisfy
the system requirements.
The model of the ATM system can be enhanced by adding properties (axioms),
which are written as logical formulas. In Alloy, properties or constraints are de-
fined as facts and assertion. The first property is that all ATM cards with
corresponding PINs should be identified in any ATM machine; the second prop-
erty is that the balance and PIN of cards that interact with the ATM should not
be less than zero (positive); and the third property is that the required amount
of money should be less than or equal to the available balance and greater than
zero for the used card.
The system requirements are inserting the card, typing the corresponding PIN,
and finally requesting the available amount of money.
3.7.4 An Alloy Specification of An ATM System
In Appendices (A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4) and Line (2) in Appendix (A.6), we give a
sample model in Alloy of an ATM system.
• Signatures, Abstract, and Extension
In our model as seen in Appendix (A.1), the type hierarchy consists of the
four top-level types Operations for customer operations (Line 2); ATM Status for
statues changes in ATM system (Line 4); Card for identifier in ATM system (Line
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6); and ATM for ATM system itself contains some fields for showing relations
with other signatures (Line 7). All top-level signatures are mutually disjoint. For
example: disj(Card, ATM ).
Types (signatures) are declared using the sig keyword and represent sets of ele-
ments. The top-level types Operations (Line 2) and ATM Status (Line 4) are the
basic types and labelled with the keyword abstract. For top-level type Operations,
the keyword abstract constrains that every element in the Operations type is an
element in (belongs to) one of its extensions EnterCard, TypePin, RequistCash,
ReceiveCashAndCard, and ReceiveCard (Line 3) for five customer operations: in-
serting card, typing PIN, requesting the amount of money to withdraw, receiving
the requested cash and the inserted card if the ATM system property is achieved,
or receiving the card if it is not. Thus, the abstract may be expressed equivalently
as formula below:
∀ o : Atom | (o ∈ Operations) = > (o ∈ EnterCard) ∨ (o ∈ TypeP in) ∨
(o ∈ RequistCash) ∨ (o ∈ ReceiveCashAndCard) ∨ (o ∈ ReceiveCard)
.
For top-level type ATM Status, the keyword abstract constrains that every ele-
ment in the ATM Status type is an element in one of its extensions WaitingCard,
WaitingPin, WaitingMoney, WaitingReceiveCashAndCard, WaitingReceiveCard,
and Update (Line 5) for six ATM statuses: waiting for entering card, waiting for
typing PIN, waiting for selecting the amount of money, waiting for receiving card
and money, waiting for just receiving card, and update if the ATM system prop-
erty is achieved, then the balance will be updated. Thus, the abstract may be
expressed equivalently as formula below:
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∀ o : Atom | (o ∈ ATM Status) = > (o ∈ WaitingCard) ∨ (o ∈ WaitingP in) ∨
in(o,WaitingMoney) (o ∈ WaitingReceiveCashAndCard)
∨ (o ∈ WaitingReceiveCard) ∨ (o ∈ Update)
Extension types EnterCard, TypePin, RequistCash, ReceiveCashAndCard, Re-
ceiveCard, WaitingCard, WaitingPin, WaitingMoney, WaitingReceiveCashAnd-
Card, WaitingReceiveCard, and Update are represented as singletons using the key-
word one which means there are no more than two Operations or two ATM Status
occur together, otherwise the model will be inconsistent. Singleton sets can be
and are often used in Alloy specifications as aliases of their unique element. The
extensions may be expressed equivalently as seen below:
(EnterCard ⊆ Operations), (TypeP in ⊆ Operations),
(RequistCash ⊆ Operations), (ReceiveCashAndCard ⊆ Operations),
(ReceiveCard ⊆ Operations), (WaitingCard ⊆ ATM Status),
(WaitingP in ⊆ ATM Status), (WaitingMoney ⊆ ATM Status),
(WaitingReceiveCashAndCard ⊆ ATM Status),
(WaitingReceiveCard ⊆ ATM Status), (Update ⊆ ATM Status)
The top-level type ATM shows the relation declarations between all defined
types and subtypes (Lines from 1 to 7). These relations will be described in detail
in the next section.
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• Relation Declarations, and Multiplicities
In our model as seen in Appendix (A.2), relations are declared as the
following signature fields.
– The field cards represents all the Cards associated with the ATM, and
declares a binary relation of type ATM ->Card which maps each ele-
ment of ATM to a set of elements of Card.
The binary relation cards ⊆ ATM × Card. Lines (7 in Appendix A.1,
and 1 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation cards with domain ATM
and range Card. The declaration of cards contains the multiplicity
annotation set which makes cards a function: a binary relation that
associates every ATM with a set of Card. For every element atm in
ATM, the keyword set before Card constrains the term atm.cards to
be a set. The declaration of
cards in ATM −>set Cards
can thus be expressed as:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.cards ⊆ (Cards)
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula as:
all atm : ATM | set atm.cards
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The multiplicity keyword set makes the declaration hold when the re-
lation cards is a function from ATM to Card.
– The field inCard represents the inserted cards in the ATM, and declares
a binary relation of type ATM ->Card which maps each element of
ATM to lone element of ATM.cards.
The binary relation inCard ⊆ ATM× Cards. Lines (7 in Appendix A.1,
and 2 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation inCard with domain ATM
and range Card. The declaration of inCard contains the multiplicity
annotation lone which makes inCard a partial function: a binary rela-
tion that associates every ATM with at most one ATM.cards. For every
element atm in ATM, the keyword lone before atm.cards constrains the
term atm.inCard to be lone. The declaration
inCard in ATM −>lone cards
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.inCard ⊆ (atm.cards)
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula:
all atm : ATM | lone atm.inCard
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the
relation inCard is a partial function from ATM to atm.cards. When a
field of the same signature appears in another field’s declaration, it is
interpreted in the context of that signature. Field cards of the same
signature ATM appears in another field’s declaration inCard. Field
inCard is added to capture that lone atm.cards might be inCard. This
declaration makes every element atm in ATM, atm.inCard subset of at
most one atm.cards.
– The field pin represents the pin numbers for the cards, and declares
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a ternary relation of type ATM ->Card ->Int which maps each ele-
ment of ATM to an element in atm.cards ; each element in atm.cards
to one integer Int ; each Int to an element in atm.cards ; each element
in atm.cards to an element in ATM.
The ternary relation pin ⊆ ATM × Cards × Int. Lines (7 in Ap-
pendix A.1, and 3 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation pin with domain
atm.cards.(atm.pin) and range Int. The declaration of pin contains the
multiplicity annotation one which makes pin a total function: a ternary
relation that associates every every atm : ATM, and every c : Card in-
cluded in atm.cards, the pair (atm, c) must be mapped to one integer.
For every element atm in ATM and for every element c in Card, the
keyword one before Int constrains the term atm.cards.(atm.pin) to be
one. The declaration of
pin in ATM −> cards−> int
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.pin ⊆ atm.cards &&
∀ atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards, pn : int|atm2.(atm.pin) ⊆ (one atm.pn)
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula:
all atm : ATM | atm.pin && all atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards|one atm2.(atm.pin)
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation pin is a total function from atm.cards.(atm.pin) to Int. Field
pin is added to capture that one atm cards has one pin which is exactly
one Int. This declaration makes every element atm in ATM, atm.pin
a subset of atm.cards because field cards of the same signature ATM
appears in another field’s declaration pin.
– The field balance represents the balance value for the cards, and de-
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clares a ternary relation of type ATM ->Card ->Int which maps each
element of ATM to an element in atm.cards ; each element in atm.cards
to one integer Int ; each Int to an element in atm.cards ; each element
in atm.cards to an element in ATM.
The ternary relation balance ⊆ ATM × Cards × Int. Lines (7 in Ap-
pendix A.1, and 4 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation balance with
domain atm.cards.(atm.balance) and range Int. The declaration of bal-
ance contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes balance a
total function: a ternary relation that associates every every atm :
ATM, and every c : Card included in atm.cards, the pair (atm, c) must
be mapped to one integer. For every element atm in ATM and for ev-
ery element c in Card, the keyword one before Int constrains the term
atm.cards.(atm.balance) to be one. The declaration of
balance in ATM −> cards−> int
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.balance ⊆ atm.cards &&
∀ atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards, m : int|atm2.(atm.balance) ⊆ (one atm.m)
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula:
all atm : ATM | atm.balance && all atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards|
one atm2.(atm.balance)
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation balance is a total function from atm.cards.(atm.balance) to Int.
Field balance is added to capture that one atm cards has one balance
which is exactly one Int. This declaration makes every element atm
in ATM, atm.balance a subset of atm.cards because field cards of the
same signature ATM appears in another field’s declaration balance.
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– The field money represents the money value that is required to be
withdrawn, and declares a ternary relation of type ATM ->Card ->Int
which maps each element of ATM to an element in atm.cards ; each
element in atm.cards to lone integer Int ; each Int to an element in
atm.cards ; each element in atm.cards to an element in ATM.
The ternary relation money ⊆ ATM × Cards × Int. Lines (7 in Ap-
pendix A.1, and 5 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation money with
domain atm.cards.(atm.money) and range Int. The declaration of bal-
ance contains the multiplicity annotation lone which makes balance a
partial function: a ternary relation that associates every every atm :
ATM, and every c : Card included in atm.cards, the pair (atm, c) must
be mapped to lone (at most one) integer. For every element atm in
ATM and for every element c in Card, the keyword lone before Int
constraints the term atm.cards.(atm.money) to be lone. The declara-
tion of
money in ATM −> cards−> int
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.money ⊆ atm.cards &&
∀ atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards, m : int|atm2.(atm.money) ⊆ (lone atm.m)
We can express the multiplicity constrains using formula:
all atm : ATM | atm.money && all atm : ATM, atm2 : atm.cards|
lone atm2.(atm.money)
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the
relation money is a partial function from atm.cards.(atm.money) to Int.
Field money is added to capture that lone atm cards has lone balance
which is at most one Int. This declaration makes every element atm in
ATM, atm.money a subset of atm.cards because field cards of the same
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signature ATM appears in another field’s declaration money.
– The field atmStatuse represents all the statuses in the ATM, and de-
clares a binary relation of type ATM ->ATM Status which maps each
element of ATM to one element of ATM Status.
The binary relation atmStatuse ⊆ ATM × ATM Status. Lines (7 in
Appendix A.1, and 6 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation atmStatuse
with domain ATM and range ATM Status. The declaration of atmSta-
tuse contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes atmStatuse
a total function: a binary relation that associates every ATM with ex-
actly one of ATM Status. For every element atm in ATM, the keyword
one before ATM Status constrains the term atm.atmStatuse to be one.
The declaration of
atmStatuse in ATM −> ATM Status
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.atmStatuse ⊆ (one ATM Status)
We can express the multiplicity constrains using formula:
all atm : ATM | one atm.atmStatuse
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation atmStatuse a total function from ATM to ATM Status.
– The field op represents all the operations that take place in the ATM by
the customer, and declares a binary relation of type ATM ->Operations
which maps each element of ATM to lone element of ATM Status.
The binary relation op ⊆ ATM × Operations. Lines (7 in Appendix
A.1, and 7 in Appendix A.2) declare a relation op with domain ATM
and range Operations. The declaration of op contains the multiplicity
annotation lone which makes op a partial function: a binary relation
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that associates every ATM with at most one of ATM Status. For every
element atm in ATM, the keyword lone before Operations constrains
the term atm.op to be lone. The declaration of
op in ATM −> Operations
can thus be expressed by:
∀ atm : ATM | atm.op ⊆ (lone Operations)
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula:
all atm : ATM | lone atm.op
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the
relation op is a partial function from ATM to Operations.
Figure 3.3 shows the corresponding structure of the Alloy ATM system specifi-
cation. It shows that all ATM statuses extends ATM Status, and all operations
extends Operations. Also, it illustrates the relations between entities and the
multiplicities that restrict each relation. As seen, the relation between ATM and
Operations is zero to one. The relation between Cards and ATM is zero to many.
The relation between cards in ATM and pin, balance is one to one. The relation
between cards in ATM and money is zero to one. The relation between cards in
ATM and atm status is one to one. The relation between inserted Card and cards
in ATM is zero to one.
In addition to the above implicit constraints, the specification introduces two
explicit general constraints (properties) as facts written as logical formulas.
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Figure 3.3: Structure Class Diagram of The Alloy ATM System Specification
• Fact
As seen in Appendix (A.3), the facts (Lines 1 and 2) represent constraints that
are written as logical formulas and are assumed to hold. The first fact constrains
that all ATM cards with its corresponding PIN should be identified in any ATM
machine (atm1 and atm2) (Line 1). The second fact constrains that the balance
and PIN of cards that interact with the ATM should not be less than zero (positive)
(Line 2). Thus, the first and the second facts should hold, i.e always true.
• Predicates
In Alloy, operations are specified using predicates. A predicate is a logical
formula with declaration parameters. A predicate describes a set of statuses and
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transitions, by using constraints among signatures and their fields. Behavioural
properties of the protocol can be expressed in terms of logical predicates which
can be checked by the Alloy Analyser. In this formal specification, consistency of
different statuses of protocol can be checked and generate instances for a given
specification that satisfy this predicate with its restrictions on each status.
In our model as seen in Appendix (A.4), predicate ATMTransaction controls six
statuses atm1, atm2, atm3, atm4, atm5, and atm6, crd for Card, pn,mon for Int
(Line 1). First of all, we need to illustrate the main point which is, each atmStatuse
expresses the previous status that takes place before the next operation takes
place. Every atmStatus is constrained to be one. Furthermore, Every Operations
constrained to be lone.
The first status (atm1), represents the status to be WaitingCard for the first
operation (Line 2). This status also defines a Card element (crd) to be subset of
the set of cards that belonged to ATM (Line 3). Moreover, in the first status,
there is no card in use (entered), no operation, and no withdrawing money take
place yet (Line 4).
The second status (atm2), is responsible for inserting a card. The first operation
that takes place is EnterCard (Line 5). In this status the inserted card is equal to
the already defined Card element (crd) which is a subset of the set of cards that
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belonged to ATM (Line 6). The ATM is now in the WaitingPin status for the
next operation and no withdrawing money takes place yet (Line 8). The balance
has not been changed yet (Line 7).
The third status (atm3), is responsible for typing the pin for the inserted card
inCard. The operation that takes place is TypePin (Line 9). In this status the
inserted card in the current status should be equal to the inserted card in the
previous status (Line 10) and typing the PIN for the inserted card is integer
(pn)(Line 11). The ATM is now in the WaitingMoney status for the next operation
and no withdrawing money takes place yet (Line 13). The balance has not been
changed yet (Line 12).
The fourth status (atm4), is responsible for requiring money for the inserted
card. The operation that takes place is RequistCash (Line 14). In this status the
inserted card in the current status should be equal to the inserted card in the
previous status and there is withdrawing money (mon) as integer takes place in
this status (Line 16). The balance has not been changed yet (Line 15). However,
this status shows the procedure of requesting money, which passes to one of two
processes.
In the first process, if the money is greater than the balance of the inserted card
inCard or the money is less than zero (Line 18), then the balance has not been
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changed and remains the same (Line 19), allowing progression to the operation
ReceiveCard in the next status (atm5), and the ATM is now in the WaitingRe-
ceiveCard status (Line 20).
However, in the second process, if the money is less than or equal to the balance
of the inserted card inCard and the money is greater than zero (Line 22), then the
balance has been changed and decreased by the requested amount of money (mon)
to withdraw (Line 23), allowing to the operation ReceiveCashAndCard in the next
status (atm5) (Line 24) and the ATM is now in the WaitingReceiveCashAndCard
status (Line 25).
The fifth status (atm5), is responsible for updating for the new ATM procedure.
The operation that takes place is either ReceiveCard (Line 20) if the first process
occurred, or ReceiveCashAndCard (Line 24) if the other (second) process occurred.
It took place after the fourth status, with either WaitingReceiveCashAndCard or
WaitingReceiveCard. The ATM is now in the Update status applied the current
operation (Line 26).
The sixth (last) status (atm6), is responsible for waiting for the new ATM
procedure. There is no card in use (entered) and no operation takes place. The
status returns to the first status, WaitingCard preparing for the first operation
(Line 27). The last status is same as the first one.
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• Assertion
In our model as seen in Appendix (A.5), assertions are the intended properties
and are used to check specifications. As seen in the assertion , if ATMTransaction
holds for ATM atm1,atm2,atm3,atm4,atm5,atm6, Card crd, Int pn,mon (Line 1),
and the required amount of money is less than or equal to the main balance in
the first status (atm1) for the inserted card (crd) and the money is greater than
zero (Line 2), that implies that the main balance in the first status is updated and
changed in the fifth status and decreased by the required money (Line 3).
3.8 Results
In this section, we present the results we achieved from modelling, analysing,
and checking the three properties of the ATM system using Alloy Analyser, and
bounded SAT solver. The first property is all ATM cards with corresponding
PINs should be identified in any ATM machine. The second property is the
balance and PIN of cards that interact with the ATM should not be less than zero
(positive). The third property is the required amount of money should be less
than or equal to the available balance, and greater than zero for the used card.
In Appendix (A), part (A.6), we used two commands: check (Line 1) and
run (Line 2). check checks the satisfiability of the model, while run checks the
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consistency of the model.
Before checking the satisfiability of the model, we need first to check its con-
sistency. If the model is inconsistent, the analyser cannot work efficiently for
detecting a counterexample.
The version of Alloy Analyser (4.1.10) that we have used works with many state-
of-the-art solvers such as BirkMin [65], MiniSat [55], ZChaff [115], and SAT4J
which is the only SAT solver we tried. The run command runs the SAT4J solver.
The command asks the analyser to search for instances to visualize them. These
instances assign sets and relations with their sizes is limited to be 1 atom for each
signature except ATM 6 atoms. The visualised instances for the ATM model are
acceptable. They correspond to the declarations of the fields and signatures and
satisfies the predicate and the Alloy model together which means the model is
consistent.
The check command searches for a counterexample showing an execution path
that caused an error if one exists. The command looks for an instance that violates
the assertion. This analysis is implemented with respect to the bounded scope of
1 atom for each signature except ATM 6 atoms. Only a finite number of elements
for each type is taken into account. Therefore, the absence of an instance does
not include checking satisfiability.
The Alloy Analyser spent 0.233s to find a counterexample in the limited scope.
That means the assertion prop1 in ATM model does not hold because the third
property (the required amount of money should be less than or equal to the avail-
able balance, and greater than zero for the used card) has not been restricted. The
detected counterexample is provided to the user by interpreting the SAT valuation
as a solution to the original problem, as seen in Figure 3.4.
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In Figure 3.4, (1) and (2), the fourth status show two counterexamples explained
as a visualization. They conflict with the assumption of the third property (the
required amount of money should be less than or equal to the available balance,
and greater than zero for the used card).
The first counterexample in (1) shows that: in the fourth status when the card
is in the ATM machine and the ATM operation is RequestCash, we see that the
requested amount of money is "6" while the available balance is "4". We noticed
that the requested amount of money is greater than the available balance. So,
we assumed that the ATM status is WaitingReceiveCard. However, we did not
see what we assumed. We saw that an error took place and the ATM status is
WaitingReceiveCashAndCard which means the ATM provides the required amount
of money even it is greater than the available balance. Consequently, the visualised
instance reflects the assumption and as a result the security is broken.
The second counterexample (2) shows that: in the fourth status when the card
is in the ATM machine and the ATM operation is RequistCash, we see that the
requested amount of money is "1" while the available balance is "2". We noticed
that the requested amount of money is less than the available balance. So, we
assumed that the ATM status is WaitingReceiveCashAndCard. However, we did
not see what we assumed. We saw that an error took place and the ATM status
is WaitingReceiveCard which means ATM does not provide the required amount
of money even it is less than the available balance. Consequently, the visualised
instance reflects the assumption and as a result the availability is broken.
So, based on Figure 3.4 the counterexamples mean the third property did not
hold. Therefore, we need to restrict the assertion to achieve the third property.
The restriction allows the ATM to provide the amount of money if the amount of
money is less than or equal to the balance and the amount of money is greater
than "0" as seen in Appendix (A) part (A.5) line (2). Otherwise, no amount of
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money is provided and the card is rejected.
After adding the third property this analysis is implemented with respect to a
bounded scope of 1 atom for each signature except ATM 6 atoms. Alloy Anal-
yser spent 0.187s checking the three properties to generate counterexamples with
respect the finite scope.
The results is that no counterexample is found and it is acceptable. That means,
the model has satisfied the assertion. The model allows us to visualise the model
states with the status changes as seen in Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 indicated by $ before
the variables name in the predicate. The figures conclude that the properties that
have been analysed hold in the model within the provided scopes and also when
the scope is increased.
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Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 achieved and illustrate the ATM properties. They show
numbers (1 ,2, 3, 4, 5, 6) which mean sequential statuses. Each number indicates
the ATM status which includes its status and operation. The status number is
shown to the right of each diagram. Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 show the ATM properties
when the required amount of money is equal to balance, less than the balance,
and greater than the balance respectively. They share the first status (1), second
status (2), third status (3), and sixth status (6). However they differ in the fourth
status (4), and fifth status (5).
In the first status (1) the ATM status is WaitingCard and there is no operation
yet. We see that there is no card in ATM yet, the balance is "2" in Figure 3.5 but
"4" in Figures 3.6, 3.7. We restrict the PIN number to be always true to hold the
second property.
The next status is (2). In this status we see that the operation is EnterCard
and the card is in the ATM (means the transaction is going on). The ATM status
is WaitingPin. The balance and PIN number remain the same.
The next status is (3). In this status we see that the operation is TypePin and
the card is in the ATM. The ATM status is WaitingMoney. The balance and PIN
number remain the same.
The next status is (4). In this status we see that the operation is RequestCash
and the card is in the ATM. In Figure 3.5, the ATM status is WaitingReceive-
CashAndCard. We see the required amount of money equals the balance "2"2. In
Figure 3.6, the ATM status is WaitingReceiveCashAndCard. We see the required
amount of money "3" is less than the balance "4". In Figure 3.7, the ATM status
is WaitingReceiveCard. We see the required amount of money "7" is greater than
the balance 4. The balance and PIN number remain the same.
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The next status is (5). In this status we see that the operation is Receive-
CashAndCard in Figures 3.5, 3.6, while the operation is ReceiveCard in Figure 3.7
and the card is in the ATM. The ATM status is Update. We see the balance is
updated, changed and decreased by the required amount of money to become "0"
in Figure 3.5 and "1" in Figure 3.6, but it remains the same in Figure 3.7. The
PIN number remains the same.
The last status is (6). In this status we see that there is no operation and the
card is out the ATM. The ATM status is WaitingCard : back to first status waiting
for a new customer.
We will discuss these results at the end of the next chapter, after looking at the
foundation of Z3.
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Foundations: Z3 SMT Solver
This chapter provides detailed information and the foundation of the framework
of the Z3 SMT solver, again using an ATM system as an example. Because the
Alloy Analyser cannot prove the validity of an assertion [64], we need to use
the Z3 SMT solver’s unbounded verification to prove the properties correct with
confidence.
Prove the properties correct using Z3 required following as same stages that
have been used in Alloy, except for using scopes as Z3 is unbounded. These stages
are: determining the properties to be achieved in the system; determining the
main entities that interact in the system; determining and constraining how the
entities are related to each other; predicate how a system will behave and describe
how the state changes; restrict facts that hold for the properties of the system;
and build a formula as an assertion to check the specification of the model.
Z3 has no syntax for defining signatures, build relations, or multiplicity keywords
the same as Alloy. Z3 uses the SMT2 language which is a standard constraints
language.
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4.1 SMT Solver
SMT stands for "SAT Modulo Theories". SAT is "Boolean satisfiability". SAT
is based on Boolean formulas: Boolean variables combined with AND (∧), OR
(∨) and NOT (¬). SMT is a popular extension to SAT. With the extension,
the SMT solver adds theories to the basic logic SAT. This makes encoding many
problems much easier with SMT than with just SAT, and it can use high-level
knowledge about the constraints to implement particular theories more efficiently.
The language of SMT solvers is first-order which is undecidable and implies that
the unbounded Z3 SMT solver is undecidable [1].
4.1.1 Z3
Z3 is a novel and efficient SMT Solver available free from Microsoft Research.
Z3 is a low level tool. It can be utilized for verifying logical formulas’ satisfiability
with quantifiers. The main goal for Z3 is to check the satisfiability of a provided
formula i.e, is there a model for the negation of the provided formula or not. It
proves the correctness of the negation of the formula of the property [40].
SMT benchmark consists of sorts and functions declarations, and a set of SMT
formulas which are the assertions given by the user [63]. The commands that are
used in Z3 are declare-const which declares a constant of a given types; declare-
fun which declares a function; assert which adds a formula into the Z3 internal
stack; and check-sat which asks the Z3 SMT solver to check if the negation of the
conjunction of the provided assertions is satisfiable or not.
The Z3 SMT solver returns one of three types of results: UNSAT, SAT, and
UNKNOWN [63]. If the command outputs UNSAT, the negation of the property
has been proven correct and the set of formulas in the Z3 stack is satisfiable which
means there is an interpretation (for the user declared constants and functions)
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that makes all asserted formulas true [63]. If the command outputs SAT, a valid
counterexample has been found and get-model can be used to retrieve an inter-
pretation that makes all formulas on the Z3 internal stack true. If the command
outputs unknown, the property may or may not be valid so here Z3 does not
guarantee a complete analysis [63].
The formulas in the Z3 SMT solver are formulated in typed first-order logic with
equality and type system the same as in Alloy. It has no explicit sub-typing like
Alloy. The satisfiability of the formulas in the Z3 SMT solver is considered with
respect to a set of logical background theories, which commonly constrain the in-
terpretation of symbols utilized in the formula [114]. Moreover, to create sorts like
Bool, Int, and Real, the language enables the declaration of novel uninterpreted
sorts and functions [138].
The Alloy language is undecidable because it uses first-order logic and first-
order logic is undecidable. Thus it is necessary to do some adaptations. In order
to make it decidable, Alloy utilizes the first-order logic with a finite scope n. This
finite scope allows a satisfying instance in limited scope with no more than n
atoms of each type. Limiting scope size when creating a model is essential to
avoid exponential explosion. However, because the analysis is restricted in scope,
there is no guarantee that a counterexample would not be found with a larger
scope. While the decidability for a finite scope is achieved, the complete analysis
is lost [135]. In this case, using Z3 SMT allows quantifiers over free sorts, and
thus is undecidable. However, Z3 does not guarantee a complete analysis: it may
output a counterexample preceded by the keyword unknown, which implies the
property may or may not be valid, or time out.
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4.1.2 The SMT Language
We translate the specification of the ATM from Alloy into Z3 FOL such that
if there is a counterexample in Alloy in finite scope, there is supposed to be a
counterexample in Z3 in infinite scopes and vice versa. The formulas that we
are going to generate utilize the quantified theories of free sorts, linear integer
arithmetic, and uninterpreted functions and constant.
4.1.2.1 Declarations
The logic implicit in SMT enables two kinds of declaration: to declare new sorts
(types) utilizing the declare-sort command, and to declare functions using declare-
fun. Functions are considered as the basic building blocks of SMT formulas.
The expression (declare-sort X 0) declares a novel simple uninterpreted top-level
sort named X. The expression
(declare− fun f (X1 X2) X3)
declares the novel uninterpreted total function
F : X1 × X2 −> X3
The command
(declare− fun f (X1, ...., Xn−1) Xn)
declares
f : X1 × . . . ×Xn−1 −> Xn
All functions are total and so they are defined for all elements of their domain.
Constants are functions but without arguments, i.e. a constant v of type X is
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declared as
(declare− fun v () X)
4.1.2.2 Assertions and Quantifiers
The command (assert f) is used to assert a formula f in the logical context.
Basic formulas are function applications and easy to be combined utilizing the
boolean operators such as and, or, not, and =>(implies).
Universal quantifiers are indicated by
(forall (a1 A1) . . . (an An) f)
while existential quantifiers are indicated by
(exists (a1 A1) . . . (an An) f)
4.2 An Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Ex-
ample in Z3
In this section, we translate the specification of the ATM from Alloy into a
satisfiability-equivalent SMT problem using Z3 SMT logic (FOL). This would be
solved by an SMT solver such that if there is a counterexample in Alloy in finite
scopes, it supposed to be a counterexample in Z3 in infinite scopes and vice versa.
Our translation is manual. We choose this method as it is easy and we can trust
it as correct [63, 62] proved this methodology in general and we simplified it to be
easier to learn and use.
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4.2.1 Type and Subtype Declarations
In Appendix (B) we give full details of the Z3 models with annotations to show
the equivalent Alloy.
As seen in Appendix (B), the hierarchical type system is translated implic-
itly. However, because the SMT language does not support subtypes, we use
uninterpreted membership functions to enforce type hierarchy declarations. Con-
sequently, top-level types are translated to the uninterpreted sorts, while the top-
level (super-type) of a type is translated to uninterpreted membership function
isType to indicate which elements of the super-type belongs to the type. It is not
necessarily to declare the membership functions of top-level types, but we declared
them to determine the semantic of the subtype.
As seen in Appendix (B.1), top-level types: Operations ; ATM Status ; Card ; and
ATM are declared as uninterpreted sorts (Lines from 1 to 4). The membership
functions in Appendix (B.2): isEnterCard ; isTypePin; isRequistCash; isReceive-
CashAndCard ; isReceiveCard ; isWaitingCard ; isWaitingPin; isWaitingMoney ;
isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ; isWaitingReceiveCard ; and isUpdate (Lines from
8 to 18) are declared to specify the semantics of subtypes: EnterCard ; Type-
Pin; RequistCash; ReceiveCashAndCard ; ReceiveCard ; WaitingCard ; WaitingPin;
WaitingMoney ; WaitingReceiveCashAndCard ; WaitingReceiveCard ; and Update.
i.e all membership functions are disjoint subsets of the declared sort Operations
(Lines from 8 to 12), and all membership functions are disjoint subsets of the
declared sort ATM Status (Lines from 13 to 18).
4.2.2 Properties Of The Sub-signatures
As seen in Appendix (B.5), we adjust the return types of the “oneOf ” function-
s/constants by specifying each return value to be of type Operation (Lines 1-5) and
ATM Status (Lines 6-11). For example: Line (1) calls function oneOf EnterCard
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in Line (2) in Appendix (B.3) to return one Operation type isEnterCard in Line
(8) Appendix (B.2) which already specified as a return type in Line (1) Appendix
(B.5).
Sub-signatures (Lines from 2 to 6) Appendix (B.3) declare functions of the
property some for each sub signatures EnterCard, TypePin, RequistCash, Receive-
CashAndCard, and ReceiveCard of the super signature Operations because Oper-
ations has at least one element of the sub signatures. The functions restrict the
super signature to have at least one element in each operation. Sub-signatures
(Lines 8-13) Appendix (B.3) declare functions of the property some for each sub
signatures WaitingCard, WaitingPin, WaitingMoney, WaitingReceiveCashAnd-
Card, WaitingReceiveCard, and Update of the super signature ATM Status be-
cause ATM Status has exactly one element of the sub signatures. The functions
restrict that the super signature ATM Status and Operations have at least one
element in each ATM Status. In (Lines from 2 to 6) and (Lines from 9 to 14)
Appendix (B.6) we need to assert the lone property of the previous sub signatures
because Operations and ATM Status have at most one element of the sub signa-
tures. The assertion (Lines from 2 to 6) and (Lines from 9 to 14) Appendix (B.6)
is expressed in the formulas AA and BB below respectively :
Formula AA:
∀ o1, o2: operation.(o1 ∈ isEnterCard ∧ o2 ∈ isEnterCard) =>o1 = o2
∀ o1, o2: operation.(o1 ∈ isTypePin ∧ o2 ∈ isTypePin) =>o1 = o2
∀ o1, o2: operation.(o1 ∈ isRequistCash ∧ o2 ∈ isRequistCash) =>o1 = o2
∀ o1, o2: operation.(o1 ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∧ o2 ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard)
=>o1 = o2
∀ o1, o2: operation.(o1 ∈ isReceiveCard ∧ o2 ∈ isReceiveCard) =>o1 = o2
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The formula AA specifies constraints that for each operation, there is at most
only one corresponding operation: if there exist two operations belonging to isEn-
terCard for example, then these two operations should be equal. i.e we restrict
the characteristics of the multiplicity lone operation of type isEnterCard for each
status to avoid the inconsistency.
Formula BB:
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isWaitingCard ∧ a2 ∈ isWaitingCard) =>a1 = a2
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isWaitingPin ∧ a2 ∈ isWaitingPin) =>a1 = a2
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isWaitingMoney ∧ a2 ∈ isWaitingMoney) =>a1 = a2
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∧ a2 ∈)
isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard =>a1 = a2
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧ a2 ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard)
=>a1 = a2
∀ a1, a2: ATM Status.(a1 ∈ isUpdate ∧ a2 ∈ isUpdate) =>a1 = a2
The formula BB specifies constraints that for each ATM Status, there is at
most only one corresponding ATM Status : if there exist two ATM Statuses be-
longing to isWaitingCard for example, then these two ATM Status should be
equal. i.e we restrict the characteristics of the multiplicity lone ATM Status of
type isWaitingCard for each status to avoid the inconsistency.
4.2.3 Abstraction
As seen in Appendix (B.7), abstract types are the union of their subtypes. Thus
abstract types constrain every element of type to belong to one of its extending
subtypes. Lines (1 and 15) are expressed in the formulas CC and DD below
respectively:
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Formula CC:
∀ o:operation.¬(o ∈ isEnterCard ∧ o ∈ isTypePin ∧
o ∈ isRequistCash ∧ o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∧
o ∈ isReceiveCard) ∧
¬(o ∈ isTypePin ∧ o ∈ isRequistCash ∧
o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∧ o ∈ isReceiveCard ∧
o ∈ isReceiveCard) ∧
¬(o ∈ isRequistCash ∧ o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∧
o ∈ isReceiveCard ∧ o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard)
The formula CC specifies constraints that for each operation there is only
one corresponding operation, and this operation is either isEnterCard ; isTypePin;
isRequistCash; isReceiveCashAndCard ; or isReceiveCard to avoid inconsistency.
No two operations occur at any one time.
Formula DD:
∀ a:ATM Status.¬(a ∈ isWaitingCard ∧ a ∈ isWaitingPin ∧
a ∈ isWaitingMoney ∧ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∧
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧ a ∈ isWaitingCard ∧ a ∈ isUpdate) ∧
¬(a ∈ isWaitingPin ∧ a ∈ isWaitingMone ∧
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∧ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧
a ∈ isUpdate) ∧
¬(a ∈ isWaitingMoney ∧ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∧ a ∈ isUpdate) ∧
¬(a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard) ∧
¬(a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∧ a ∈ isUpdate)
The formula DD specifies constraints that for each ATM Status there is only
one corresponding ATM Status, and this is either isWaitingCard ; isWaitingPin;
isWaitingMoney ; isWaitingReceiveCard ; isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ; or isUp-
date to avoid inconsistency. No two ATM Statuses occur at any one time.
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4.2.4 Extension
As seen in Appendix (B.7), the extends types are mutually disjoint. Lines
(4 to 13) and Lines (18 to 32) are expressed in the formulas EE and FF below
respectively :
Formula EE:
∀ o:operation.(o ∈ isEnterCard ∨ o ∈ isTypePin ∨
o ∈ isRequistCash ∨ o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∨
o ∈ isReceiveCard)
∀ o:operation.(o ∈ isTypePin ∨ o ∈ isRequistCash ∨
o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∨ o ∈ isReceiveCard)
∀ o:operation.(o ∈ isRequistCash ∨ o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∨
o ∈ isReceiveCard)
∀ o:operation.(o ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∨ o ∈ isReceiveCard)
The formula EE specifies constraints that for all operation , the operation
(o) does not belong to more than one of isEnterCard ; isTypePin; isRequistCash;
isReceiveCashAndCard ; and isReceiveCard.
Formula FF:
∀ a:ATM Status.(a ∈ isWaitingCard ∨ a ∈ isWaitingPin ∨
a ∈ isWaitingMoney ∨ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∨
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∨ a ∈ isUpdate)
∀ a:ATM Status.(a ∈ isWaitingPin ∨ a ∈ isWaitingMoney ∨
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∨ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∨
a ∈ isUpdate)
∀ a:ATM Status.(a ∈ isWaitingMoney ∨ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∨
a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∨ a ∈ isUpdate)
∀ a:ATM Status.(a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∨ a ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ∨
a ∈ isUpdate)
The formula FF specifies constraints that for all ATM Status, the ATM Status
(a) does not belong to more than one of isWaitingCard ; isWaitingPin; isWaiting-
Money ; isWaitingReceiveCard ; isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ; and isUpdate.
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4.2.5 Facts
Alloy facts are assumed to be true. They represents the first and the second
ATM system property. As seen in Appendix (B.9), Line (1) declares quantifiers
to restrict the first fact. Line (2) declares quantifiers to restrict the second fact.
The first fact in (Line 1) as seen below is expressed in formula GG below:
First fact:
(forall ((atm1 ATM)(atm2 ATM))(and(forall ((c1 Card))(=>
(cards atm2 c1)(cards atm1 c1)))
(forall ((c2 Card))(=>(cards atm1 c2)(cards atm2 c2)))
(forall ((c3 Card)(i Int))(=>(pin atm2 c3 i)(pin atm1 c3 i)))
(forall ((c4 Card)(i1 Int))(=>(pin atm1 c4 i1)(pin atm2 c4 i1)))))
Formula GG:
∀ atm1,atm2:ATM,c1:Card.(atm2,c1) ∈ cards =>(atm1,c1) ∈ cards ∧
∀ c2:Card.(atm1,c2) ∈ cards =>(atm2,c2) ∈ cards ∧
∀ c3:Card, i:Int.(atm2,c3,i) ∈ pin =>(atm1,c3,i) ∈ pin ∧
∀ c4:Card, i1:Int.(atm1,c4,i1) ∈ pin =>(atm2,c4,i1) ∈ pin
The formula GG specifies constraints that: if different atoms of ATM belong
to the same Card, then they have the same pin
The second fact in (Line 2) as seen below is expressed in formula HH below:
The formula HH specifies constraints that: in all atoms in ATM belong to a
card have a balance greater than or equal to 0 and a positive pin number.
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Second fact:
(forall ((atm1 ATM)(card Card))(=>(cards atm1 card)(and
(forall ((i Int))(=>(balance atm1 card i)(>= i 0)))
(forall ((i1 Int))(=>(pin atm1 card i1)(>i1 0)))))))
Formula HH:
∀ atm1:ATM,card:Card.(atm1,card) ∈ cards =>
∀ i:Int.(atm1,card,i) ∈ balance =>(i >= 0) ∧
∀ i1:Int.(atm1,card,i1) ∈ pin =>(i1 >0)
4.2.6 Relations Declaration
Relations are translated to Boolean-valued SMT2 functions, uninterpreted, mem-
bership functions. As seen in Appendix (B.2) these functions are declared over
top-level types because only top-level types are declared as sorts. Because all SMT
functions are total function, relations are specified utilizing three parts: function
name, received sorts, and returned value of Boolean type. The Boolean type in-
cludes two kinds of value, true for the tuples that are involved in the declared
relation, or false for all others that are not involved.
Lines (1-7) Appendix (B.2) declare Boolean-valued SMT2 functions of relations.
These relations are: cards and inCard which are declared as a Boolean-valued func-
tion over top-level types ATM and Card (Lines 1, and 2); pin, balance, and money
which are declared as a Boolean-valued function over top-level types ATM, Card,
and Int (Lines 3,4,and 5); atmStatuse and op which are declared as a Boolean-
valued function over top-level types ATM, ATM Status, and ATM, Operations
respectively (Lines 6, and 7).
Lines (1-6) Appendix (B.8) declare constraint guarantee that each relation is
defined for its specific types considering the multiplicity keywords constraints.
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The first relation cards: set Card is not required to be translated to a formula
to show its constraints as the set keyword constrains and allows any number of
elements. Thus, its defined Boolean-valued function (Line 1) Appendix (B.2) is
equivalent to its meaning.
Line (1) shows the second relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is
expressed in formula II below:
inCard : lone cards
(forall ((this ATM))(and (forall ((c1 Card))(=>(inCard this c1)
(cards this c1)))
(forall ((c3 Card)(c2 Card))(=>(and(inCard this c2)(inCard this c3))
(= c2 c3)))))
Formula II:
∀ atm:ATM,c1:Card.(atm,c1) ∈ inCard =>(atm,c1) ∈ cards ∧
∀ c2,c3:Card.(atm,c2) ∈ inCard ∧ (atm,c3) ∈ inCard =>(c2 = c3)
The formula II specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM and
c1 in Card if the atoms belong to inCard then they also belong to cards as well,
and for all c2 and c3 in Card such that atm and c2 belong to inCard and atm and
c3 belong to inCard then c2 equals c3 because the maximum number of (inCard)
in used is one.
Line (2) shows the third relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is ex-
pressed in formula JJ below:
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pin : cards ->one Int
(forall ((this ATM))(and(forall ((c1 Card)(i Int))(=>(pin this c1 i)(cards this c1)))
(forall ((a1 Card))(=>(cards this a1)(and(exists ((i1 Int))(pin this a1 i1))
(forall ((i3 Int)(i2 Int))(=>(and(pin this a1 i2)(pin this a1 i3))(= i2 i3))))))))
Formula JJ:
∀ atm:ATM, c1:Card,i:Int.(atm,c1,i) ∈ pin =>(atm,c1)∈ cards ∧
∀ a1:Card.(atm, a1) ∈ cards =>∃ i1:Int.(atm,a1,i1) ∈ pin ∧
∀ i2, i3:Int.(atm, a1, i2) ∈ pin ∧ (atm, a1, i3) ∈ pin =>(i2=i3)
The formula JJ specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM, c1
in Card and i in Int such that the atoms belong to the pin then they belong to
cards as well, and for all set of atoms a1 in Card such that the atoms atm and a1
belong to cards then if there exist integer (i1) such that atm, a1, and i1 belong to
pin, and for all i2 and i3 in integer such that atm, a1, and i2 belong to pin and
atm, a1, and i3 belong to pin then i2 equals i3 because the the number of (pin
is exactly one.
Line (3) shows the fourth relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is
expressed in formula KK below:
balance : cards ->one Int
(forall ((this ATM))(and(forall ((c1 Card)(i Int))(=>(balance this c1 i)(cards this c1)))
(forall ((a1 Card))(=>(cards this a1)(and(exists ((i1 Int))(balance this a1 i1))
(forall ((i3 Int)(i2 Int))(=>(and(balance this a1 i2)(pin this a1 i3))
(= i2 i3))))))))
Formula KK:
∀ atm:ATM,c1:Card,i:Int.(atm,c1,i) ∈ balance =>(atm,c1) ∈ cards ∧
∀ a1:Card.(atm, a1) ∈ cards =>∃ i1:Int.(atm,a1,i1) ∈ balance ∧
∀ i2, i3:Int.(atm, a1, i2) ∈ balance ∧ (atm, a1, i3) ∈ balance =>(i2=i3)
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The formula KK specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM, c1
in Card and i in Int such that the atoms belong to the balance then they belong
to cards as well, and for all set of atoms a1 in Card such that the atoms atm and
a1 belong to cards then if there exist integer (i1) such that atm, a1, and i1 belong
to balance, and for all i2 and i3 in integer such that atm, a1, and i2 belong to
balance and atm, a1, and i3 belong to balance then i2 equals i3 because the the
number of balance is exactly one.
Line (4) shows the fifth relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is expressed
in formula LL below:
money : cards ->lone Int
(forall ((atm ATM))(and(forall ((c1 Card)(i Int))(=>(money atm c1 i)(cards atm c1)))
(forall ((a1 Card)(i3 Int)(i2 Int))(=>(and(money atm a1 i2)(money atm a1 i3))
(= i2 i3)))))
Formula LL:
∀ atm:ATM,c1:Card,i:Int.(atm,c1,i) ∈ money =>(atm,c1) ∈ cards ∧
∀ a1:Card, i2, i3:Int.(atm, a1, i2) ∈ money ∧ (atm, a1, i3) ∈ money =>(i2=i3)
The formula LL specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM, c1
in Card and i in Int such that the atoms belong to the money then they belong
to cards as well, and for all set of atoms a1 in Card, i2 and i3 in integer such
that atm, a1, and i2 belong to money and atm, a1, and i3 belong to money then
i2 equals i3 because the the number of money is at most one.
Line (5) shows the sixth relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is ex-
pressed in formula MM below:
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atmStatuse: one ATM Status
(forall ((this ATM))(and(exists ((a1 ATM Status))(atmStatuse this a1))
(forall ((a3 ATM Status)(a2 ATM Status))(=>(and
(atmStatuse this a2)(atmStatuse this a3))(= a2 a3)))))
Formula MM:
∀ atm:ATM ∃ a1:ATM Status.(atm,a1) ∈ atmStatus ∧
∀ a2,a3:ATM Status.(atm, a2) ∈ atmStatus ∧ (atm, a3) ∈ atmStatus
=>(a2=a3)
The formula MM specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM,
if there exists one atom a1 in ATM Status such that, the atoms atm and a1
belong to the atmStatus, and for all a2 and a3 in ATM Status such that atm and
a2 belong to atmStatus and atm and a3 belong to atmStatus then a2 equals a3
because the the number of ATM Status is exactly one.
Line (6) shows the seventh relation below and as seen in Appendix (B.8) is
expressed in formula NN below:
op: lone Operations
(forall ((this ATM)(o2 Operations)(o1 Operations)
(=>(and(op this o1)(op this o2))(= o1 o2)))
Formula NN:
∀ atm:ATM, o1,o2:Operations.(atm,o1)∈ op ∧ (atm,o2)∈ op
=>(o1=o2)
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The formula NN specifies constrains that: for all set of atoms atm in ATM
and o1 and o2 in Operations such that the atoms atm and o1 belong to the op
and atm and o2 belong to op as well then o1 equals o2, because the the maximum
number of Operations used is one.
4.2.7 Predicates
As seen in Appendix (B.10), the translation focuses on “inlining ” of the pred-
icate ATMTransaction. Inlining means without explicit declaration the ATM
passes through 6 statuses. We illustrates each status individually.
Lines (5-8) show the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the first status
is expressed in formula OO below:
(atm1.atmStatuse)= WaitingCard and
crd in atm1.cards and no atm1.inCard and
no atm1.op and no atm1.money and
(forall ((a1 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm1 a1)(isWaitingCard a1)))
(forall ((w ATM Status))(=>(isWaitingCard w)(atmStatuse atm1 w)))
(cards atm1 crd)
(forall ((c2 Card))(not(inCard atm1 c2)))
(forall ((o Operations))(not (op atm1 o)))
(forall ((m Int)(c9 Card))(not(money atm1 c9 m)))
Formula OO:
∀ atm1:ATM,a1:ATM Status.(atm1,a1) ∈ atmStatus =>(a1) ∈ isWaitinCard
∀ atm1:ATM,w:ATM Status.(w) ∈ isWaitinCard =>(atm1,w) ∈ atmStatus ∧
∀ atm1:ATM,crd:Card.(atm1, crd) ∈ cards ∧
∀ atm1:ATM,c2:Card.(atm1,c2) /∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm1:ATM,o:Operations.(atm1,o) /∈ op ∧
∀ atm1:ATM,m:Int,C9:Card.(atm1,C9,m) /∈ money
The formula OO specifies constrains that: for all atoms atm1 in ATM and
a1 in ATM Status such that the atoms atm1 and a1 belong to atmStatus then
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the atom a1 belongs to isWaitinCard. For all atoms atm1 in ATM and w in
ATM Status such that the atom w belongs to isWaitinCard then the atoms atm1
and w belong to atmStatus. For all atoms atm1 in ATM and crd in Card such
that the atoms atm1 and crd belong to cards. For all atoms atm1 in ATM and
c2 in Card such that the atoms atm1 and c2 do not belong to inCard. For all
atoms atm1 in ATM and o in Operations such that the atoms atm1 and o do not
belong to op. For all atoms (atm1) in ATM, m in Int, and C9 in Card such that
the atoms atm1, C9, and m do not belong to money.
Lines (9-13) show the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the second
status is expressed in formula PP below:
atm2.op= EnterCard and atm2.inCard = crd and
atm2.balance = atm1.balance and
(atm2.atmStatuse) = WaitingPin and
no atm2.money and
(forall ((o1 Operations))(=>(op atm2 o1)(isEnterCard o1)))
(forall ((e Operations))(=>(isEnterCard e)(op atm2 e)))
(forall ((c3 Card))(=>(inCard atm2 c3)(= crd c3)))
(inCard atm2 crd)
(forall ((c5 Card)(i1 Int))(=>(balance atm2 c5 i1)(balance atm1 c5 i1)))
(forall ((c6 Card)(i2 Int))(=>(balance atm1 c6 i2)(balance atm2 c6 i2)))
(forall ((a15 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm2 a15)(isWaitingPin a15)))
(forall ((w1 ATM Status))(=>(isWaitingPin w1)(atmStatuse atm2 w1)))
(forall ((m Int)(c9 Card))(not(money atm2 c9 m))))))
Formula PP:
∀ atm2:ATM,o1:Operations.(atm2,o1) ∈ op =>(o1) ∈ isEnterCard ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,e:Operations.(e) ∈ isEnterCard =>(atm2,e) ∈ op ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,c3:Card.(atm2,c3) ∈ inCard =>(crd=c3) ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,crd:Card.(atm2, crd) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm1,atm2:ATM,c5:Card,i1:Int.(atm2,c5,i1) ∈ balance =>(atm1,c5,i1) ∈ balance ∧
∀ atm1,atm2:ATM,c6:Card,i2:Int.(atm1,c6,i2) ∈ balance =>(atm2,c6,i2) ∈ balance ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,a15:ATM Status.(atm2,a15) ∈ atmStatus =>(a15) ∈ isWaitinPin ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,w1:ATM Status.(w1) ∈ isWaitinPin =>(atm2,w1) ∈ atmStatus ∧
∀ atm2:ATM,m:Int,C9:Card.(atm2,C9,m) /∈ money
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The formula PP specifies constraints that: for all atoms atm2 in ATM and o1
in Operations such that the atoms atm2 and o1 belong to op then the atom o1
belongs to isEnterCard. For all atoms atm2 in ATM and e in Operations such
that the atom e belongs to isEnterCard then the atoms atm2 and e belong to op.
For all atoms atm2 in ATM and c3 in Cards such that the atoms atm2 and c3
belong to inCard then crd is in used: crd equals c3. For all atoms atm2 in ATM
and crd in Card such that the atoms atm2 and crd belong to inCard.
For all atoms atm1 and atm2 in ATM, c5 in Card, and i1 in Int such that
the atoms atm2, c5, and i1 belong to balance then the atoms atm1, c5, and i1 in
the first status belong to balance as well. For all atoms atm1 and atm2 in ATM,
c6 in Card, and i2 in Int such that the atoms atm1, c6, and i2 belong to balance
then the atoms atm2, c6, and i2 in the second status belong to balance as well.
For all atoms atm2 in ATM and a15 in ATM Status such that the atoms atm2
and a15 belong to atmStatus then the atoms a15 belongs to isWaitinPin. For all
atoms atm2 in ATM and w in ATM Status such that the atom w1 belongs to
isWaitinPin then the atoms atm2 and w1 belongs to atmStatus.
For all atoms atm2 in ATM, m in Int, C9 in Card such that, the atoms atm2,
C9, and m do not belong to money.
Lines (14-19) show the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the third
status is expressed in formula QQ below:
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atm3.op= TypePin and
atm3.inCard = atm2.inCard and
atm3.inCard.(atm3.pin)=pn and
atm3.balance = atm2.balance and
(atm3.atmStatuse) = WaitingMoney and
no atm3.money and
(forall ((o2 Operations))(=>(op atm3 o2)(isTypePin o2)))
(forall ((t Operations))(=>(isTypePin t)(op atm3 t)))
(forall ((c7 Card))(=>(inCard atm3 c7)(inCard atm2 c7)))
(forall ((c8 Card))(=>(inCard atm2 c8)(inCard atm3 c8)))
(forall ((i3 Int))(=>(exists ((c9 Card))(and(inCard atm3 c9)(pin atm3 c9 i3)))
(= pn i3)))
(exists ((c10 Card))(and (inCard atm3 c10)(pin atm3 c10 pn)))
(forall ((c11 Card)(i5 Int))(=>(balance atm3 c11 i5)(balance atm2 c11 i5)))
(forall ((c12 Card)(i6 Int))(=>(balance atm2 c12 i6)(balance atm3 c12 i6)))
(forall ((a32 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm3 a32)(isWaitingMoney a32)))
(forall ((w2 ATM Status))(=>(isWaitingMoney w2)(atmStatuse atm3 w2)))
(forall ((m Int)(c9 Card))(not(money atm3 c9 m)))
Formula QQ:
∀ atm3:ATM,o2:Operations.(atm3,o2) ∈ op =>(o2) ∈ isTypingPin ∧
∀ atm3:ATM,t:Operations.(t) ∈ isTypingPin =>(atm3,t) ∈ op ∧
∀ atm2,atm3:ATM,c7:Card.(atm3,c7) ∈ inCard =>(atm2, c7) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm2,atm3:ATM,c8:Card.(atm2,c8) ∈ inCard =>(atm3, c8) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm3:ATM,pn,i3:Int ∃c9 : Card.(atm3, c9)∈ inCard ∧
(atm3,c9,i3) ∈ pin =>(pn = i3)
∃ atm3:ATM,c10:Card,pn:Int.(atm3,c10) ∈ inCard ∧ (atm3, c10, pn) ∈ pin ∧
∀ atm2,atm3:ATM,c11:Card,i5:Int.(atm3,c11,i5) ∈ balance =>(atm2,c11,i5) ∈ balance ∧
∀ atm2,atm3:ATM,c12:Card,i6:Int.(atm2,c12,i6) ∈ balance =>(atm3,c12,i6) ∈ balance∧
∀ atm3:ATM,a32:ATM Status.(atm3,a32) ∈ atmStatus =>(a32) ∈ isWaitinMoney ∧
∀ atm3:ATM,w2:ATM Status.(w2) ∈ isWaitinMoney =>(atm3,w2) ∈ atmStatus ∧
∀ atm3:ATM,m:Int,C9:Card.(atm3,C9,m) /∈ money
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The formula QQ specifies constraints that: for all atoms atm3 in ATM and
o2 in Operations such that the atoms o2 and atm3 belong to op then the only
o2 atom belongs to isTypingPin in the third status atm3. For all atoms atm3 in
ATM and t in Operations such that the atom t belongs to isTypingPin then the
atoms atm3 and t belong to op. For all atoms atm2 and atm3 in ATM and c7 in
Card such that, the atoms atm3 and c7 belong to inCard then the atoms atm2
and c7 belong to inCard ; For all atoms atm2 and atm3 in ATM and c8 in Card
such that, the atoms atm2 and c8 belong to inCard then the atoms atm3 and
c8 belong to inCard which means, the used card in the second status is the same
card in third status. For all atoms atm3 in ATM and pn; i1 in Int if there exists
atom c9 in Card such that the existed Card c9 in the third status atm3 belong
to inCard and the atoms atm3, c9, and i3 belong to pin then pn equals i3. So, if
there exists a card c10 in Card, atm3 in ATM, and pn in Int such that atm3 and
c10 belong to inCard and atm3, c10, and pn belong to pin. For all atoms atm2
and atm3 in ATM, c11 in Card, and i5 in Int such that the atoms atm3, c11, and
i5 belong to balance then the atoms atm2, c11, and i5 with same card and same
amount belong to balance as well (the balance still remains the same in the third
status). For all atoms atm2 and atm3 in ATM, c12 in Card, and i6 in Int such
that the atoms atm2, c12, and i6 belong to balance then the atoms atm3, c12,
and i6 belong to balance. For all atoms atm3 in ATM and a32 in ATM Status
such that the atoms atm3 and a32 belong to atmStatus then the only a32 atom
belongs to isWaitinMoney. For all atoms atm3 in ATM and w2 in ATM Status
such that the atom w2 belongs to isWaitinMoney then the atoms atm3 and w2
belong to atmStatus. For all atoms atm3 in ATM, m in Int, and C9 in Card such
that the atoms atm3, C9, and m do not belong to money.
Lines (20-23) show the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the fourth
status is expressed in formula RR below:
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atm4.op = RequistCash and
atm4.balance = atm3.balance and
atm4.inCard = atm3.inCard and
atm4.inCard.(atm4.money)= mon and
(forall ((o3 Operations))(=>(op atm4 o3)(isRequistCash o3)))
(forall ((r Operations))(=>(isRequistCash r)(op atm4 r)))
(forall ((c13 Card)(i7 Int))(=>(balance atm4 c13 i7)(balance atm3 c13 i7)))
(forall ((c14 Card)(i8 Int))(=>(balance atm3 c14 i8)(balance atm4 c14 i8)))
(forall ((c15 Card))(=>(inCard atm4 c15)(inCard atm3 c15)))
(forall ((c16 Card))(=>(inCard atm3 c16)(inCard atm4 c16)))
(forall ((i3 Int))(=>(forall ((c9 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c9)(money atm4 c9 i3)))
(= mon i3)))
(forall ((c10 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c10)(money atm4 c10 mon)))
Formula RR:
∀ atm4:ATM,o3:Operations.(atm4,o3) ∈ op =>(o3) ∈ isRequestCash ∧
∀ atm4:ATM,r:Operations.(r) ∈ isRequestCash =>(atm4,r) ∈ op ∧
∀ atm3,atm4:ATM,c13:Card,i7:Int.(atm4,c13,i7) ∈ balance => ∧
(atm3,c13,i7) ∈ balance ∧
∀ atm3,atm4:ATM,c14:Card,i8:Int.(atm3,c14,i8) ∈ balance => ∧
(atm4,c14,i8) ∈ balance ∧
∀ atm3,atm4:ATM,c15:Card.(atm4,c15) ∈ inCard =>(atm3, c15) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm3,atm4:ATM,c16:Card.(atm3,c16) ∈ inCard =>(atm4, c16) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm4:ATM,mon,i3:Int,c9:Card.(atm4,c9) ∈ inCard ∧ ∧
(atm4,c9,i3) ∈ money =>(mon = i3) ∧
∀ c10:Card.(atm4,c10) ∈ inCard ∧ (atm4,c10,mon) ∈ money
105
Chapter 4: Foundations: Z3 SMT Solver
The formula RR specifics constraints that: for all atoms atm4 in ATM and
o3 in Operations such that the atoms atm4 and o3 belong to op then the only o3
atom belongs to isRequestCash in the fourth status atm4. For all atoms atm4 in
ATM and r in Operations such that the atom r belongs to isRequestCash then
the atoms atm4 and r belong to op. For all atoms atm3 and atm4 in ATM, c13 in
Card, and i7 in Int such that the atoms atm4, c13,and i7 belong to balance then
the atoms atm3, c13, and i7 belong to balance (the balance still remains the same
in the fourth status). For all atoms atm3 and atm4 in ATM, c14 in Card, and
i8 in Int such that the atoms atm3, c14,and i8 belong to balance then the atoms
atm4, c14, and i8 belong to balance. For all atoms atm3 and atm4 in ATM and
c15 in Card such that the atoms atm4 and c15 belong to inCard then the atoms
atm3 and c15 belong to inCard as well which means, the used card in the fourth
status is the same card in third status. For all atoms atm3 and atm4 in ATM
and c16 in Card such that the atoms atm3 and c16 belong to inCard then the
atoms atm4 and c16 belong to inCard as well. For all atoms atm4 in ATM, mon;
i1 in Int, and c9 in Card such that the Card c9 in the fourth status atm4 belong
to inCard and the atoms atm4, c9, and i3 belong to money then mon equals i3.
For all c10:Card, then atm4, and c10 belong to inCard ; and atm4, c10,and mon
belong to money.
Lines (24-27) show the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the fifth
status is expressed in formula SS below:
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atm5.inCard = atm4.inCard and
(( mon <= atm4.inCard.(atm4.balance) and mon >0) and
(atm5.inCard.(atm5.balance) = atm4.inCard.(atm4.balance).minus[mon]
and atm5.op= ReceiveCashAndCard and
(atm4.atmStatuse) = WaitingReceiveCashAndCard )))and
or(((mon >atm4.inCard.(atm4.balance) or mon <0) and
(atm5.inCard.(atm5.balance) = atm4.inCard.(atm4.balance) and
atm5.op= ReceiveCard and (atm4.atmStatuse) = WaitingReceiveCard))
(atm5.atmStatuse) = Update and
(forall ((c17 Card))(=>(inCard atm5 c17)(inCard atm4 c17)))
(forall ((c18 Card))(=>(inCard atm4 c18)(inCard atm5 c18)))
(or (and(forall ((i9 Int))(=>(exists ((c19 Card))(and
(inCard atm4 c19)(balance atm4 c19 i9)))(<= mon i9)))(<0 mon)
(forall ((i10 Int)(i11 Int))(=(and(exists ((c20 Card))
(and(inCard atm5 c20)(balance atm5 c20 i10)))
(exists ((c21 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c21)(balance atm4 c21 i11))))
(= i10 (- i11 mon))))
(forall ((o4 Operations))(=>(op atm5 o4)(isReceiveCashAndCard o4)))
(forall ((r1 Operations))(=>(isReceiveCashAndCard r1) (op atm5 r1)))
(forall ((a57 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm4 a57)(isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a57)))
(forall ((w3 ATM Status))(=>(isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard w3)(atmStatuse atm4 w3)))))
(and(or(forall ((i12 Int))(=>(exists ((c22 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c22)
(balance atm4 c22 i12)))(<i12 mon)))(<mon 0))
(forall ((i13 Int))(=>(exists ((c23 Card))(and(inCard atm5 c23)(balance atm5 c23 i13)))
(exists ((c24 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c24)(balance atm4 c24 i13)))))
(forall ((i14 Int))(=>(exists ((c25 Card))(and(inCard atm4 c25)(balance atm4 c25 i14)))
(exists ((c26 Card))(and(inCard atm5 c26)(balance atm5 c26 i14)))))
(forall ((o5 Operations))(=>(op atm5 o5)(isReceiveCard o5)))
(forall ((r2 Operations))(=>(isReceiveCard r2)(op atm5 r2)))
(forall ((a72 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm4 a72)(isWaitingReceiveCard a72)))
(forall ((w4 ATM Status>isWaitingReceiveCard w4)(atmStatuse atm4 w4)))))
(forall ((a75 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm5 a75)(isUpdate a75)))
(forall ((u ATM Status))(=>(isUpdate u)(atmStatuse atm5 u)))
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Formula SS:
∀ atm5,atm4:ATM,c17:Card.(atm5,c17) ∈ inCard =>(atm4,c17) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm5,atm4:ATM,c18:Card.(atm4,c18) ∈ inCard =>(atm5,c18) ∈ inCard ∧
∀ atm5,atm4:ATM,i9,mon:Int ∃ c19:Card.(atm4,c19) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm4,c19,i9) ∈ balance =>mon <= i9 ∧ mon >0 =>
∀ atm5,atm4:ATM,i10,i11,mon:Int (∃ c20:Card.(atm5,c20) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm5,c20,i10) ∈ balance ∧ ∃ c21:Card.(atm4,c21) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm4,c21,i11) ∈ balance ) = ((i10 = i11 - mon))
∀ atm5:ATM,o4:Operations.(atm5,o4) ∈ op =>(o4) ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard ∧
∀ atm5:ATM,r1:Operations.(r1) ∈ isReceiveCashAndCard =>(atm5,r1) ∈ op ∧
∀ atm4:ATM,a57:ATM Status.(atm4,a57) ∈ atmStatuse =>
(a57) ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard
∀ atm4:ATM,w3:ATM Status.(w3) ∈ isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard =>
(atm4,w3) ∈ atmStatuse ∨))
∀ atm4:ATM,i12,mon:Int ∃ c22:Card.(atm4,c22) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm4,c22,i12) ∈ balance =>mon >= i12 ∨ mon <0 ∧ (
∀ atm4,atm5:ATM,i13:Int (∃ c23:Card.(atm5,c23) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm5,c23,i13) ∈ balance =>∃ c24:Card.(atm4,c24) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm4,c24,i13) ∈ balance) ∧
∀ atm4,atm5:ATM,i14:Int (∃ c25:Card.(atm4,c25) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm4,c25,i14) ∈ balance =>∃ c26:Card.(atm5,c26) ∈ inCard ∧
(atm5,c26,i14) ∈ balance) ∧
∀ atm5:ATM,o5:Operations.(atm5,o5) ∈ op =>(o5) ∈ isReceiveCard ∧
∀ atm5:ATM,r2:Operations.(r2) ∈ isReceiveCard =>(atm5,r3) ∈ op ∧
∀ atm4:ATM,a72:ATM Status.(atm4,a72) ∈ atmStatuse =>
(a72) ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard ∧
∀ atm4:ATM,w4:ATM Status.(w4) ∈ isWaitingReceiveCard =>
(atm4,w4) ∈ atmStatuse ))))
∀ atm5:ATM,a75:ATM Status.(atm5,a75) ∈ atmStatuse =>
(a75) ∈ isUpdate ∧
∀ a54:ATM,u:ATM Status.(u) ∈ isUpdate =>
(atm5,u) ∈ atmStatuse
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The formula SS specifics constraints that: for all atoms atm5 and atm4 in
ATM and c17 in Card such that the atom atm5 and c17 belong to (inCard)
then atoms atm4 and c17 belong to inCard. For all atoms atm5 and atm4 in
ATM and c18 in Card such that the atom atm5 and c18 belong to (inCard) then
atoms atm5 and c18 belong to inCard. For all atoms atm5 and atm4 in ATM,
i9 ; mon in Int if there exists an atom c19 in Card such that the atoms atm5 and
c19 belong to inCard and the atoms atm5, c19, and i9 belong to balance then
mon should be less than or equals to the balance i9 and greater than zero, if this
formula true, then for all atoms atm5 and atm4 in ATM and i10 ; i1 ; mon in Int
if there exists an atom c20 in Card such that the atoms atm5 and c20 belong to
inCard and the atoms atm5, c20, and i10 belong to balance and if there exists
an atom c21 in Card such that the atoms atm4 and c21 belong to inCard and
the atoms atm4, c21, and i11 belong to balance equals to the balance after sub-
tracted by the required amount of mon; and in this case: for all atoms atm5 in
ATM and o4 in Operations such that the atoms atm5 and o4 belong to (op) then
atom o4 belong to isReceiveCashAndCard. For all atoms atm5 in ATM and r in
Operations such that the atom r belongs to (isReceiveCashAndCard) then atoms
atm5 and r1 belong to op. For all atoms atm4 in ATM and a57 in ATM Status
such that the atoms atm4 and a57 belong to (atmStatuse) then atom a57 be-
long to isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard. For all atoms atm4 in ATM and w3 in
ATM Status such that the atoms w3 belongs to (isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard)
then atom atm4 and w3 belong to atmStatuse.
For all atoms atm4 in ATM, i12 ; mon in Int if there exists an atom c22 in
Card such that the atoms atm4 and c22 belong to inCard and the atoms atm4,
c22, and i12 belong to balance then mon should be greater than the balance i12 or
less than zero, if this formula true, then for all atoms atm5 and atm4 in ATM and
i13 in Int if there exists an atom c23 in Card such that the atoms atm5 and c23
belong to inCard and the atoms atm5, c23, and i13 belong to balance then if there
exists an atom c24 in Card such that the atoms atm4 and c24 belong to inCard
and the atoms atm4, c24, and i13 belong to balance and; for all atoms atm4
and atm5 in ATM, i14 in Int if there exists an atom c25 in Card such that the
atoms atm4 and c25 belong to inCard and the atoms atm4, c25, and i14 belong
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to balance then if there exists an atom c26 in Card such that the atoms atm5
and c26 belong to inCard and the atoms atm5, c26, and i14 belong to balance.
For all atoms atm5 in ATM and o in Operations such that the atoms atm5 and
o5 belong to op then the atom o5 belongs to isReceiveCard. For all atoms atm5
in ATM and r2 in Operations such that the atom r2 belongs to isReceiveCard
then the atoms atm5 and r2 belong to op. For all atoms atm4 in ATM, a72 in
ATM Status such that the atoms atm4 and a72 belong to atmStatuse then the
atom a72 belongs to isWaitingReceiveCard. For all atoms atm4 in ATM and w4
in ATM Status such that the atom w4 belongs to isWaitingReceiveCard then the
atoms atm4 and w4 belong to atmStatuse. For all atoms atm5 in ATM and a72
in ATM Status such that the atoms atm5 and a72 belong to atmStatuse then the
atom a75 belongs to isUpdate. For all atoms atm5 in ATM and u in ATM Status
such that the atom u belongs to isUpdate then the atoms atm5 and u belong to
atmStatuse.
Lines (28) for the predicate below and in Appendix (B.10) for the sixth status
is expressed in formula TT below:
no atm6.inCard and (atm6.atmStatuse) = WaitingCard and
no atm6.op no atm6.money
(forall ((c27 Card))(not(inCard atm6 c27)))
(forall ((a79 ATM Status))(=>(atmStatuse atm6 a79)(isWaitingCard a79)))
(forall ((w5 ATM Status))(=>(isWaitingCard w5)(atmStatuse atm6 w5)))
(forall ((o6 Operations))(not(op atm6 o6))))
Formula TT:
∀ atm6:ATM, c27:Card. (atm6,c27) /∈ inCard
∀ atm6:ATM, a79 ATM Status.(atm6,a79) ∈ atmStatuse =>(a79) ∈ isWaitingCard
∀ atm6:ATM, w5 ATM Status.(w5) ∈ isWaitingCard =>(atm6,w5) ∈ atmStatuse
∀ atm6:ATM, o6:Operations.(atm6,o6) /∈ op )
The formula TT specifics constraints that: for all atoms atm6 in ATM and
c27 in Card such that the atoms atm6 and c27 do not belong to inCard. For
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all atoms atm6 in ATM and a79 in ATM Status such that, the atoms atm6 and
a79 belong to atmStatuse then the atom a79 belongs to isWaitingCard. For all
atoms atm6 in ATM and w5 in ATM Status such that, the atom w5 belongs to
isWaitingCard then the atoms atm6 and w5 belong to atmStatuse. For all atoms
atm6 in ATM and o6 in Operations such that, the atoms atm6 and o6 do not
belong to op.
4.2.8 Assertion
Assertions are intended to be checked. As seen in Appendix (B.10), we negate an
assertion so that any instance found by the SMT solver will be a counterexample
to the assertion. If the SMT solver does not find an instances, the assertion is
proven correct.
Line (29) for the ATM system requirement and Lines (4) in Appendix (B.10)
are expressed in formula UU below:
mon <= crd.(atm1.balance) and mon >0 and
ATMTransaction implies
crd.(atm5.balance) = crd.(atm1.balance).minus[mon]
(forall ((i Int))(=>(balance atm1 crd i)(<= mon i)))(<0 mon)
and ATMTransaction =>
(forall ((i15 Int)(i16 Int) )(=>(and(balance atm5 crd i15)
(balance atm1 crd i16))
(= i15 (- i16 mon))))
Formula UU:
∀ atm1,atm2,atm3,atm4,atm5,atm6:ATM,pn,mon:Int,crd:Card
∀ i:Int.(atm1,crd,i) ∈ balance =>(mon <=i) ∧
(mon >0) ∧ ( ATMTransaction =>
∀ atm1,atm5:ATM,crd:Card, i15,i16,mon:Int.(atm5,crd,i15) ∈ balance
∧ (atm1,crd,i16) ∈ balance =>i15= (i16 - mon))
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The formula UU specifies constraints that: for all atoms atm1, atm2, atm3,
atm4, atm5, and atm6 in ATM, crd in Card, and atoms pn; mon in Int such
that, the atoms atm1, crd, and i belong to balance then the required mon should
be less than or equal to the balance i and greater than zero to achieve the third
ATM property. Otherwise, SMT solver finds an instance as a counterexample; and
the predicate ATMTransaction then for all atoms (atm1,atm5) in ATM, crd in
Card, and i15 ; i16 ; mon in Int such that the atoms atm5, crd, and i15 belong to
balance and the atoms atm1, crd, i16 belong to balance then the updated balance
i15 equals (the exists balance i16 - required money mon).
4.3 Results
We used the check-sat command as seen in Appendix (C), part (C.11) (Line 1)
to ask the SMT solver to check whether the negation of the conjunction of the
provided assertions is unsatisfiable or not.
In this section, we present the results we achieved from modelling, analysing,
and checking the three properties of ATM system, using the Alloy Analyser, and
bounded SAT solver. The first property is that all ATM cards with correspond-
ing PINs should be identified in any ATM machine. The second property is
that the balance and PIN of cards that interact with the ATM should not be less
than zero (positive). The third property is that the required amount of money
should be less than or equal to the available balance, and greater than zero for
the used card.
The SMT solver spent 0.022s to try to find a model that satisfied the negation
of the set of formula, but it did not find one.
However, omitting the logical formulas as seen in Line (4) Appendix (C.10)
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which represented the third property of the ATM model, the SMT solver provided
the SAT result in 0.039s. By using the get-model command as seen in Appendix
(C.11) (Line 2), the SMT solver could find a model. So that the instance (model)
found by the SMT solver is a counterexample to the assertion.
4.4 Comparison Between SAT and SMT results,
and SAT and SMT Tools
In this section we compare the results we achieved in modelling the ATM system
and checking the satisfiability of their properties using the SAT and SMT solvers.
Also, we compare the SAT and SMT solvers as tools. The goal of Alloy which is
analysing and checking a model is different from the goal of Z3 which is proving the
satisfiability of the model. We compare the following criteria: decidability, time
spent to generate a counterexample, limitation and the accuracy in generating a
counterexample, how is the counterexample look like, the abilities for Alloy and
Z3, and the techniques for both solvers.
• Decidability
To compare the decidability, the Alloy Analyser restricts both operations sim-
ulation (for checking consistency of the model) and checking (for generating a
counterexample) to a finite scope. A scope gives a finite bound on the sizes of
the domains in the specification. Alloy translates its problem into a bounded SAT
problem. A bounded SAT problem is passed to the SAT solver to solve the sat-
isfiability problem. Thus, the SAT solver is decidable. On the other hand, Z3
translates its problem into unbounded SMT problem. Unbounded SMT problem
is passed to the SMT solver. Thus, the SMT solver is undecidable in general.
In addition, Alloy uses an engine as a SAT solver and a SAT solver does not
identify an unbounded problem. Consequently, the Alloy Analyser must translates
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its problem to a propositional logic. It needs therefore scopes to do this translation
as propositional logic is decidable. On the other hand, the Z3 SMT solver takes
input formula as first-order predicate logic and FOL is undecidable. Verification
within a finite scope is decidable, thus we used Alloy for limiting our analysis to
a finite scope in the specification that bounds the sizes of the types as the Alloy
Analyser is decidable. In our ATM example, we could bound the problem to be
small by restricting the scope of search to be 1 atom for all entities except the
ATM to be 6 atoms according to the number of statuses. However, in Z3 we could
not limit the sorts and the search for the counterexamples was infinite.
• Time
The Alloy analysis time is the summation of the time spent on generating CNF,
and in the SAT solver as reported by the Alloy Analyzer 4.1.10 running the SAT4J
solver. In Z3 time is what the SMT solver reports in proving the satisfiability of the
formula. In comparison the time (in second) is measured on an Intel Core2Quad,
2.7GHz, 4GB memory. The SAT solver in the Alloy Analyser spent 0.233s to check
the satisfiability for the properties of ATM system. On the other hand, the Z3
SMT solver spent 0.039s to generate the counterexample to check the satisfiability
for the same properties.
• Limitation and Confidence
In finite scopes, the Alloy analysis is noticeably faster and reduces the size of
the model to accelerate and making more confident finding a counterexample.
For example, in analysing the ATM system, the Alloy Analyser does not find a
counterexample in the first and second property when the scope was 1,2,3, or 4.
However, when we increased the scope we could see a counterexample. In this
case we know that there is a problem as seen in Figure 3.6. However, when the
Alloy Analyser does not find a counterexample in the third property when the
scope was increased and limited to be 1 atom for each signature but 6 atoms for
ATM, we feel more confident about the specification in this limitation.
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To increase our confidence, we increased the number of scopes with the same
result. However, if there is a counterexample in the larger scope, we do not know
what is the maximum number of scopes we need to try. In fact, the Analyser has
been developed especially to do the process quickly in a small scope analysis. In
the study done by [77] the experimental results demonstrates that specification
with a default scope of three can be analysed well in a minute.
In contrast, Z3 SMT is an unbounded solver. When Alloy gives a counterex-
ample within finite scope and Z3 gives a counterexample in infinite scope, there
is no problem in this case and the comparison is equivalent. However, in contrast
when Alloy says there is no counterexample within a finite scope and Z3 says there
is no counterexample in an infinite scope, Alloy may find a counterexample in a
larger scope. That happened when analysing the first and second property when
the scope was from 1 to 4, and the SAT solver says there is no counterexample.
However, the Z3 SMT solver guarantees that there is a counterexample and says
the result is SAT. Consequently, the comparison is not equivalent in this case be-
cause if we did not increase the number of scopes, we may think that the property
is correct. As a result, a mistake will take place. Therefore, the Z3 SMT solver
is stronger in guaranteeing generating counterexample than the the SAT solver
because the Z3 SMT solver proves that the formula is valid in general, while Alloy
does not show that the formula is valid in general.
So, the use of a finite scope makes the analysis decidable but also incomplete.
If an instance satisfying the formula cannot be found within a finite scope, that
does not imply that the model is unsatisfiable. An instance may be found if the
scope is increased. Also, the lack of a counterexample for an assertion does not
imply that the asserted property holds in a larger scope.
Although a SAT solver has an advantage in minimizing the problem by bounding
the number of scopes, we see that the number of variables and the verification time
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in SAT solver have increased with respect to increasing the number of scopes. That
may lead to making the SMT solver faster and detect counterexample earlier.
• Counterexample
To compare the counterexamples, when Alloy Analyser generates a counterex-
ample in analysing the ATM system, it was based on a finite number of domains,
while in Z3 was based on infinite scope. Both Alloy and Z3 provided us with the
result as a model. However, Alloy has an internal representation of a model which
is logical as a mapping between values and variables. Because of the difficulty of
reading the logical internal representation, Alloy gave us the ability to visualize
the mappings between variables and values. As a result it helps us looking at coun-
terexample. On the othe hand, Z3 presents the counterexample as a formula. It
was difficult for us to detect the flows in the Z3 counterexample compared to Alloy
because Alloy presents the detected counterexample using graphic capabilities.
• Abilities
To compare the abilities of Alloy and Z3, Alloy is a model finder and not a
prover. It shows why there is a counterexample. Thus it cannot prove theorems
without additional help such as the Z3 theorem prover. On the other hand, Z3
can prove why there is a counterexample. However, the Alloy model finder is still
useful if the goal does not need to waste time trying to prove a theorem as a model
finder can generate a counterexample for us automatically.
• Quantifiers
In our model both the Alloy Analyser and the SMT solver use quantifiers.
However, the difference between them lies in the analysis not in the language
itself.
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All in Alloy means binding free variables for a specific domain. The specific
domain of bounded scope just in the Analysis not in the language because All is
for all variables in a type and type is bounded. On the other hand, ∀ in Z3 means
the specific domain is not bounded in either the Analysis nor in the language.
Thus, ∀ in Alloy has limited power in analysis and Z3 has absolute power in
analysis. Some in Alloy and ∃ in Z3 are the same in the language and in the
analysis.
So, we conclude that Alloy is better than Z3 in providing the counterexample
in visualization saving time and effort for non experts to understand the problem.
Z3 cannot do that. Z3 is better than Alloy in searching for the counterexample in
general and proving why it is exists, while Alloy searches for the counterexample
in a limited scope and just models the counterexample with no proof as why it is
exist. Searching for a counterexample in a limited scope may lead to missing an
instance that may cause a counterexample in the lager scope.
Z3 is faster than Alloy in providing the results even though it is unbounded
and that may be due to the technique of Alloy which takes a longer process
when the Alloy Analyser is using SAT4J solver. It provides a model after doing
inclusive verification for all models until a bounded number of instances for a
prop1 assertion.
If the SAT4J solver found a model which means verification fails, Alloy adds
the resulting counterexample as a constraint to guide the search for the next
solution, and starts again. When verification succeeds, the solution is represented
as a higher-order quantification, and can be returned to the user. As the scope
increase, more time spent to analyse the model.
In addition, the technique of the SAT solver in Alloy and the Z3 SMT solver
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is to negate the assertion, and look for a model if there exist a counterexample.
The Alloy Analyser uses the negation of the assertion automatically, while in Z3
we had to write that explicitly as seen in Appendix (C.4) line (2). If we forgot to
write the negation, there will be a mistake in the result and thus there is a defect
in the comparison.
Alloy uses relations, while Z3 uses functions. Relations are constrained by
multiplicities and any mistakes in determining the multiplicity key word may lead
to an inconsistent model which leads to making Alloy a sensitive language.
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Problem Specification and Case
Study, and Multichannel Security
Protocol Modelling and Analysis
In this chapter we model and analyse our solution protocol for transmitting data
securely in WLANs using multichannel protocol. Our protocol is separated into
two levels, the first for sending a mix of letters over a channel, and the second for
sending indices over a different channel.
This chapter presents how the protocol works to detect security flaws for data
transmission over a multichannel in a wireless network, depending on analysing
the message into two unreadable messages (letters and indices) and sending each
message over a separate channel, taking into account the changing MAC address
for each channel.
5.1 Proposed Solution for The Case Study
The model depends on an analysis and combination technique for data trans-
mission between the two hosts over a multichannel. Testing the model includes
checking the security of the data transmission over a multichannel in a secure and
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in an insecure scope, which is in the presence of a MitM. It then provides a report
with the results of whether the protocol achieved security for data transmission
(unreadable).
We assume that there is just one MitM between two hosts that are transmitting
an email message over two wireless channels taking into account changing MAC
address for each channel using software like "Technitium MAC Address Changer".
When the MitM needs to intercept a communication between two parties, the
MAC address is the key to accessing the data inside the packets transferred be-
tween them. So, when the MAC address is already known the MitM can hack the
packets that are sent to or received from the specific host directly, or the MitM
runs his tools to list all of the hosts’ MAC addresses around the area that are
sending and receiving data wirelessly [69].
The reason for analysing the message in two parts and submitting each part
over a channel is to mislead the MitM. Once one channel has been intercepted
the MitM will not get the message because the intercepted packet either includes
indices or letters and getting a readable message requires both parts, as seen in
Figure 5.2.
Changing the MAC address is part of our security strategy that intends to
mislead MitM because each sender’s wireless card (Network Interface Card (NIC))
has a unique MAC address provided with every packet to denote the sender’s
source even with a different wireless connection. NIC is used to connect a computer
to an Ethernet network [117].
A MAC address is represented by six groups of two hexadecimal digits (0-9,
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A-F). Each group of two hexadecimal numbers is separated by the hyphen (-) or
by the colon (:). For example: 02-43-40-99-79-Az, or 02:43:40:99:79:Az.
When the MitM attempts to hack a connection and intercept its packets, he is
focused on displaying all the MAC addresses. Once he finds two MAC addresses
that have the same hexadecimal values, he will recognise that these two packets
have been sent from one sender. Matching the two packets will then provide
readable data. So, changing the MAC address is essential in our case study.
The message that needs to be sent is analysed at the client side into a changeable
array of letters and is submitted over one channel with indices submitted over
another channel. This takes into account the changing MAC addresses to make it
appear that this data was issued from different clients.
A changeable array of letters means that, the array contains 26 unordered alpha-
betical letters. The order of these letters is changeable randomly in each sending
message.
Each index points to the location of the correct letter of the message, and by
combining and matching each index with its index on the server side the receiver
will get the message. The changeable array of letters means that each time the
sender sends an email the arrangement of letters will be different, as they are
chosen randomly.
The model consists of two systems:
• For the sender to analyse (decompose) the message into an array of letters
and indices.
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• For the receiver to receive the letters and indices and match the letters with
the indices to get the original message.
The first channel contains the original MAC addresses. The second channel
will contain the fake MAC addresses. Because the original MAC address will
be used in the first connection to submit indices and the fake MAC address will
be generated and used in the second connection to submit letters, the server’s
system recognizes which channel contains the original MAC addresses because the
reply message should be sent to the correct sender known using the original MAC
address.
In more detail regarding changing the MAC addresses, the system passes through
two levels of connections while sending data using the following steps:
• Level 1: Sending indices
– Connecting to the Internet via wireless A using MAC1 address.
– Sending indices.
– Disconnecting from the Internet.
• Level 2: Sending letters
– Changing MAC1 address.
– Generating new address, MAC2 address.
– Connecting to the Internet via wireless B using MAC2 address.
– Sending an array of mix of letters.
– Disconnecting from the Internet.
– Retrieving old MAC1 address.
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5.2 Example in Both Single Channel and Multi-
channel
This section, shows a worked example for different protocols in transmitting
data over single channel followed by multichannel, and the success in achieving
security.
5.2.1 Single Channel
Transmitting data over a single channel means that there are two hosts - a
client and a server who would like to transmit a message over a channel using
their computers. Each host has a unique MAC address. A client connects to an
ISP. When a message is transmitted from the client’s computer, the MAC address
of the client’s computer is identified as the source. Suppose a sender needs to
submit message "computer" to the server. In the existence of a MitM, due to
transmitting the message over a single channel, and by finding out the MAC
address of the sender, it is easy for the MitM to intercept the channel that has
already been opened for the known MAC address. As a result, the message that
was transmitted is vulnerable to eavesdropping as seen in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: MitM Intercepts Data Transmission Between Two Parties Over Single
Channel
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5.2.2 Multichannel
For transmitting data over a multichannel each host has two different MAC
addresses: one is original and the other is fake. The original MAC address will be
used in the first connection to submit indices, while the fake MAC address will be
generated and used in the second connection to submit letters. The client connects
to two different ISPs. Suppose a sender needs to submit message "computer" to
the server. In the existence of one MitM, due to transmitting the message over
multichannel, it is not easy for the MitM to intercept both channels simultaneously
because when one channel is connected, the other is not connected. Also it is not
easy for the MitM to recognize that both channels belong to the same source as
both of them identified by different MAC address. However, by finding out a MAC
address of the sender and intercepting a channel that has already been opened for
the known MAC address meaning that the message that was transmitted is now
invulnerable to be eavesdropped as seen in Figure 5.2. The reason for that is, the
intercepted channel either contains a message of 26 random letters or message of
numbers which means the attackers got an unreadable message.
Figure 5.2: MitM Intercepts Data Transmission Between Two Parties Over Mul-
tichannel
• Example for send a message over multichannel
Each sender and receiver has a system. The sender’s system works on sending
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a message following its steps below, while receiver’s system works on receiving the
message following its steps below. When a sender needs to submit the message
"computer", their system does that in four steps. The first step is when a sender
connects to a wireles network choosing an Internet Service Provider (ISP A) using
the original MAC address, the sender then opens the system dialogue (application
form) as seen in Figure 5.3 to start sending their message to the receiver. The ap-
plication form includes approved accounts (from email address /to email address);
the email’s password; the subject of the message; a MAC address box to type the
generated fake MAC address; an adaptor to select an ISP; the body of the mes-
sage to type a message; a sendIndexs icon which is responsible for submitting the
indices file; a ReConnect icon which is responsible to re-connect to the second ISP
as the system will disconnect from the first ISP directly after pressing sendIndexs
icon; a sendLetters icon which is responsible for submitting the letters file; and
Exit icon which is responsible to exit from the system.
In the second step, after the client’s account is approved (client’s email and pass-
word are authenticated). The sender’s system will work in three parts. The first
part is generating an array containing 26 unordered alphabetical letters such as
wxikrlpheaqybfjuzngmvdocst. Then it opens an external file for example letters.txt
to write each letter in the array in a line in the file.
The second part is finding the index of each letter of the message "computer"
that has been written in the body of the message. Finding the index of each letter
according to the array of letters to get an array of numbers containing the indices
such as 2322190615250804. After that the sender’s system opens an external file
for example indices.txt to write each number in the array in a line in the file. Here
the index ’23’ points to letter ’c’, the index ’22’ points to letter ’o’, the index ’19’
points to letter ’m’, the index ’06’ points to letter ’p’, the index ’15’ points to
letter ’u’, the index ’25’ points to letter ’t’, the index ’08’ points to letter ’e’, and
the index ’04’ points to letter ’r’. Then decomposing the list into pairs gives:
23 ->c; 22 ->o; 19 ->m; 06 ->p; 15 ->u; 25 ->t; 08 ->e; 04 ->r
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Figure 5.3: Application Form For Sending A Message
The third part is when sender’s and receiver’s account details and client email’s
password are stored in a different external file to be used in the second connection.
The external file is account.txt file. These three files are automatically generated
in the same directory of the protocol system.
After that, the sender’s system directly opens the file that stores indices, reads
the file, and replaces the body of the message with the content of the file in the
same format as lines. After that the message of indices is transmitted over the
first channel which is addressed by the original MAC address such as (00-17-4F-
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08-5D-69) and connected to the first ISP such as ISP A. After that the system will
disconnect from the ISP A, changing the original MAC address to a fake one such
as (00-01-34-AD-45-F6), and reconnect to a different Internet Service Provider
(ISP B) from the adapter.
In the third step, when the client clicks on sendLetters icon the sender’s system
directly opens the file that stores letters, reads the file, and replaces the body of
the message with the content of the file in the same format as lines. Moreover,
the sender’s system extracts the approved accounts (from email address /to email
address); and client email’s password from the account.txt file. After that the
message of letters is transmitted over the second channel which is addressed by
the fake MAC address such as (00-01-34-AD-45-F6) and connected to the second
ISP such as ISP B. At the end, the MAC address will be changed back to the
original MAC address.
Finally, when the receiver’s system receives these two channels which include
letters and indices, in the first step the system writes two messages line by line in
different external files. In the second step it matches each index with its location
in the array of letter to get the message "computer". In the last step presents the
readable message in their mailbox to be read at the other end.
5.3 Conclusion
In summary, we will investigate whether our multichannel protocol may provide
more security compared with a single channel because it depends on dividing the
message into two unreadable messages where each message is submitted over a
different channel. We change the MAC address in the second submission and if
one of the channels is intercepted, the MitM may not read the message.
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6.1 Overall Framework
This chapter presents the Alloy framework for modelling and checking the va-
lidity of properties of the provided protocols in two major analyses. The first
major analysis is called predicate-running. It is applied to Alloy problems with a
predicate and results in a visualization. If satisfying structures (called instances)
exist, then the model is consistent; otherwise the model is inconsistent. This is
required before checking the assertion.
The second major analysis form is called assertion-checking. It is applied to
Alloy problems with an Alloy specification taking into account the properties that
have been constrained as facts. It results in either generating a counterexample
if the properties do not satisfy the requirements, or otherwise no counterexample
has been generated in a limited scope.
To model properties of our protocols in these two major analyses using Alloy,
we follow the same methodology of making the ATM model in chapter 3.
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6.2 Approach
Our framework provides two kinds of protocols in different aspects. The first
protocol is for data transmission over a single channel. The second protocol is for
data transmission over a multichannel. Both protocols will be modelled in secure
and in insecure scopes with the presence of MitM.
6.3 Motivation
The goal of building a model for such protocols as a case study is to describe
the properties of the aspects of security protocols (but not the entire system),
constrain the properties to exclude holes which lead to malfunction, and check if
the properties satisfy the system requirement or not. We describe the procedure
of a protocol that has been used to transmit data securely, add some constraints
about how data transmitted securely should behave, and then check to see if any
status of each aspect gets to its destination securely or, has been intercepted by a
MitM to get a readable message. The modelling tool of Alloy in this case would
then either say “this property always holds for the scope of X” or “this property
does not always hold in the scope of Y, and here is a counterexample”.
6.4 Protocol of Transmitting Data Over Single
Channel Case Study
In this section we represent the first case study protocol in data transmission
over a single-channel without the presence of MitM, followed by data transmission
over a single-channel in the presence of MitM. This enables us to study how Alloy
can be aligned with the model as it begins with a simple model and gradually
introduce complexities. In addition, we also study how Alloy could model a secure
and insecure protocol providing instances that satisfies the constraints if the model
is consistent and then providing a counterexample if one exists. Consequently, in
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the case of providing a counterexample, we can understand the holes in the security
of the protocol once system properties do not satisfy the system requirements in
limited scope, and fix these holes before implementing our decided protocol.
6.4.1 First Protocol: Describing Data Transmitting Over
Single Channel WLANs in Secure / Insecure Scope
Model
The first protocol is modelled in aspects of secure and insecure scope. The first
aspect is very simple and requires two hosts to be communicating regularly using
one ISP and identified using their unique MAC address. Also there is no MitM
be intercept data transmitting over a single channel between the two parties. As
a result, time is not delayed which leads to data that has been received having
not been read or modified. Thus, data that has received by the server equals data
that has sent by the client.
The second aspect is developed from the first aspect by inserting a MitM be-
tween the two parties. As a result, time is delayed which leads to data that has
been received possibly having being read or modified. Thus, data that has been
received by a server may not equals to data that has sent by client.
6.4.1.1 Protocol Model Properties and Requirements
For the first aspect: the first property is that there is no MitM; the second
property is opening one channel to exchange data between two hosts (client,
server); the third property is the time for sending and receiving data over the
opened channel has not been delayed which implies that received data by the server
equals sent data by the client; the fourth property is that MAC addresses have
to be unique. The second aspect has the same properties as first aspect except
the first property which requires that there is a MitM,
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The protocol requirements for both aspects are that equalities of sending and
receiving time implies that the data that has been received equals the data that
has been sent. Thus, the submitted message has neither been modified nor eaves-
dropped.
Modelling this protocol passes through one status when two parties are connect-
ing to their selected ISP. Thus opening a single channel between them to exchange
data between them illustrates that sending data takes place at the sending time,
while receiving data takes place over the same channel at the receiving time.
6.4.1.2 An Alloy Specification of the First Protocol
Abstractly seen in Appendix (C), an Alloy model M describes the structures of
the problem i.e., signatures, Appendix (C.1), and fields declarations which shows
the relation of the signatures including their implicit constraints, Appendix (C.2)
, a set F of facts which restrict the properties of the model, Appendix (C.3), a
predicate which shows how the model behaves, Appendix (C.4), and an assertion A
describing some properties about the problem, Appendix (C.5). An Alloy problem
is correct if any Alloy instance that conforms with the model M and satisfies the
facts in F, satisfies the assertion A as well.
Modelling the protocol begins by determining and identifying the Alloy specifi-
cation: the main objects (signatures), relations, and predicates for the interaction
protocol as seen in Appendices (C.1, C.2, C.4).
• Signatures
In our model in Appendix (C.1), signatures in Alloy represent a sets of atoms,
each signature represents a set of atoms with a maximum number of three and
has no relation signs as (->). For example, object Time represents a set of atoms
which are {time0,time1,time2} by default (Line 1).
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The signatures in (Lines 1,2,3,4,5,7,8) are called top-level signatures because
they do not extend other signatures and they will be implicitly disjoint until they
show the relation (field) between them. Each top-level signature has a maximum
set of three atoms by default with no relation between them.
The type hierarchy of our Alloy specification consists of seven top-level types:
Time which is used as a timer which calculates when data has been sent and
when data has been received (Line 1). In this protocol, Time is a parameter. We
supposed that sending and receiving a message takes place at the same time in the
secure communication. There are two cases. In the first, we assume that there has
been no interception and no delay in the time (sending and receiving a message
takes place at the same time). As a result data has been received equals to data
has been sent.
In the second case, if we assume that, if there is an interception, we supposed
that sending and receiving a message takes place at different times in insecure
communication. This denotes that there is an interception and a delay in time
happened (sending and receiving a message takes place at the different time). As
a result, data has been received is not equal to the data that has been sent.
For example, if sending a message took place at time "0", receiving a message
we supposed to be at time "0" in secure communication. So, we see here the
time was not delayed. However, if sending a message took place at time "0", but
receiving a message was at time "1" in insecure communication. So, we see here
a time delayed.
ISP and Channel are required to show how two parties exchange data over a
single channel which is opened after two parties are connected to the selected ISP
in the first status (Lines 2,3); Data is used as a measure of whether a modification
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has been done or not. This is the main object the protocol uses to be modelled
as an exchanging tool between parties (Lines 4); ConnectionStatus is required to
express each status individually (Lines 5); MAC address is used to express each
visitor to the connection (Line 7); Communication Status is the main part in
the model which shows how signatures are related to each other to visualize each
status under the restrictions applied in the predicates and facts and checked in
the assertion (Line 8).
• Abstraction
The top-level type ConnectionStatus in (Line 5) is the basic type. It is labelled
with the keyword abstract and has no elements except those which are extended
which constrains each element to belong to one of its extending subtypes. However,
we have just one subtype Connection And Exchanging Data (Lines 6), and the
idea of the abstract and the extension will be clear when the protocol will be
developed to increase the status information. This subtype is for representing the
status of the connection and exchanged data between two parties.
• Extension
Type ConnectionStatus in (Line 5) is extended in Alloy using the keyword ex-
tends. The rest of the top-level types are neither abstract nor extended.
Extending subtype Connection And Exchanging Data (Line 6) is restricted to
be a singleton using the keyword one.
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• Relation Declarations, and Multiplicities
Table 6.1 shows the relations and their types.
Relations
fields name Related atoms (Type/size) of
relation No. of
atom per tuple
serviceProvider (CommunicationStatus, ISP ) Binary 2 atoms
visitors (CommunicationStatus,MAC) Binary 2 atoms
client (CommunicationStatus,MAC) Binary 2 atoms
server (CommunicationStatus,MAC) Binary 2 atoms
mitm (CommunicationStatus,MAC) Binary 2 atoms
connection (CommunicationStatus,MAC,
serviceProvider ) Ternary 3 atoms
opens (CommunicationStatus,MAC,
serviceProvider, Channel) >Ternary 4 atoms
status (CommunicationStatus,MAC
, ConnectionStatus ) Ternary 3 atoms
sends (CommunicationStatus,MAC,
Data, Time, Channel) >Ternary 5 atoms
receives (CommunicationStatus,MAC,
Data, Time, Channel) >Ternary 5 atoms
Table 6.1: Relations And Their Types
The fields are represented in Apppendix (D.2).
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• The field serviceProvider represents all the ISPs that exist in the Communi-
cation Status and declares a binary relation of type Communication Status
->ISP which maps each element of Communication Status to set (arbitrary
number/any number) of elements of ISP.
The binary relation serviceProvider ⊆ Communication Status × ISP. (Lines
8 Appendix C.1, Line 1 Appendix C.2) declares a relation serviceProvider
with domain Communication Status and range ISP. The declaration of ser-
viceProvider contains the multiplicity annotation set which makes servi-
ceProvider a function: a binary relation that associates every Communica-
tion Status with a set of ISP. For every element cs in Communication Status,
the keyword set before ISP constraints the term cs.serviceProvider to be set.
The declaration of
serviceProvider in Communication Status−> ISP
can thus be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.serviceProvider ⊆ (set ISP )
We can express the multiplicity constraints using formula as:
all cs : Communication Status| set cs.serviceProvider
The multiplicity keyword set makes the declaration hold when the relation
serviceProvider is a function from Communication Status to ISP.
• The field visitors represents all the MACs that exist in the Communica-
tion Status and declares a binary relation of type Communication Status
->MAC which maps each element of Communication Status to set of ele-
ments of MAC.
The binary relation visitors ⊆ Communication Status × MAC. (Lines 8
Appendix C.1, Line 2 Appendix C.2) declares a relation visitors with domain
Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of visitors contains
the multiplicity annotation set which makes visitors a function: a binary
135
Chapter 6: Multichannel Security Protocol Modelling Using Alloy
relation that associates every Communication Status with a set of MAC.
For every element cs in Communication Status, the keyword set before MAC
constraints the term cs.visitors to be set. The declaration of
visitors in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.visitors ⊆ (set MAC)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| set cs.visitors
The multiplicity keyword set makes the declaration hold when the relation
visitors is a function from Communication Status to MAC.
• The field client represents the MAC that exists as a client in the Communi-
cation Status, and declares a binary relation of type Communication Status
->MAC which maps each element of Communication Status to one element
of MAC.
The binary relation client ⊆ Communication Status × MAC. (Lines 8 Ap-
pendix C.1, Line 3 Appendix C.2) declares a relation client with domain
Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of client contains
the multiplicity annotation one which makes client a total function: a bi-
nary relation that associates every Communication Status with one MAC.
For every element cs in Communication Status, the keyword one before MAC
constraints the term cs.client to be one. The declaration of
client in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.client ⊆ (one MAC)
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We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.client
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the relation
client is a total function from Communication Status to MAC.
• The field server represents the MAC that exists as a server in the Communi-
cation Status, and declares a binary relation of type Communication Status
->MAC which maps each element of Communication Status to one element
of MAC.
The binary relation server ⊆ Communication Status × MAC. (Lines 8 Ap-
pendix C.1, Line 4 Appendix C.2) declares a relation server with domain
Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of server contains
the multiplicity annotation one which makes server a total function: a bi-
nary relation that associates every Communication Status with one MAC.
For every element cs in Communication Status, the keyword one before MAC
constraints the term cs.server to be one. The declaration of
server in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.server ⊆ (one MAC)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.server
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the relation
server is a total function from Communication Status to MAC.
• The field mitmIntercepts represents the MAC that exists as a MitM in the
Communication Status, and declares a binary relation of type Communica-
tion Status ->MAC which maps each element of Communication Status to
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lone element of MAC, except server.
The binary relation mitmIntercepts ⊆ Communication Status ×MAC. (Lines
8 Appendix C.1, Line 5 Appendix C.2) declares a relation mitmIntercepts
with domain Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of
mitmIntercepts contains the multiplicity annotation lone which makes mit-
mIntercepts a partial function: a binary relation that associates every Com-
munication Status with (lone) at most one of MAC. For every element cs in
Communication Status, the keyword lone before MAC constraints the term
cs.mitmIntercepts to be lone. The declaration of
mitmIntercepts in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.mitmIntercepts ⊆ (lone MAC)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| lone cs.mitmIntercepts
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the relation
mitmIntercepts is a partial function from Communication Status to MAC.
• The field connection represents the MAC that connects to the ISP, and
declares a ternary relation of type Communication Status ->MAC ->ISP
which maps each element of Communication Status to an element of MAC ;
and each element of MAC to lone element of cs.serviceProvider ; each ele-
ment of cs.serviceProvider to an element of MAC ; each element of MAC to
an element of Communication Status.
The ternary relation connection ⊆ Communication Status × MAC × ISP.
(Line 8 Appendix C.1, Line 6 Appendix C.2) declares a relation connection
with domain Communication Status and range ISP. The declaration of con-
nection contains the multiplicity annotation lone which makes connection
a partial function: a ternary relation that associates every Communica-
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tion Status with lone MAC.connection. For every element cs in Communi-
cation Status and for every element mac in MAC, the keyword lone before
cs.serviceProvider constraints the term mac.(cs.connection) to be lone. The
declaration of
connection in Communication Status−>MAC −> serviceProvider
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac| mac.(cs.connection) ⊆
(lone cs.serviceProvider)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status|cs.connection &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac|lone mac.(cs.connection)
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the relation
connection is a partial function from mac.(cs.connection) to cs.serviceProvider.
When a field of the same signature appears in another field’s declaration,
it is interpreted in the context of that signature. Field serviceProvider of
the same signature Communication Status appears in another field’s dec-
laration connection. Field connection is added to capture that the lone
mac.(cs.connection) might be connection. This declaration says that for ev-
ery element cs in Communication Status, and mac in MAC, mac.(cs.connection)
is a subset of cs.serviceProvider because field serviceProvider of the same
signature Communication Status appears in another field’s declaration con-
nection.
• The field opens represents the Channel that has been opened between a MAC
and an ISP, and declares a more than ternary relation (four) of type Com-
munication Status ->MAC ->ISP ->Channel which maps each element of
Communication Status to an element of MAC ; each element of MAC to an
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element of cs.serviceProvider ; each element of cs.serviceProvider to an ele-
ment of Channel ; each element of Channel to an element of cs.serviceProvider ;
each element of cs.serviceProvider to an element of MAC ; each element of
MAC to an element of Communication Status.
The (four) relation opens ⊆ Communication Status ×MAC × ISP × Chan-
nel. (Line 8 Appendix C.1, Line 7 Appendix C.2) declares a relation opens
with domain Communication Status and range Channel. The declaration of
opens is not prefixed with a multiplicity keyword. The declaration of
opens in Communication Status−>MAC−> serviceProvider −>Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac| mac.(cs.opens)
⊆ cs.serviceProvider)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| cs.opens &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac|mac.(cs.opens) &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac, isp : cs.serviceProvider|
(isp).mac.(cs.opens)
This declaration states that every element cs in Communication Status, and
mac in MAC, mac.(cs.opens) is a subset of cs.serviceProvider because field
serviceProvider of the same signature Communication Status appears in an-
other field’s declaration opens.
• The field status represents the MAC statuses, and declares a ternary re-
lation of type Communication Status ->MAC ->ConnectionStatus which
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maps each element of Communication Status to one element of Connection-
Status.
The binary relation status ⊆ Communication Status × ConnectionStatus.
(Lines 8 Appendix C.1, Line 8 Appendix C.2) declares a relation status with
domain Communication Status and range ConnectionStatus. The declara-
tion of status contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes sta-
tus a total function: a ternary relation that associates every Communi-
cation Status with exactly one of ConnectionStatus. For every element cs
in Communication Status, the keyword one before ConnectionStatus con-
straints the term cs.status to be one. The declaration of
status in Communication Status−> ConnectionStatus
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.status ⊆ (one ConnectionStatus)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.status
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the relation
status is a total function from Communication Status to ConnectionStatus.
• The field sends represents the Data that has been sent each Time from
a MAC over a Channel. It declares a more than ternary relation (five)
of type Communication Status ->MAC ->Data ->Time ->Channel which
maps each element of Communication Status to an element of MAC ; each
element of MAC to lone element of Data that is mapped to an element of
Time; each element of Data that is mapped to an element of Time to an
element of Channel ; each element of Channel to an element of Data that is
mapped to an element of Time; each element of Data that is mapped to an
element of Time to an element of MAC ; each element of MAC to an element
of Communication Status.
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The (five) relation sends ⊆ Communication Status × MAC × Data × Time
× Channel. (Line 9 Appendix C.1, Line 9 Appendix C.2) declares a relation
sends with domain Communication Status and range Channel. The declara-
tion of sends contains the multiplicity annotation lone which makes sends a
partial function: a five relation that associates every Communication Status
and every MAC with lone associated data with time. For every element cs
in Communication Status, and for every element mac in MAC, the keyword
lone before Data with Time constraints the term mac.(cs.sends) to be lone.
The declaration of
sends in Communication Status−> MAC −>
(Data −> Time) −> Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status, mac : MAC, d : Data, t : Time|
(t.d).mac.(cs.sends) ⊆ (lone Channel)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| cs.sends &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac| mac.(cs.sends) &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac, d : Data, t : Time|
lone (t.d).mac.(cs.sends)
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the relation
sends is a partial function from Communication Status to Cahnnel.
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• The field receives represents the Data that has been received from a MAC
each Time over a Channel. It declares a more than ternary relation (five)
of type Communication Status ->MAC ->Data ->Time ->Channel which
maps each element of Communication Status to an element of MAC ; each
element of MAC to lone element of Data that is mapped to an element of
Time; each element of Data that is mapped to an element of Time to an
element of Channel ; each element of Channel to an element of Data that is
mapped to an element of Time; each element of Data that is mapped to an
element of Time to an element of MAC ; each element of MAC to an element
of Communication Status.
The (five) relation receives ⊆ Communication Status × MAC × Data ×
Time × Channel. (Line 9 Appendix C.1, Line 9 Appendix C.2) declares
a relation receives with domain Communication Status and range Chan-
nel. The declaration of receives contains the multiplicity annotation lone
which makes receives a partial function: a five relation that associates ev-
ery Communication Status and every MAC with lone associated data with
time. For every element cs in Communication Status, and for every element
mac in MAC, the keyword lone before Data with Time constraints the term
mac.(cs.receives) to be lone. The declaration of
receives in Communication Status−> MAC −>
(Data −> Time) −> Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status, mac : MAC, d : Data, t : Time|
(t.d).mac.(cs.receives) ⊆ (lone Channel)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| cs.receives &&
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all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac| mac.(cs.receives) &&
all cs : Communication Status, mac : Mac, d : Data, t : Time|
lone (t.d).mac.(cs.receives)
The multiplicity keyword lone makes the declaration hold when the relation
receives is a partial function from Communication Status to Cahnnel.
• Fact
The three facts in our model Appendix (C.3) representing a constraint on for-
mulas. The first fact (Line 1) states that for all Communication Status, such that
a MitM does not exist in the set of visitors for the first aspect, or for the second
aspect, a MitM exists as a visitor (belongs to the visitors), but he does not in-
tercept the client because the client does not belong to the MitM. This implies
for all time t,t’ which represents sending and receiving time respectively, and for
all data d,d’ which represent sending and receiving data respectively, and for all
channels ch1 which represents that there is a channel to exchange data over, such
that what the client sent during Communication Status is data d in time t over
a channel ch1 and what the server receives during Communication Status is data
d’ in time t’ over the same channel ch1 implies that sending and receiving time
are equals which means there is no time delay occurred.
The second fact states the truth of the first fact to imply that data that has
been sent d equals data that has been received d’ and because the MitM does not
exist, he has no ability to send or receive as a client (Line 2).
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The third fact states that, for all s of Communication Status, the client, and the
server are not equal as they have different unique MAC address (Line 3). However,
the mitm has not been constrained to not be equal to the client, because in case of
an interception (second aspect), he may pretend to be a client to the server using
the client’s MAC address.
• Predicate
Our protocol model as seen in Appendix (C.4) has one predicate SingleChannel
below which controls Time t,t’, Data, t,t’, Internet server provider, isp, isp’,
Communication Status status1, and channel ch1 (Line 1). The statuses are linked
using “and ”. The predicate also visualizes the operation of the protocol and is
specified using status1 of Communication Status.
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The SingleChannel predicate in (Lines 1-19) illustrates that it passes through
one status. The status (status1 ) begins by determining the current status for the
two hosts as they are both in the status of connecting and exchanging data (Lines
2,3) and these two hosts exists as visitors (Lines 4,5). In this status, the two
parties are connecting to their selected ISP (isp,isp’) (Lines 6,7), thus opening a
single channel using their ISP to exchange data between them (Lines 8,9).
After that, the two hosts are now exchanging data at a time over the channel
(Lines 10,11). The client never has the function of receiving (Line 12), while the
server never has the function of sending (Line 13). For the first aspect, (Line 14)
illustrate that there is no MitM as a visitor, while for the second aspect, (Line 15)
illustrate that there is a MitM as a visitor but it has not intercepted the client as
the client does not belong to the MitM.
When two parties are exchanging their data over the opened single channel,
sending data over a channel takes place at sending time, and receiving data takes
place over the same channel at receiving time. The assumption of this status is
that, the data that has been received equals the data that has been sent if the
sending time equals the receiving time and no MitM exist, so it is a secure scope
and no MitM intercepts data that has been exchanged and data has neither been
eavesdropped nor modified.
• Assertion
The assertion in Appendix (C.5), states that, if SingleChannel holds in times
t,t’, Data d,d’,ISP isp,isp’, and Communication Status status1,status2, then the
equalities of sending and receiving data hold as well.
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The user limits the scope of analysis to 3 atoms of MAC, 2 atoms of Time, 2
atoms of ISP, 2 atoms of Data, 1 atom of ConnectionStatus, 1 atom of Channel,
and 1 atom of Communication Status.
6.5 Results
In this section, we present the results we achieved from modelling, analysing,
and checking the four properties of the first protocol for two aspects using the
Alloy Analyser and bounded SAT solver. These two aspects are transmitting data
securely, and transmitting data insecurely with the presence of a MitM.
For the first aspect: the first property is there is no MitM; the second
property is opening one channel to exchange data between two hosts (client,
server); the third property is the time for sending and receiving data over the
opened channel has not been delayed which implies that the data received by the
server equals the data sent by the client; the fourth property is MAC addresses
is one and has to be unique. The second aspect has the same properties as the
first aspect except the first property which requires that there is a MitM,
Before checking the satisfiability of the model, we need first to check its con-
sistency. If the model is inconsistent, the analyser cannot work efficiently for
detecting a counterexample.
The run command runs the SAT4J solver. The command asks the analyser to
search for instances to visualize them. These instances assign sets and relations
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that their size is limited to be 3 atoms for MAC, 2 atoms for Time, 2 atoms for
ISP, 2 atoms for Data, 1 atom for ConnectionStatus, 1 atom for Channel, 1 atom
for Communication Status. The visualised instances for the first protocol model
are acceptable. They correspond to the declarations of the fields and signatures,
and satisfy the predicate and the Alloy model together which means the model is
consistent.
The check command searches for a counterexample showing an execution path
that caused an error if one exist. The command looks for an instance that violates
the assertion. This analysis is implemented with respect to the bounded scope of
3 atoms for MAC, 2 atoms for Time, 2 atoms for ISP, 2 atoms for Data, 1 atom for
ConnectionStatus, 1 atom for Channel, 1 atom for Communication Statu. Only
a finite number of elements for each type is taken into account. Therefore, the
absence of an instance does not include checking satisfiability.
The analyser spent 0.119s checking the four properties of the first protocol for
the first aspect to generate counterexamples with respect to the finite scope.
The automatic check detects that, for the first aspect, when the predicate shows
that there is no MitM as a visitor there is no counterexample to the assertion
within the limited scope. The results is acceptable because the analyser found an
instance as seen in Figures D.1 that satisfied the specification but did not violate
the DataSecure assertion. The model allows us to visualise the model states where
the status is shown in Figure 6.1 indicated by $. We conclude that the property
that has been analysed holds in the model within the provided scopes.
Figure 6.1, visualises the first aspect of transmitting data securely over a single
channel. As we see, transmitting data over a single channel requires one status.
Both the client mac1 and the server mac0 have the same status which is Connec-
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tion And Exchanging Data. Both the client and the server appeared as visitors
and there is no MitM to intercept the client. Each connects to its Internet Service
Provider as the client connects to isp1, while the server connects to isp0. In this
connection status we notice that a channel ch is opened between two hosts to
exchange data between them. As we see, the client sends data1 at time1, and
the sever receives the same data data1 at the same sending time time1. The non
existence of the interception of the MitM led to the receiving data being equal
to the sending data with the assumption that the time for sending and receiving
data are equal. So, we notice that sending and receiving time still remained the
same which corresponds with our assumption that they should be equals.
So, from the figure, we achieved all the properties that we wanted to assert for
the first aspect. The result we achieved made the system properties satisfy the
system requirements. Thus, the submitted message has not been modified or read.
For the second aspect (insecure protocol) this analysis is implemented with
respect to a bounded scope of 3 atoms for MAC, 2 atoms for Time, 2 atoms for
ISP, 2 atoms for Data, 1 atom for ConnectionStatus, 1 atom for Channel, 1 atom
for Communication Statu in which only a finite number of elements for each type is
taken into account; and therefore absence of an instance does not include checking
satisfiability.
The Alloy Analyser spent 0.211s checking the four properties of the first protocol
for the second aspect. The first property is that there is a MitM; the second
property is opening one channel to exchange data between two hosts (client,
server); the third property is the time for sending and receiving data over the
opened channel has not been delayed which implies to received data by the server
equals to sent data by the client; the fourth property is MAC addresses are one
and unique.
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The automatic check detects that there is a MitM as visitor which intercepts
the client’s MAC. There are two kinds of counterexample to the assertion within
the limited scope checked. The results is acceptable because the analyser found an
instance as seen in Figures 6.2 for dynamic MitM, and (6.3) for static MitM that
violated the DataSecure assertion. The model allows us to visualise the model
states where the status is shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3 indicated by $. It concludes
that the property that has been analysed does not hold in the model within the
provided scopes.
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Figure 6.2 visualises the second aspect of transmitting data over a single channel
which requires one status. Both the client mac1 and the server mac0 have the
same status which is Connection And Exchanging Data. Both the client and the
server appeared as visitors and there is a dynamic MitM which intercepts the
client. The client and MitM connect to isp1, while the server connects to isp0. In
this connection status we notice that a channel ch is opened between two hosts to
exchange data between them. As we see, the client sends data1 at time1, and the
server receives different data data0 that has been sent at the same sending time
time1. The interception of the MitM led to receiving data that is not equal to the
sending data assuming that the time for sending and receiving data is not equal
because of the interception and modifying data. However, we notice that sending
and receiving time still remained the same which conflicts with our assumption
that they should be different, and here is the counterexample.
So, from the figure we achieved all the properties that we wanted to assert for
the second aspect except the third property which is that the time for sending
and receiving data over the opened channel has not been delayed. The result we
achieved shows that system properties do not satisfy system requirements. Thus,
the submitted message has been modified.
Figure 6.3, visualises the second aspect of transmitting data over a single channel
which requires one status. Both the client mac1 and the server mac0 have the
same status which is Connection And Exchanging Data. Both the client and the
server appeared as visitors and there is a static MitM which intercepts the client.
The client and MitM connect to isp1, while the server connects to isp0. In this
connection status we notice that a channel ch is opened between two hosts to
exchange data between them. As we see, the client sends data1 at time1, and
the sever receives the same data data1 at the same sending time time1. The
interception of the MitM led to receiving data that is equal to the sending data,
assuming that the time for sending and receiving data is not equal because of the
interception and reading data. However, we notice that time still remained the
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same which conflicts with our assumption that they should be different, and here
is the counterexample.
So, from the figure we achieved all the properties that we wanted to assert for
the second aspect except the third property which is that the time for sending and
receiving data over the opened channel has not been delayed. These requirements
are that the equality of sending and receiving time leads to the data that has been
received being equal to the data that has been sent. Thus, the submitted message
has been eavesdropped.
By examining the trace of the instance that the SAT solver found with coun-
terexamples as shown in Figures 6.2, 6.3, we can see that, even with the assumption
that there is a MitM as a visitor and he intercepts the client, data has not been
exchanged securely, as data that has been received does or does not equal data
that has been sent. Also there is no time delay in the two counterexamples which
conflicts with our assumption that when exchanged data is insecure then time
should not be equal which shows that interception happened.
To achieve the the third property, we needed to add constraints as facts. After
adding the three facts as seen in Appendix (C.3), the Alloy Analyser checking
found that there is no counterexample in 0.409s even with the large scope in
checking the DataSecure assertion.
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We now explore the model further to identify the problem that data that has
been received is equal to data that has been sent because of the receiving time
being equal to the sending time; MitM did not intercept any MAC address because
we restricted that he is not in the visitors. Thus there is no counterexample as
seen in Figure 6.4 because the analyser did not find an instance that satisfied the
specification, with each constraint formula in facts but violating the DataSecure
assertion. We conclude that the property that has been analysed holds in the
model only within the provided scopes and a MitM in a single channel may cause
readable or modified data without showing any delay time unless the MitM exists
as a visitor without interception as seen in Figure 6.4.
Figure 6.4, visualises the second aspect of transmitting data over a single channel
with no MitM interception. As we see, transmitting data over a single channel
requires one status. Both the client mac2 and the server mac0 have the same
status which is Connection And Exchanging Data. The client, the server, and a
MitM mac1 appeared as visitors and the MitM did not intercept the client. The
client connect to isp1, while the server connects to isp0. In this status we notice
that a channel ch is opened between the two hosts to exchange data. As we see,
the client sends data1 at time1, and the sever receives the same data data1 at
the same sending time time1. The existence of the MitM as a visitor with no
interception led to received data being equal to the sent data assuming that the
time for sending and receiving data is equal. So, we notice that time still remained
the same which corresponds with our assumption that they should be equal.
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So, from the figure we achieved all the properties that we wanted to assert for the
second aspect. These properties are the first property is that there is no MitM,
the second property is opening one channel to exchange data between two hosts
(client, server), the third property is the time for sending and receiving data
over the opened channel has not been delayed which implies that the received data
equals the sent data, the fourth property is MAC addresses is one and unique.
Thus, the submitted message has not been modified or read.
Next, we will see how the first protocol is developed when the scopes of Com-
munication Status, channels, ISP, MACs, data, and time are increased.
6.6 Protocol of Transmitting Data Over Multi-
channel Case Study
6.6.1 Second Protocol: Describing Data Transmitting Se-
curely Over Multichannel WLANs in The presence
of MitM
Our second protocol cares about protecting data to make it unreadable based on
submitting it over a multichannel instead of one channel. The protocol is developed
from the first protocol by separating transmitted data into letters and its matching
indices, and transmitting each over different channel connected with different MAC
addresses with different ISPs. Therefore, the properties and requirements are
also developed. The protocol considers there being a MitM to intercept data
transmitting over multichannel between the two parties communication. As a
result, data that has been received may have not been read when data over a
channel is intercepted because it includes either letters or indices, the consideration
of the different MAC addresses, and connecting to different ISPs. Intercepting
one of two channels may cause a delay time for the intercepted one. Thus, if no
modification occurs for the data that is transmitted over an intercepted channel,
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data that has been received equals the data that has been sent which leads to data
not being read.
6.6.1.1 Protocol Model Properties and Requirements
The model of the protocol can be enhanced by adding six properties. The first
property is that data (indices) and (letters) are transmitted over two different
channels. The second property is that only one channel is able to be intercepted
during the two communication statuses, i.e no two channels have been intercepted.
The third property is that the MAC address is changeable and no MAC ad-
dresses are equal. The fourth property is that there is one MitM. The fifth
property is that two channels are opened to exchange data between two hosts
(client, server), one channel for exchanging letters and the other for exchanging
indices. The sixth property is that the time for sending and receiving data over
the opened channel has not been delayed which implies that data received by the
server equals to data sent by the client.
The protocol requirements are that if one of two channels has been intercepted,
data that has been received equals data that has been sent over this intercepted
channel although the time for sending and receiving data should not be equal
which refers to time delays which are caused by the interception.
6.6.1.2 Model Structure Description
As seen in Appendix (E), modelling this protocol passes through two statuses.
The first status is when two parties connect to their first ISP using the original
MAC address, thus opening a single channel between them to exchange indices of
data. The second status is when two parties connect to their different second ISP,
thus opening a different single channel between them to exchange letters with the
original MAC address changing to the fake one.
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The assumption of these statuses is that data that has been received equals data
that has been sent if the sending time equals the receiving time. Furthermore no
MitM exists to act as a client or a server using their MAC addresses to pretend
to be a client to the server and a server to the client. So this is a secure scope,
no MitM intercepts data that has been exchanged and data has neither been
eavesdropped nor modified.
Another assumption is that data that has been received equals data that has
been sent if one sending time equals to one of receiving time and there is a MitM.
This shows that this is still a secure scope even if the MitM intercepts one of the
data (indices or letters) over one of the multichannels because the whole data is
kept unreadable.
6.6.1.3 Modelling and Checking The Protocol Using Alloy
Modelling the protocol is similar to the previous protocol in terms of the inter-
acting signatures. However we add some relations and facts to correspond with
the new properties. We also add new predicates and the assertion that we want to
check. The predicate is developed to include the behaviour of two statuses. The
assertion is developed to check that sending and receiving data are equal.
• Relation Declarations, and Multiplicities
The protocol as seen in Appendix (E.1) has some relations that are com-
mon with the first protocol. Here, we are going to express the developed
relations in the second protocol.
– The field client1 represents the first (the original) MAC that exists
as client in the Communication Status, and declares a binary relation
of type Communication Status ->MAC which maps each element of
Communication Status to one element of MAC.
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The binary relation client1 ⊆ Communication Status × MAC. (Lines
9 Appendix E.1, Line 2 Appendix E.2) declares a relation client1 with
domain Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of
client1 contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes client1
a total function: a binary relation that associates every Communi-
cation Status with one of MAC. For every element cs in Communica-
tion Status, the keyword one before MAC constrains the term cs.client1
to be one. The declaration of
client1 in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.client1 ⊆ (one MAC)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.client1
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
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relation client1 is a total function from Communication Status to MAC.
– The field client2 represents the second (the fake) MAC that exists as
a client in the Communication Status, and declares a binary relation
of type Communication Status ->MAC which maps each element of
Communication Status to one element of MAC.
The binary relation client2 ⊆ Communication Status × MAC. (Lines
9 Appendix E.1, Line 3 Appendix E.2) declares a relation client2 with
domain Communication Status and range MAC. The declaration of
client2 contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes client2
a total function: a binary relation that associates every Communica-
tion Status with (one) exactly one of MAC. For every element cs in
Communication Status, the keyword one before MAC constraint]s the
term cs.client2 to be one. The declaration of
client2 in Communication Status−> MAC
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.client2 ⊆ (one MAC)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.client2
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation client2 is a total function from Communication Status to MAC.
– The field ispA represents the first ISP that has been connected to, and
declares a binary relation of type Communication Status ->ISP which
maps each element of Communication Status to one element of ISP.
The binary relation ispA ⊆ Communication Status × ISP. (Lines 9 Ap-
pendix E.1, Line 7 Appendix E.2) declares a relation ispA with domain
Communication Status and range ISP. The declaration of ispA contains
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the multiplicity annotation one which makes ispA a total function: a
binary relation that associates every Communication Status with one
of ISP. For every element cs in Communication Status, the keyword
one before ISP constrains the term cs.ispA to be one. The declaration
of
ispA in Communication Status−> ISP
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.ispA ⊆ (one ISP )
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.ispA
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation ispA is a total function from Communication Status to ISP.
– The field ispB represents the second ISP that has been connected to,
and declares a binary relation of type Communication Status ->ISP
which maps each element of Communication Status to one element of
ISP.
The binary relation ispB ⊆ Communication Status × ISP. (Lines 9 Ap-
pendix E.1, Line 8 Appendix E.2) declares a relation ispB with domain
Communication Status and range ISP. The declaration of ispB contains
the multiplicity annotation one which makes ispB a total function: a
binary relation that associates every Communication Status with one
of ISP. For every element cs in Communication Status, the keyword
one before ISP constrains the term cs.ispB to be one. The declaration
of
ispB in Communication Status−> ISP
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.ispB ⊆ (one ISP )
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We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.ispB
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation ispB is a total function from Communication Status to ISP.
– The field channel represents the available Channel in the Commu-
nication Status, and declares a binary relation of type Communica-
tion Status ->Channel which maps each element of Communication Status
to set of elements of Channel.
The binary relation channel ⊆ Communication Status × Channel. (Lines
9 Appendix E.1, Line 11 Appendix E.2) declares a relation channel with
domain Communication Status and range Channel. The declaration of
channel contains the multiplicity annotation set which makes channel a
function: a binary relation that associates every Communication Status
with set of Channel. For every element cs in Communication Status,
the keyword set before Channel constrains the term cs.channel to be
set. The declaration of
channel in Communication Status−> Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.channel ⊆ (set Channel)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| set cs.channel
The multiplicity keyword set makes the declaration hold when the re-
lation channel is a function from Communication Status to Channel.
– The field ch1 represents the first Channel that transmits the first
data (indices) over, and declares a binary relation of type Commu-
164
Chapter 6: Multichannel Security Protocol Modelling Using Alloy
nication Status ->Channel which maps each element of Communica-
tion Status to one element of Channel.
The binary relation ch1 ⊆ Communication Status × Channel. (Lines
9 Appendix E.1, Line 12 Appendix E.2) declares a relation ch1 with
domain Communication Status and range Channel. The declaration of
ch1 contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes ch1 a total
function: a binary relation that associates every Communication Status
with one of Channel. For every element cs in Communication Status,
the keyword one before Channel constrains the term cs.ch1 to be one.
The declaration of
ch1 in Communication Status−> Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.ch1 ⊆ (one Channel)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.ch1
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation ch1 is a total function from Communication Status to Channel.
– The field ch2 represents the first Channel that transmits the second
data (letters) over, and declares a binary relation of type Commu-
nication Status ->Channel which maps each element of Communica-
tion Status to one element of Channel.
The binary relation ch2 ⊆ Communication Status × Channel. (Lines
9 Appendix E.1, Line 13 Appendix E.2) declares a relation ch2 with
domain Communication Status and range Channel. The declaration of
ch2 contains the multiplicity annotation one which makes ch2 a total
function: a binary relation that associates every Communication Status
with one of Channel. For every element cs in Communication Status,
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the keyword one before Channel constrains the term cs.ch2 to be one.
The declaration of
ch2 in Communication Status−> Channel
can be expressed as:
∀ cs : Communication Status| cs.ch2 ⊆ (one Channel)
We can express the multiplicity constraints as:
all cs : Communication Status| one cs.ch2
The multiplicity keyword one makes the declaration hold when the
relation ch2 is a total function from Communication Status to Channel.
• Predicate
Our protocol as seen in Appendix (E.4) has one predicate MultiChannel which
controls Time t,t’,t”,t”’, Data, indices,indices’, letters,letters’, Internet server
provider, isp, Communication Status status1, status2 (Line 1). The MultiChan-
nel predicate is the operation of the protocol and is specified using status1, and
status2 of Communication Status. status1, and status2 are instances of Commu-
nication Status showing the statuses of Communication Status, first and second
operations respectively.
The MultiChannel predicate illustrates that it passes through two statuses. The
first status occurs from (Line 2-19). The status begins by showing that two parties
client1 and server are starting the communication in terms of communication and
exchanging indices (Line 2,3). The server belongs to the visitors (Line 4). The
first ISPA belongs to the service provider making client1 connects to (Lines 5,8)
while the second ISPB does not belong to service provider (Line 6). The second
Client Client2 is not connected (Line 7). The first channel belongs to the channels
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to exchange indices between client1 and the server over this first channel at a time
(Lines 10,12, and 14), while the second channel does not belong to the channels
(Line 11). Also, in this status no exchange of letters (sending or receiving) has
occurred (Line 13,15). Moreover, neither client1 has a receiving function nor
server has a sending function (Line 16,17). Also, client2 has no ability to send or
receive (Line 18,19). In status1, client1 belongs to the visitors (Lines 38) while
client2 does not belong to the visitors (Lines 39).
The second status occurs from (Line 20-45). The status begins by showing
that two parties client2 and server are starting the communication in terms of
communication and exchanging letters (Line 20,21). The server belongs to the
visitors (Line 221). The second ISPB belongs to the service provider making
client2 connect to (Line 24,26) while the first ISPA does not belong to the service
provider (Line 23). The server still connects to its (isp) that it is already connected
to in the first status (Line 27). The second channel belongs to the channels making
client2 and the server exchange letters over this second channel at the time (Line
29,30, and 32), while the first channel does not belong to the channels (Line 28).
Also, in this status no exchange of indices (sending or receiving) has occurred
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(Line 31,33). Moreover, neither client2 has a receiving function nor server has a
sending function (Line 34,35). Also, client1 has no ability to send or receive in
the second status (Line 36,37). In status2, client2 belongs to the visitors (Lines
41) while client1 does not belong to the the visitors (Lines 40).
In this protocol, transmitting data may continue through one of three opera-
tions. Either there is a MitM and client1 in status1 belongs to the intercepts
and client2 in status2 does not belong to the intercepts (Line 43) which means
the interception takes place in the first status for the first client. Or,there is a
MitM and client1 in status1 which does not belong to the intercepts and client2
in status2 belongs to the intercepts (Line 44) which means the interception takes
place in the second status for the second client. Or there is a MitM and client1
in status1 which does not belong to the intercepts and client2 in status2 does not
belong to the intercepts (Line 45) which means that both channels have not been
intercepted.
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• Assertion
The protocol as seen in Appendix (E.5) has one assertion DataSecure. As
seen in the assertion (Line 1), it states that, if MultiChannel meets the facts
at times t,t’,t”,t”’, Data indices,indices’, letters,letters’,ISP isp, and Communi-
cation Status (status1), (status2). This implies that the equalities of sending and
receiving indices and letters hold as well.
• Fact
The protocol as seen in Appendix (F.2) has three facts (Line 1-10). In the first
fact (Lines 1-5) we need to constrain that, for all s,s’, which represent the first
and the second communication in Communication Status respectively, as follows.
The first status s the first client client1 belongs to the visitors, while the second
client client2 does not belong to the visitors, and in the second status s’ the first
client (client1) does not belong to the visitors, while the second client (client2)
belongs to the visitors.
We have three cases, either: 1) the first channel has been intercepted and the sec-
ond channel has not been intercepted when client1 in status1 has been intercepted,
i.e it belongs to the MitM, while client2 in status2 has not been intercepted, i.e
it does not belong to the MitM ; or 2) the first channel has not been intercepted
and the second channel has been intercepted when client1 in status1 has not been
intercepted, i.e it does not belong to the MitM, while client2 in status2 has been
intercepted, i.e it belongs to the MitM ; or 3) the first and the second channel have
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not been intercepted when client1 in status1 and client2 in status2 have not been
intercepted, i.e both of them do not belong to the MitM.
These three cases above imply that, for all s,s’ which represent the first and
the second communication in Communication Status respectively, and all time
t,t’,t”,t”’ which represent sending and receiving indices,letters time respectively,
and for all data indices, indices’,letters,letters’ which represent sending and receiv-
ing data indices and letters respectively as follows. The data indices’ the server
receives at time t’ over the first channel ch1 equals the data indices the client1
sends at time t over the first channel ch1 and the data letters’ the server receives
at time t”’ over the second channel ch2 equals the data letters the client2 sends
at time t” over the second channel ch2 implies that the receiving time t’ is not
equal to the sending time t and the receiving time t”’ is equal to the sending time
t” when there is an interception in the first channel, or the receiving time t’ is
equal to the sending time t and the receiving time t”’ is not equal to the sending
time t” when there is an interception in the second channel, or the receiving time
t’ is equal to the sending time t and the receiving time t”’ is equal to the sending
time t” when there is no interception in both channels.
170
Chapter 6: Multichannel Security Protocol Modelling Using Alloy
In the second fact (Lines 6-8) we need to constrain that, the truth of the first
fact implies that the data (indices’/ letters’) the server receives equals the data
(indices/letters) the client sends, i.e achieving the assertion if one of the channels
has been intercepted causing a delay time in one channel and as a result data is
unreadable.
In the third fact (Lines 9,10) we need to constrain that, for all Communi-
cation Status, no two MACs (client1’s mac, client2’s mac, or server’s mac) are
equals. Macs should be unique.
6.7 Results
In this section, we present the results we achieved from modelling, analysing,
and checking the properties of the second protocol using the Alloy Analyser, and
bounded SAT solver.
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After running the model, we got that the predicate MultiChannel is consistent
and there are instances that are available according to the finite scopes. This
analysis is implemented with respect to a bounded scope of 3 atoms of MAC, 4
atoms of Time, 2 atoms of ISP, 2 atoms of Channel, 4 atoms of Data, 1 atom
of ConnectionStatus, 2 atoms of Communication Status in which only a finite
number of elements for each type is taken into account; and therefore absence of
an instance does not include checking satisfiability.
The Alloy Analyser spent 1.703s checking the properties of the third protocol.
These properties are data (indices) and (letters) transmit over two different chan-
nels, only one channel is able to be intercepted during the two communication
statuses, i.e no two channels have been intercepted, the MAC address is change-
able and there are no MAC addresses that are equal, there is one MitM, opening
two channels to exchange data between two hosts, one channel for exchanging let-
ters and the other for exchanging indices, and the time for sending and receiving
data over the opened channel has not been delayed which implies that received
data by the server equals sent data from the client.
The automatic check detects that there is a counterexample to the assertion
as shown in Figure 6.5. The result is acceptable because the analyser found an
instance that satisfied the specification but violated the DataSecure assertion. We
conclude that the properties that have been analysed do not hold in the model
within the provided scopes.
Figure 6.5, shows two statuses, status1 and status2. The first status shows that
status2 mac1 and server have the same status First Communication And Exchanging Indices.
Client1 and server belong to the visitors, while client2 does not. Client1 connects
to the first ispA. The server connects to an isp. The first channel ch1 is opened
between two hosts to exchange indices. A MitM intercepts client1.
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We notice that, the client1 sends data1 at time1, and the server receives different
data data0 that has been sent at same time time1. The interception of the MitM
led to receiving data not being equal to the sending data. However, we notice
that sending and receiving time still remained the same which conflicts with our
assumption that they should be different, and here is the counterexample.
The second status shows that client2 mac1 and server have the same status
Second Communication And Exchanging Letters. Client2 and server belong to
the visitors, while client1 does not. Client2 connects to the second ispB. The
server connects to an isp. The second channel ch2 is opened between two hosts
to exchange letters. A MitM intercepts client2.
We notice that, the client2 sends data2 at time1, and the server receives different
data data1 that has been sent at a different sending time time2. The interception of
the MitM led to receiving data not being equal to the sending data and the time for
sending and receiving data are not equal as well. However, we notice that because
the client did not change the MAC address when moving from status1 to status2
it may be noticeable by the MitM, the MitM could intercept it again and get the
data and match between letters and indices, and here is the counterexample.
So, from the figure, we did not achieved the sixth property in the first status
which is that the time for sending and receiving data over the opened channel has
not been delayed which implies that received data by the server equals sent data
from the client. Also, we did not achieve the second property in the second status
which is that only one channel is able to be intercepted during the two commu-
nication statuses, and the third property in the second status which is that the
MAC address is changeable and there is no MAC addresses are equals. The result
we achieved showed that system properties do not satisfy system requirements.
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By examining the trace of the instance that SAT solver found, the counterexam-
ple is as shown in Figure 6.5. We can see that, the sixth property does not hold:
time for exchanging data (indices) still remains the same despite the presence of
a MitM which intercepted the channel that exchanged data in the first status,
and exchanging data (indices) are not equal as well. Thus, an interception took
place but there is no delay so the data that has been received does not equal the
data that has been sent. Also, the MAC addresses in two channels did not change
which conflict with the third property.
To achieve the model goal in the assertion, we need to add constraints or prop-
erties as facts as seen in Appendix (E.3). After adding the three facts, if no such
counterexample has been found it is still possible that one could exist in a larger
scope. However the Alloy Analyser spent 1.594s to gain the result that there is
no counterexample even with the large scope in checking this assertion.
After correcting the counterexample, we now explore the model further to iden-
tify the problem in three hypotheses. The first hypotheses is that when a MitM
intercept the first channel but not the second channel: as seen in Figure 6.6, the
first status shows that client1 mac2 and server mac0 are in the same status
First Communication And Exchanging Indices. Client1 and server belong to the
visitors, while client2 does not. Client1 connects to the first ispA. The server con-
nects to an isp. The first channel ch1 is opened between two hosts to exchange
indices. A MitM intercepts client1. We notice that, as we see, the client1 sends
data2 at time3, and the sever receives the same data data2 that has been sent at
a different sending time time2. The interception of the MitM led to receiving data
being equal to the sending data assuming that the time for sending and receiving
data are not equal as well because of the interception and eavesdrop data. We
notice that our assumption is achieved and the time is different because of the
interception of a MitM, and there is no counterexample.
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The second status shows that client2 mac1 and server mac0 have the same
status Second Communication And Exchanging Letters. Client2 and server be-
longs to the visitors, while client1 does not. Client2 connects to the second ispB.
The server connects to an isp. The second channel ch2 is opened between two
hosts to exchange letters. There is no MitM which intercepts client2. We notice
that the client2 sends data1 at time3, and the server receives the same data data1
at the same sending time time3. The non existence of the interception of the
MitM led to the receiving data being equal to the sending data, and the time for
sending and receiving data are equal. We notice that because the client changed
the MAC address when moving from status1 to status2 this lead to it not being
noticeable by the MitM, MitM could not intercept it again and get the data and
match between letters and indices, and there is no counterexample.
The second hypotheses is that when a MitM intercept the second channel but
not the first channel : as seen in Figure 6.7, the first status shows that client1 mac2
and server mac0 are in the same status First Communication And Exchanging Indices.
Client1 and server belong to the visitors, while client2 does not. Client1 connects
to the first ispA. The server connects to an isp. The first channel ch1 is opened
between two hosts to exchange indices. No MitM intercepts client1. We notice
that, as we see, the client1 sends data3 at time3, and the sever receives the same
data data3 at the same sending time (time3). The non existence of the intercep-
tion of the MitM led to receiving data being equal to the sending data assuming
that the time for sending and receiving data are equal as well. We notice that our
assumption is achieved and the time is equal because there is no interception by
a MitM, and there is no counterexample.
The second status shows that client2 mac1 and server mac0 are in the same
status Second Communication And Exchanging Letters. Client2 and server be-
long to the visitors, while client1 does not. Client2 connects to the second ispB.
The server connects to an isp. The second channel ch2 is opened between two
hosts to exchange letters. A MitM intercepts client2. We notice that the client2
sends data2 at time2, and the server receives the same data data2 at a different
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sending time time1. The existence of the interception of the MitM led to receiving
data being equal to the sending data and the time for sending and receiving data
are different. We notice that our assumption is achieved and the time is different
because there is an interception by MitM, and there is no counterexample.
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The third hypotheses is that when a MitM neither intercepts the first channel
nor the second channel: as seen in Figure 6.8, the first status shows that client1
mac2 and server mac0 are in the same status First Communication And Exchanging Indices.
Client1 and server belong to the visitors, while client2 does not. Client1 connects
to the first ispA. The server connects to an isp. The first channel ch1 is opened
between two hosts to exchange indices. No MitM intercepts client1. We notice
that the client1 sends data1 at time1, and the server receives the same data data1
at the same sending time time2. The non existence of the interception of the MitM
led to receiving data being equal to the sending data assuming that the time for
sending and receiving data are equal as well. We notice that our assumption is
achieved and the time is equal because there is no interception by a MitM, and
there is no counterexample.
The second status shows that client2 mac1 and server mac0 are in the same
status Second Communication And Exchanging Letters. Client2 and server be-
long to the visitors, while client1 does not. Client2 connects to the second ispB.
The server connects to an isp. The second channel ch2 is opened between two
hosts to exchange letters. There is no MitM which intercepts client2. We notice
that the client2 sends data0 at time0, and the sever receives the same data data0
at the same sending time time0. The no existence of the interception of the MitM
led to receiving data being equal to the sending data and the time for sending
and receiving data are equal as well. We notice that our assumption is achieved
and the time is equal because there is no interception by a MitM, and there is no
counterexample.
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Chapter 7
Multichannel Security Protocol
Proving Using Z3
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we translate the specification of the protocols from Alloy into Z3
FOL such that if there is a counterexample in Alloy in finite scopes, this is supposed
to be a counterexample in Z3 in infinite scopes and vice versa. We must ensure
that our formulation of the two specifications in Z3 are satisfiability equivalent to
Alloy which means if a formula in Alloy is satisfiable, then the formula in Z3 is
satisfiable and vice versa. We choose this methods as it is easy and we can trust
it to provide good results [63]. It should be noted that the translation presented
within this thesis is has not been formally verified.
7.1.1 First Protocol: Transmitting Data Over Single Chan-
nel
7.1.1.1 Type and Subtype Declarations
In Appendix (D) we give full details of the Z3 models with annotations to show
the equivalent Alloy.
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The hierarchical type system is translated implicitly. However, because the
SMT language does not support subtypes, we use membership functions to en-
force type hierarchy declarations. Consequently, top-level types are translated
to uninterpreted sorts, while the top-level (super-type) of a type is translated to
an uninterpreted membership function isType to indicate which elements of the
super-type belongs to the type. It is not necessarily to declare the membership
functions of top-level types, but we declared them to determine the semantics of
the subtype.
As seen in Appendix (D.1), top-level types Time, Channel, Card, ISP, Data,
ConnectionStatus, MAC, and CommunicationStatus are declared as uninterpreted
sorts Lines (1-7). The membership function in Appendix (D.2) Line (11) isCon-
nection And Exchanging Data is declared to specify the semantics of subtypes
Connection And Exchanging Data.
7.1.1.2 Properties Of The Sub-signatures
As seen in Appendix (D.5), (Line 1) we adjust the returns types of the “oneOf ”
functions/constants by specifying that each return a value of type ConnectionSta-
tus. For example: line (1) calls function oneOf Connection And Exchanging Data
in Line (1) in Appendix (D.3) which calls function isConnection And Exchanging Data
in Line (11) in Appendix (D.2) which returns one Operation type isConnec-
tion And Exchanging Data in Line (11) Appendix (D.2) which is already specified
as a return type in Line (1) Appendix (D.5).
Sub-signatures (Lines 1) Appendix (D.3) declare functions of the property some
for the sub signature Connection And Exchanging Data of the super signature
ConnectionStatus because ConnectionStatus has at least one element of the sub
signatures. In (Line 1) Appendix (D.6) we need to assert the lone property of the
previous sub signature because ConnectionStatus has at most one element of the
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sub signature. The assertion (Line 1) Appendix (D.6) is expressed to the formula
A below:
Formula A:
∀ o1, o2: ConnectionStatus.(o1 ∈ isConnection And Exchanging Data ∧
o2 ∈ isConnection And Exchanging Data) =>o1 = o2
The formula A specifies constrains that for each ConnectionStatus, there is
at most only one corresponding ConnectionStatus : if there exist two Connection-
Status belonging to isConnection And Exchanging Data for example, then these
two ConnectionStatus should be equal. i.e we restrict the characteristics of lone
ConnectionStatus of type isConnection And Exchanging Data for each status to
avoid the inconsistency.
7.1.1.3 Abstraction and Extension
In the first protocol, we do not need to prove the abstract and extension formulas
as we have only one status. The expression and the prove of the abstract and
extension will be developed in the protocol which contains two statuses.
7.1.1.4 Facts
Facts are assumed to be true. They represents the protocol properties. As seen
in Appendix (D.8), Line (1) declares quantifiers to restrict the first fact. Line (2)
declares quantifiers to restrict the second fact. Line (3) declares quantifiers to
restrict the third fact.
The first fact as seen below is expressed in formula B below:
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First fact:
(forall ((status1 CommunicationStatus))(implies(forall ((cmac MAC)(mmac MAC))
(or(=>(mitmIntercepts status1 mmac)(not(visitors status1 mmac)))
(and(=>(mitmIntercepts status1 mmac)(visitors status1 mmac))
(=>(client1 status1 cmac)(not(mitmIntercepts status1 cmac))))))
(forall ((t Time)(t1 Time)(d Data)(d1 Data)(ch1 Channel))
(implies (and (forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d d11)(= t t11)(= ch1 ch11))))
(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(sends status1 cmac1 d t ch1)))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11) (= ch1 ch11))))
(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(receives status1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1))))(= t t1)))))
Formula B:
(∀ status1:Communication Status, cmac,mmac:MAC.((status1,mmac) ∈
(mitmIntercepts =>(status1,mmac) /∈ visitors ∨
((status1,mmac) ∈ mitmIntercepts =>(status1,mmac) ∈ visitors
∧ (status1,cmac) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac) /∈ mitmIntercepts) =>
∀ t,t1:Time, d,d1:Data, ch1:Channel
( ∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(d = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11))) ∧
∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac1,d,t,ch1) ∈ sends ∧
∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(d1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11))) ∧
∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac1,d1,t1,ch1) ∈ receives ) =>t = t1 )
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The formula B specifies constraints that: for all atoms status1 in Communica-
tion Status, cmac (client’s mac) in MAC, and mmac (MitM’s mac) in MAC such
that if a MitM mmac belongs to mitmIntercepts in the status, then the MitM
mmac does not belong to the visitors in the status (secure scope), or if the MitM
mmac belongs to mitmIntercepts in the status, then the MitM mmac belongs to
the visitors in the status, and if a client cmac belongs to client1 in the status,
then the client cmac does not belong to mitmIntercepts in the status.
It follows that for all atoms t and t1 in Time; d and d1 in Data; and ch1 in
Channel, for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in Data; and ch11 in Channel, if there
exists cmac in MAC such that, status1 and cmac belong to client1 ; and status1,
cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends, then d equals d11, t equals t11, and ch1
equals ch11. So, if there exists cmac1 in MAC, then status1 and cmac1 belong
to client1 ; and status1, cmac1, d, t, and ch1 belong to sends.
And for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in Data; and ch11 in Channel, if there
exists smac in MAC such that, status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1,
smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives, then d1 equals d11, t1 equals t11,
and ch1 equals ch11. So, if there exists smac1 in MAC, then status1 and smac1
belong to server ; and status1, smac1, d1, t1, and ch1 belong to receives ; then t
equals t1.
The second fact as seen below is expressed to formula C below:
Second fact:
(forall ((t Time)(t1 Time)(d Data)(d1 Data)(ch1 Channel))
(implies (and (forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d d11)(= t t11)(= ch1 ch11))))
(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(sends status1 cmac1 d t ch1)))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11) (= ch1 ch11))))
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(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(receives status1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1))))(= t t1))(= d d1)))
Formula C:
∀ t,t1:Time, d,d1:Data, ch1:Channel
( ∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(d = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11))) ∧
∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac1,d,t,ch1) ∈ sends ∧
∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(d1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11))) ∧
∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac1,d1,t1,ch1) ∈ receives ∧
t = t1) =>d = d1
The formula C specifies constraints that: for all atoms t and t1 in Time; d
and d1 in Data; and ch1 in Channel, for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in Data; and
ch11 in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that, status1 and cmac belong
to client1 ; and status1, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends, then d equals
d11, t equals t11, and ch1 equals ch11. So, if there exists cmac1 in MAC, then
status1 and cmac1 belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac1, d, t, and ch1 belong to
sends.
And for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in Data; and ch11 in Channel, if there
exists smac in MAC such that, status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1,
smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives, then d1 equals d11, t1 equals t11,
and ch1 equals ch11. So, if there exists smac1 in MAC, then status1 and smac1
belong to server ; and status1, smac1, d1, t1, and ch1 belong to receives ; and t
equals t1, then d equals d1
The third fact as seen below is expressed to formula D below:
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Third fact:
(forall ((s CommunicationStatus))(forall ((mac1 MAC) (mac2 MAC))
(=>(and(client1 s mac1) (server s mac2))(not(= mac1 mac2)))))
Formula D:
∀ s:Communication Status, cmac1,cmac2:MAC.(s,cmac1) ∈ client1
∧ (s,cmac2) ∈ server =>cmac1 6= cmac2
The formula D specifies constraints that: all atoms s in Communication Status,
cmac1 (client1’s mac) in MAC and cmac2 (server’s mac) in MAC such that
client1’s mac in status1 is not equal to server’s mac in status1.
7.1.1.5 Relation Declarations
Relations are translated to Boolean-valued, uninterpreted, membership func-
tions. As seen in Appendix (D.2) these functions are declared over top-level types
because only top-level types are declared as sorts. Because all SMT functions are
total function, relations are specified utilizing three parts: function name, received
sorts, and returned value of Boolean type. The Boolean type includes two kinds
of value, true for the tuples that are involved in the declared relation, or false for
all others that are not involved.
Lines (1-10) Appendix (D.2) declare functions of relations. These relations are:
serviceProvider, which is declared as Boolean-valued function over Communica-
tion Status ; ISP (Line 1), visitors, client,server, and mitmIntercepts which are
declared as Boolean-valued function over Communication Status and MAC (Lines
2-5); connection which is declared as Boolean-valued functions over Communica-
tion Status, MAC, and ISP (Line 6); opens which is declared as Boolean-valued
functions over Communication Status, MAC, ISP, and Channel (Line 7); status
which is declared as Boolean-valued functions over Communication Status, MAC,
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and ConnectionStatus (Line 8); sends, receives which are declared as Boolean-
valued functions over Communication Status, MAC,Data,Time, and Channel (Lines
9,10).
Lines (1-8) Appendix (D.7) declare more constraints that guarantee that each
relation is defined for its specific types considering the multiplicity keywords con-
straints.
The relations serviceProvider: set ISP and visitors:set MAC are not required
to be translated to formula as the set keyword constrains and allows any number
of elements. Thus, its defined Boolean-valued function (Lines 1, and 2) Appendix
(D.2) is equivalent to their meaning.
Line (1) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula E below:
client: one MAC
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and (exists ((mac1 MAC))(client1 cs mac1))
(forall ((mac3 MAC)(mac2 MAC))(=>(and(client1 cs mac2)(client1 cs mac3))
(= mac2 mac3)))))
Formula E:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus ∃ mac1:MAC.(cs,mac1) ∈
client1 ∧ ∀ mac3,mac2:MAC.(cs,mac2) ∈ client1
∧ (cs,mac3) ∈ client1 =>mac2 = mac3
The formula E specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status, if there exists mac1 in MAC, such that, the cs and mac1 belong to the
first client client1, and for all mac3 and mac2 :MAC, such that cs and mac2 be-
long to the client (client1); and cs and mac3 belong to the client (client1) then
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mac2 equals mac3. To restrict the multiplicity to one, we suppose that if two
macs belong to the client client1, thus these two macs are equal.
Line (2) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula F below:
server: one MAC
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and(exists ((mac1 MAC))(server cs mac1))
(forall ((mac3 MAC)(mac2 MAC))(=>(and (server cs mac2)(server cs mac3))
(= mac2 mac3)))))
Formula F:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus ∃ mac1:MAC.(cs,mac1) ∈ server ∧
∀ mac3,mac2:MAC.(cs,mac2) ∈ server ∧
(cs,mac3) ∈ server =>mac2 = mac3
The formula F constrains that: for all atoms cs in CommunicationStatus, if
there exists mac1 in MAC, such that the cs and mac1 belong to the server, and for
all mac3 and mac2 :MAC, such that cs and mac2 belong to the server ; and cs and
mac3 belong to the server then mac2 equals mac3. To restrict the multiplicity
to one, we suppose that if there are two macs belonging to the server, these two
macs are equal.
Line (3) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula G below:
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mitmIntercepts: lone MAC-server
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus)(mac3 MAC)(mac2 MAC))(=>(and
(mitmIntercepts cs mac2)(mitmIntercepts cs mac3))(= mac2 mac3)))
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(exists ((mac1 MAC))
(not(mitmIntercepts cs mac1))))
Formula G:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus, mac3,mac2:MAC.(cs,mac2) ∈
mitmIntercepts ∧ (cs,mac3) ∈ mitmIntercepts =>mac2 = mac3
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus ∃mac1 : MAC.(cs,mac1)/∈ mitmIntercepts
The formula G specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communica-
tionStatus, mac2 and mac3 in MAC, such that the cs and mac2 belong to the
mitmIntercepts ; and cs and mac3 belong to the mitmIntercepts, then mac2 equals
mac3. For all cs in CommunicationStatus, there exists mac1 in MAC, such that
cs and mac1 do not belong to the mitmIntercepts. To restrict the multiplicity to
one, we supposed that if there are two macs belong to the mitmIntercepts, these
two macs are equal.
Line (4) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula H below:
connection: MAC ->lone serviceProvider
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus)(mac MAC))(and(forall ((isp11 ISP))
(=>(connection cs mac isp11)(serviceProvider cs isp11)))
(forall ((isp12 ISP)(isp13 ISP))(=>(and(connection cs mac isp12)
(connection cs mac isp13))(= isp12 isp13)))))
Formula H:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus,mac:MAC
(∀ isp11:ISP.(cs,mac,isp11) ∈ connection =>
(cs,isp11) ∈ serviceProvider ∧
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∀ isp12,isp13:ISP.(cs,mac,isp12) ∈ connection ∧
(cs,mac,isp13) ∈ connection =>isp12 = isp13)
The formula H specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status, mac in MAC ; for all isp11 :ISP, such that the cs, mac, and isp11 belong
to connection, then cs and isp11 belong to serviceProvider, and for all isp12 and
isp13 in ISP, such that the cs, mac, and isp12 belong to connection, and cs, mac,
and isp13 belong to connection, then that isp12 equals isp13. To restrict the
multiplicity to lone we supposed that if there are two isp in the connection, they
are equal.
Line (5) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula I below:
status:MAC ->one ConnectionStatus
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus)(mac MAC))(and(exists ((co ConnectionStatus))
(status cs mac co))
(forall ((a3 ConnectionStatus)(a2 ConnectionStatus))
(=>(and(status cs mac a2)(status cs mac a3))(= a2 a3)))))
Formula I:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus,mac:MAC ∃ o:ConnectionStatus.(cs,mac,co) ∈ status ∧
∀ a2,a3:ConnectionStatus.(cs,mac,a2) ∈ status ∧ (cs,mac,a3) ∈ status =>(a2 = a3)
The formula I specifics constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status and mac in MAC, if there exists an atom o in ConnectionStatus such that
cs, mac, and co belong to status, and for all atoms a2 and a3 in Communication-
Status such that cs, mac, and a2 belong to status and cs, mac, and a3 belong to
status then a1 equals a2. To restrict the multiplicity to one we supposed that if
there are two ConnectionStatus, thus they are equal.
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Line (6) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula J below:
opens :MAC ->serviceProvider ->Channel
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus) (mac MAC)(isp ISP)(ch Channel))
(=>(opens cs mac isp ch)(serviceProvider cs isp)))
Formula J:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus,mac:MAC, isp:ISP,
ch:Channel.(cs,mac,isp,ch) ∈ opens =>(cs,isp) ∈ serviceProvider
The formula J specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status, mac in MAC, isp in ISP, and ch in Channel such that cs, mac, isp,and ch
belong to open then cs and isp belong to serviceProvider .
Line (7) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed in
formula K below:
sends: MAC ->lone (Data ->Time)->Channel
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus)(mac MAC)(ch Channel)
(d1 Data)(d2 Data)(t Time)(t1 Time))(=>
(and(sends cs mac d1 t ch)(sends cs mac d2 t1 ch)) (and(= d1 d2 )(= t t1 ))))
Formula K:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus, mac:MAC,ch:Channel, t,t1:Time,
d1,d2:Data.(cs mac d1 t ch) ∈ sends ∧
(cs mac d2 t1 ch) ∈ sends =>(d1 = d2) ∧ (t = t1)
The formula K specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status, mac in MAC, ch in Channel, t and t1 in Time and d1 and d2 in Data such
that cs, mac, d1, t, and ch belong to sends ; and cs, mac, d2, t1, and ch belong to
sends then d2 equals d1 and t equals t1. To restrict the multiplicity to lone, we
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suppose that if there are two times and data belonging to the sends, thus these
two times and datum are equal.
Line (8) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (D.2) is expressed to
formula L below:
receives: MAC ->lone (Data ->Time)->Channel
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus)(mac MAC)(ch Channel),
(d1 Data)(d2 Data)(t Time)(t1 Time))(=>
(and(receives cs mac d1 t ch)(receives cs mac d2 t1 ch))
(and(= d1 d2 )(= t t1 ))))
Formula L:
∀ cs:CommunicationStatus, mac:MAC,ch:Channel ∃ t,t1:Time,
d1,d2:Data.(cs mac d1 t ch) ∈ receives ∧
(cs mac d2 t1 ch) ∈ receives =>(d1 = d2) ∧ (t = t1)
The formula L specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs in Communication-
Status, mac in MAC, ch in Channel, t and t1 in Time; d1 and d2 in Data such
that cs, mac, d1, t, and ch belong to receives ; and cs, mac, d2, t1, and ch belong
to receives then d2 equals d1 and t equals t1. To restrict the multiplicity to lone,
we suppose that if there are two times and data belonging to the receives, thus
these two times and datum are equal.
7.1.1.6 Predicates
As seen in Appendix (D.9), the translation focuses on “in-lining ” of the pred-
icate SingleChannel. In-lining means without explicit declaration. The Sin-
gleChannel protocol passes through one status.
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Line (1) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
M below:
[t,t’:Time, d,d’:Data,isp,isp1:ISP, status1:Communication Status ,ch:Channel]
(forall ((isp ISP)(isp1 ISP)(d Data)(d1 Data)(t Time)(t1 Time)
(ch1 Channel)(status1 CommunicationStatus))
Formula M:
∀ status1:CommunicationStatus, isp,isp1:ISP, d,d1:Data, t,t1:Time, ch1:Channel
The formula M declares all variables to be used in the predicate and assertion:
status1 for the status; d and d1 for data that has been sent and received in the
status; t and t1 for times for sending and receiving data; isp for the internet service
provider that the client connects with; isp1 for the internet service provider that
the server connects with; the channel ch1 for exchange data.
These variables will be used directly in the predicates and assertion below with-
out the need for redeclaration.
Line (2) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
N below:
status1.client1.(status1.status)=isConnection And Exchanging Data
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus)(cmac MAC))
(=>(and (client1 status1 cmac)(status status1 cmac cs1))
(isConnection And Exchanging Data cs1)))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus))(cmac MAC))
(=>(isConnection And Exchanging Data cs2)
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(status status1 cmac cs2)))))
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Formula N:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isConnectionAndExchangingData ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isConnectionAndExchangingData =>(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,cs2)∈ status)
The formula N specifics constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in ConnectionSta-
tus, and cmac in MAC, such that status1 and cmac belong to client1, and status1,
cmac, and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isConnectionAndExchanging-
Data. It follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus, and cmac in MAC,
such that cs2 belongs to isConnectionAndExchangingData then status1 and cmac
belong to client1, and status1, cmac, and cs2 belong to status.
Line (3) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
O below:
status1.server.(status1.status)=isConnection And Exchanging Data
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus),(smac MAC))
(=>(and (server status1 smac)(status status1 smac cs1))
(isConnection And Exchanging Data cs1)))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus),(smac MAC))
(=>(isConnection And Exchanging Data cs2)
(and (server status1 smac)(status status1 smac cs2)))))
Formula O:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isConnectionAndExchangingData ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isConnectionAndExchangingData =>(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,cs2)∈ status)
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The formula O specifics constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in ConnectionStatus,
an smac in MAC, such that status1 and smac belong to server, and status1, smac,
and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isConnectionAndExchangingData. It
follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus, and smac in MAC, such that
cs2 belongs to isConnectionAndExchangingData then status1 and smac belong to
server, and status1, smac, and cs2 belong to status.
Line (4) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
P below:
status1.client1 in status1.visitors
(forall ((cmac MAC))(=>(client1 status1 cmac)(visitors status1 cmac)))
Formula P:
( ∀ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac) ∈ visitors
The formula P specifies constraints that: for all cmac in MAC, such that
status1 and cmac belong to client1 then status1 and cmac belong to visitors.
Line (5) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
Q below:
status1.server in status1.visitors
(forall ((smac MAC))(=>(client1 status1 smac)(visitors status1 smac)))
Formula Q:
( forall smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server =>
(status1,smac) ∈ visitors
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The formula Q specifies constraints that: for all smac in MAC, such that
status1 and smac belong to server then status1 and smac belong to visitors.
Line (6) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
R below:
no status1.client1.(status1.receives)
(forall ((cmac MAC))
(and(not(and(client1 status1 cmac)(receives status1 cmac d1 t1 ch1)))
(not(and(client1 status1 cmac)(receives status1 cmac d t ch1)))))
Formula R:
(∀ cmac:MAC.(not(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
((status1,cmac,d1,t1,ch1) ∈ receives) ∧
(not(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
((status1,cmac,d,t,ch1) ∈ receives)
The formula R specifies constraints that: for all cmac in MAC, such that
status1 and cmac do not belong to client1 and status1, cmac, d1, t1, and ch1
belong to receives ; and status1 and cmac do not belong to client1 and status1,
cmac, d, t, and ch1 belong to receives.
Line (7) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
S below:
no status1.server.(status1.sends)
(forall ((smac MAC))
(and(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac d1 t1 ch1)))
(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac d t ch1)))))
198
Chapter 7: Multichannel Security Protocol Proving Using Z3
Formula S:
(∀ smac:MAC.(not(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
((status1,smac,d1,t1,ch1) ∈ sends) ∧
(not(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
((status1,smac,d,t,ch1) ∈ sends)
The formula S specifies constraints that: for all smac in MAC, such that status1
and smac do not belong to server and status1, smac, d1, t1, and ch1 belong to
sends); and status1 and smac do not belong to server and status1, smac, d, t, and
ch1 belong to sends.
Line (8) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
T below:
status1.client1.(status1.connection)= isp
(forall ((isp11 ISP))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(connection status1 cmac isp11)))(= isp isp11))
(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(connection status1 cmac1 isp)))))
Formula T:
(∀ isp11:ISP ∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac,isp11) ∈ connection =>(= isp isp11))
=>(∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac1,isp) ∈ connection
The formula T specifies constraints that:for all isp11 in ISP, if there exist cmac
in MAC such that the status1 and cmac belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac,
and isp11 belong to connection then isp equals isp11. It follows that there exists
cmac1 in MAC such that the status1 and cmac1 belong to client1 ; and status1,
cmac1, and isp belong to connection.
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Line (9) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
U below:
status1.server.(status1.connection)= isp’
(forall ((isp11 ISP))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(connection status1 smac isp11)))(= isp1 isp11))
(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(connection status1 smac isp1)))))
Formula U:
(∀ isp11:ISP ∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac,isp11) ∈ connection =>(= isp1 isp11))
=>(∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,isp1) ∈ connection
The formula U specifies constraints that:for all isp11 in ISP, if there exist smac
in MAC such that the status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1, smac, and
isp11 belong to connection then isp1 equals isp11. It follows that there exists
smac1 in MAC such that the status1 and smac1 belong to server ; and status1,
smac1, and isp1 belong to connection.
Line (10) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
V below:
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status1.client1.(status1.opens)= status1.client.(status1.connection)->ch1
(forall ((isp11 ISP)(ch Channel))(=>(forall ((cmac MAC))(=>
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(connection status1 cmac isp11))
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(opens status1 cmac isp11 ch ))))
(and(= isp isp11)(= ch1 ch))))(forall ((cmac1 MAC))(=>
(and (client1 status1 cmac1)(connection status1 cmac1 isp))
(and (client1 status1 cmac1)(opens status1 cmac1 isp ch1))))
Formula V:
(exists ((mac25 MAC)) (∀ isp11:ISP, ch:Channel ∀ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac,isp11) ∈ connection =>
(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,cmac,isp11,ch) ∈ opens
=> (isp = isp11) ∧ (ch1 = ch) ∧
(∀ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac1,isp) ∈ connection =>
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,cmac1,isp,ch1) ∈ opens)
The formula V specifies constraints that: for all isp11 in ISP, ch in Channel,
and cmac in MAC such that, status1 and cmac belong to client1 and status1,
cmac, and isp11 belong to connection. It follows that, status1 and cmac belong
to client1 and status1, cmac, isp11, and ch belong to opens, then isp equals isp11
and ch1 equals ch. For all cmac1 in MAC such that, status1 and cmac1 belong to
client1 and status1, cmac1, and isp belong to connection. It follows that, status1
and cmac1 belong to client1 and status1, cmac1, isp, and ch1 belong to opens.
Line (11) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
W below:
status1.server.(status1.opens)= status1.server.(status1.connection)->ch1
(forall ((isp11 ISP)(ch Channel))(=>(forall ((smac MAC))(=>
(and (server status1 smac)(connection status1 smac isp11))
(and (server status1 smac)(opens status1 smac isp11 ch ))))
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(and(= isp1 isp11)(= ch1 ch))))(forall ((smac1 MAC))(=>
(and (server status1 smac1)(connection status1 smac1 isp))
(and (server status1 smac1)(opens status1 smac1 isp1 ch1))))
Formula W:
(exists ((mac25 MAC)) (∀ isp11:ISP, ch:Channel ∀ smac:MAC.(status1,smac)
∈ server ∧(status1,smac,isp11) ∈ connection =>
(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,isp11,ch) ∈ opens
=> (isp1 = isp11) ∧ (ch1 = ch) ∧
(∀ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,isp) ∈ connection =>
(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧ (status1,smac1,isp1,ch1) ∈ opens)
The formula W specifies constraints that: for all isp11 in ISP, ch in Chan-
nel,and smac in MAC such that, status1 and smac belong to server and status1,
smac, and isp11 belong to connection. It follows that, status1 and smac belong
to server and status1, smac, isp11, and ch belong to opens, then isp1 equals isp11
and ch1 equals ch. For all smac1 in MAC such that, status1 and smac1 belong to
server and status1, smac1, and isp belong to connection. It follows that, status1
and smac1 belong to server and status1, smac1, isp1, and ch1 belong to opens.
Line (12) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula
x below:
status1.client1.(status1.sends)=d->t->ch1
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d d11)(= t t11)(= ch1 ch11))))
(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(sends status1 cmac1 d t ch1)))
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Formula x:
(∀ t,t1:Time, d,d1:Data, ch1:Channel
( ∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(d = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11)))) ∧
∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac1,d,t,ch1) ∈ sends)))
The formula x specifies constraints that: for all atoms t and t1 in Time; d and
d1 in Data; and ch1 in Channel, for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in Data; and ch11
in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that, status1 and cmac belong to
client1 ; and status1, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends, then d equals d11,
t equals t11, and ch1 equals ch11. So, if there exists cmac1 in MAC, then status1
and cmac1 belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac1, d, t, and ch1 belong to sends.
Line (13) for the predicate below and in Appendix (D.9) expressed to formula
Y below:
status1.server.(status1.receives)=d1 ->t1 ->ch1
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))
(=>(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11) (= ch1 ch11))))
(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(receives status1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1)))
Formula Y:
(∀ t11:Time, d11:Data, ch11:Channel
∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(d1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧ (ch1 = ch11))) ∧
∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac1,d1,t1,ch1) ∈ receives)))
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The formula Y specifies constraints that: for all atoms t11 in Time; d11 in
Data; and ch11 in Channel, if there exists smac in MAC such that, status1 and
smac belong to server ; and status1, smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives,
then d1 equals d11, t1 equals t11, and ch1 equals ch11. So, if there exists smac1
in MAC, then status1 and smac1 belong to server ; and status1, smac1, d1, t1,
and ch1 belong to receives.
Lines (14, 15) for the predicate below and in Appendix (E.9) is expressed in
formula Z below:
status1.mitmIntercepts !in status1.visitors or
(((status1.mitmIntercepts in status1.visitors) and
(status1.client) !in status1.mitmIntercepts))
(or(=>(mitmIntercepts status1 mmac)(not(visitors status1 mmac)))
(and(=>(mitmIntercepts status1 mmac)(visitors status1 mmac))
(=>(client1 status1 cmac)(not(mitmIntercepts status1 cmac))))))
Formula Z:
(status1,mmac) ∈ mitmIntercepts =>(status1,mmac) /∈ visitors ∨
((status1,mmac) ∈ mitmIntercepts =>(status1,mmac) ∈ visitors
∧ (status1,cmac) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac) /∈ mitmIntercepts)
=>
The formula Z specifies constraints that: if a MitM mmac belongs to mit-
mIntercepts in the status, then the MitM mmac does not belong to the visitors in
the status (secure scope), or if the MitM mmac belongs to mitmIntercepts in the
status, then the MitM mmac belongs to the visitors in the status, and if a client
cmac belongs to client1 in the status, then the client cmac does not belong to
mitmIntercepts in the status.
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7.1.1.7 Assertion
Lines (24) in Appendix (D.9) is expressed in formula A1 below:
d = d1
= d d1
Formula A1:
d = d1
The formula A1 specifies constraints that: sending and receiving data should
be equal.
7.1.2 Second Protocol: Transmitting Data Over Multi-
channel
7.1.2.1 Type and Subtype Declarations
In Appendix (F) we give full details of the Z3 models with annotations to show
the equivalent Alloy.
As seen in Appendix F, the hierarchical type system is translated implicitly.
However, because the SMT language does not support subtypes, we use mem-
bership functions to enforce type hierarchy declarations. Consequently, top-level
types are translated to the uninterpreted sorts, while the top-level (super-type)
of a type is translated to uninterpreted membership function isType to indicate
which elements of the super-type belongs to the type. It is not necessary to declare
the membership functions of top-level types, but we declared them to determine
the semantics of the subtype.
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As seen in Appendix (F.1), top-level types are the same as the top-level type in
the first protocol. Membership functions in Appendix (F.2) Lines (16, 17) isFirst-
CommunicationAndExchangingIndices, and isSecondCommunicationAndExchang-
ingLetters are declared to specify the semantics of subtypes FirstCommunicatio-
nAndExchangingIndices, and SecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters. I.e all
membership functions in Lines (16, 17) are disjoint subsets of the declared type
ConnectionStatus.
7.1.2.2 Properties Of The Sub-signatures
As seen in Appendix (F.5), in (Lines 1, 2) we adjust the return types of the
“oneOf ” functions/constants by specifying that each returns a value of type Con-
nectionStatus. For example: Line (1) calls function oneOfFirstCommunicatio-
nAndExchangingIndices in Line (1) in Appendix (F.3) which calls function is-
FirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices in Line (16) in Appendix (F.2) which
returns one ConnectionStatus type isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices
in Line (16) Appendix (F.2) which is already specified as return type in Line (1)
Appendix (F.5).
Sub-signatures (Lines 1, 2) Appendix (F.5) declare functions of the property
some for each of the sub signatures FirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices,
and SecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters of the super signature Connec-
tionStatus because ConnectionStatus has at least one element of the sub signa-
tures. The functions restrict the super signature to have at least one element in
each ConnectionStatus. In (Lines 1, 2) Appendix (F.6) we need to assert the lone
property of the previous sub signatures because ConnectionStatus has at most
one element of the sub signatures. The assertion (Lines 1, 2) Appendix (F.6) are
expressed in the formula B1 below:
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Formula B1:
∀ f1, f2: ConnectionStatus.(f1 ∈ isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices ∧
f2 ∈ isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices) =>f1 = f2 ∧
∀ s1, s2: ConnectionStatus.(s1 ∈ isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters ∧
s2 ∈ isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters) =>s1 = s2
The formula B1 specifies constraints that for each ConnectionStatus, there is
at most only one corresponding ConnectionStatus : if there exist two Connection-
Status belongs to isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices for example, then
these two ConnectionStatus should be equals. i.e we restrict the characteristics of
multiplicity lone which is (at most one) ConnectionStatus of type isFirstCommu-
nicationAndExchangingIndices for each statues to avoid the inconsistency.
7.1.2.3 Abstraction
As seen in Appendix (F.7), an abstract type is the union of its subtypes. Thus
it constrains every element of a type to belong to one of its extending subtypes.
Line (1) is expressed in the formula C1 below:
Formula C1:
∀ co:ConnectionStatus.¬(co ∈ isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices ∧
co ∈ isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters)
The formula C1 specifies constraints that for each ConnectionStatus, there
is only one corresponding ConnectionStatus, and this ConnectionStatus is ei-
ther isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices or isSecondCommunicationAn-
dExchangingLetters to avoid inconsistency. No two ConnectionStatus occur at one
time.
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7.1.2.4 Extension
As seen in Appendix (F.8), the extends types are mutually disjoint. Line (1) is
expressed in the formula D1 below:
Formula D1:
∀ co:ConnectionStatus.(co ∈ isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices ∨
co ∈ isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters)
The formula D1 specifies constraints that for all ConnectionStatus , Connec-
tionStatus co does not belong to isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices and
isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters ; it only belongs to one Connec-
tionStatus.
7.1.2.5 Facts
Alloy facts are assumed to be true. They represent the multichannel protocol
properties. As seen in Appendix (F.10), Line (1) declares quantifiers that restrict
the first fact, line (2) declares quantifiers that restrict the second fact, and line
(3) declares quantifiers that restrict the third fact.
The first fact as seen below is expressed in formula E1 below:
First fact:
(forall ((status1 CommunicationStatus)(status2 CommunicationStatus)
(implies(forall ((cmac1 MAC)(cmac2 MAC))(and(and (=>
(client1 status1 cmac1)(visitors status1 cmac1))(=>(client2 status1 cmac2)
(not(visitors status1 cmac2)))(=>(client1 status2 cmac1)(not(visitors status2 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(visitors status2 cmac2)))
(or (and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(interseptMacs status1 cmac1))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2))))
(and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))
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(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))
(and(=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))))))
(forall ((status1 CommunicationStatus)(status2 CommunicationStatus)(t Time)(t1 Time)
(t2 Time)(t3 Time)(indices Data)(indices1 Data)(letters Data)(letters1 Data))
(implies (and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices d11)(= t t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))(exists ((cmac1 MAC))
(and (client1 status1 cmac1)(sends status1 cmac1 indices t ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))
(and (server status1 smac)(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices1 d11)(= t1 t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))(exists ((smac1 MAC))
(and (server status1 smac1)(receives status1 smac1 indices1 t1 ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))
(and (client2 status2 cmac)(sends status2 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters d11)(= t2 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))(exists ((cmac2 MAC))
(and (client2 status2 cmac2)(sends status2 cmac2 letters t2 ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))
(and (server status2 smac)(receives status2 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters1 d11)(= t3 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))(exists ((smac2 MAC))
(and (server status2 smac2)(receives status2 smac2 letters1 t3 ch11))))))
(forall ((cmac1 MAC)(cmac2 MAC))
(or (and(and(= t2 t3)(not(= t t1)))(and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)
(interseptMacs status1 cmac1))(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)
(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))))(and(and(not(= t2 t3))(= t t1))
(and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(interseptMacs status2 cmac2))))
(and(and(= t t1 )(= t2 t3 ))(and(=>(client1 status1 cmac1)
(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))(=>(client2 status2 cmac2))))
(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))))))))))
Formula E1:
∀ status1,status2:CommunicationStatus, cmac1, cmac2:MAC.((status1,cmac1)
∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) ∈ visitors ∧ (status1,cmac2) /∈ client2
=>(status1,cmac2) /∈ visitors ∧ (status2,cmac1) /∈ client1
=>(status2,cmac1) /∈ visitors ∧ (status2,cmac2) ∈ client2
=>(status2,cmac2) ∈ visitors ∧
((status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) ∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs ∨
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) ∈ interseptMacs ∨
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs) =>
∀status1,status2:CommunicationStatus, t,t1,t2,t3:Time,indices,
indices1,letters,letters1:Data
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( ∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MCAC.(ststus1, cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
(ststus1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>(indices = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧
(ststus1,ch11) ∈ ch1 ) =>∃ cmac1:MCAC.(ststus1, cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧
(ststus1,cmac1,indices,t,ch11) ∈ sends ∧
∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MCAC.(ststus1, smac) ∈ server ∧
(ststus1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>(indices1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧
(ststus1,ch11) ∈ ch1 ) =>∃ smac1:MCAC.(ststus1, smac1) ∈ server ∧
(ststus1,smac1,indices1,t1,ch11) ∈ receives ∧
( ∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MCAC.(ststus2, cmac) ∈ client2 ∧
(ststus2,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>(letters = d11) ∧ (t2 = t11) ∧
(ststus2,ch11) ∈ ch2 ) =>∃ cmac2:MCAC.(ststus2, cmac2) ∈ client2 ∧
(ststus2,cmac2,letters,t2,ch11) ∈ sends ∧
∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MCAC.(ststus2, smac) ∈ server ∧
(ststus2,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>(letters1 = d11) ∧ (t3 = t11) ∧
(ststus2,ch11) ∈ ch2 ) =>∃ smac2:MCAC.(ststus2, smac2) ∈ server ∧
(ststus2,smac2,letters1,t2,ch11) ∈ receives ) =>
(∀ cmac1:MCAC,cmac2:MCAC.(t2 = t3) ∧ (t 6= t1) ∧
((status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) ∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(t2 6= t3) ∧ (t = t1) ∧
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) ∈ interseptMacs ∧
(t2 = t3) ∧ (t = t1) ∧
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs)))))))))))
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The formula E1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status1 and status2 in
CommunicationStatus, cmac1, cmac2 in MAC, such that if the first client belongs
to client1 in status1, the first client belongs to visitors in status1, and if the second
client does not belong to client2 in status1, the second client does not belong to
visitors in status1, and if the first client does not belong to client1 in status2, the
first client does not belong to visitors in status2, and if the second client belongs
to client2 in status2, the second client belongs to visitors in status2.
And, if the first client belongs to client1 in status1, the first client belongs to
interseptMacs in status1, and if the second client belongs to client2 in status2, the
second client does not belong to interseptMacs in status2. Or, if the first client
belongs to client1 in status1, the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in
status1, and if the second client belongs to client2 in status2, the second client
belongs to interseptMacs in status2. Or, if the first client belongs to client1 in
status1, the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in status1, and if the
second client belongs to client2 in status2, the second client does not belong to
interseptMacs in status2.
It follows that for all status1 and CommunicationStatus in status1 ; t, t1, t2, and
t3 in Time; indices, indices1, letters, and letters1 in Data, for all d11 in Data, t11
in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a cmac in MAC, such that status1
and cmac belong to client1 and status1, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends
then indices equals d11, t equals t11, and ststus1, ch11 belong to ch1, then if
there exists a cmac1 in MAC, such that status1 and cmac1 belong to client1 and
status1, cmac1, indices, t, and ch11 belong to sends.
Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
smac in MAC, such that status1 and smac belong to server and status1, smac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then indices1 equals d11, t1 equals t11 ,and
ststus1, ch11 belong to ch1, then if there exists a smac1 in MAC, such that status1
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and smac1 belong to server and status1, smac1, indices1, t1, and ch11 belong to
receives.
Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
cmac in MAC, such that status2 and cmac belong to client2 and status2, cmac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends then letters equals d11, t2 equals t11, and
ststus2, ch11 belong to ch2, then if there exists a cmac2 in MAC, such that
status2 and cmac2 belong to client2 and status2, cmac2, letters, t2, and ch11
belong to sends.
Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
smac in MAC, such that status2 and smac belong to server and status2, smac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then letters1 equals d11, t3 equals t11 ,and
ststus2, ch11 belong to ch2, then if there exists a smac2 in MAC, such that status2
and smac2 belong to server and status2, smac2, letters1, t3, and ch11 belong to
receives.
Then for all cmac1, and cmac2 in MAC, such that if times for sending and
receiving indices are not equal and times for sending and receiving letters are
equal and if the first client belongs to client1 in status1, then the first client
belongs to interseptMacs in status1, and if the second client belongs to client2
in status2, then the second client does not belong to interseptMacs in status2.
And, times for sending and receiving indices are equal and times for sending and
receiving letters are not equal and if the first client belongs to client1 in status1,
then the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in status1, and if the second
client belongs to client2 in status2, then the second client belongs to interseptMacs
in status2. And, times for sending and receiving indices are equal and times for
sending and receiving letters are equal and if the first client belongs to client1 in
stastus1, then the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in status1, and if
the second client belongs to client2 in status2, then the second client does not
212
Chapter 7: Multichannel Security Protocol Proving Using Z3
belong to interseptMacs in status2.
The second fact as seen below is expressed in formula F1 below:
Second fact:
(forall ((status1 CommunicationStatus)(status2 CommunicationStatus)(t Time)(t1 Time)
(t2 Time)(t3 Time)(indices Data)(indices1 Data)(letters Data)(letters1 Data))
(implies (and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices d11)(= t t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))(exists ((cmac1 MAC))
(and (client1 status1 cmac1)(sends status1 cmac1 indices t ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))
(and (server status1 smac)(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices1 d11)(= t1 t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))(exists ((smac1 MAC))
(and (server status1 smac1)(receives status1 smac1 indices1 t1 ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))
(and (client2 status2 cmac)(sends status2 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters d11)(= t2 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))(exists ((cmac2 MAC))
(and (client2 status2 cmac2)(sends status2 cmac2 letters t2 ch11)))))
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))
(and (server status2 smac)(receives status2 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters1 d11)(= t3 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))(exists ((smac2 MAC))
(and (server status2 smac2)(receives status2 smac2 letters1 t3 ch11)))))
(or(and(= t t1)(not(= t2 t3)))(and(= t2 t3)(not(= t t1)))(and(= t2 t3)(= t t1))))
(and(= indices indices1)(= letters letters1))))
Formula F1:
∀status1,status2:CommunicationStatus, t,t1,t2,t3:Time,indices,
indices1,letters,letters1:Data
( ∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MCAC.(ststus1, cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (ststus1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>(indices = d11) ∧ (t = t11)
∧ (ststus1,ch11) ∈ ch1 ) =>∃ cmac1:MCAC.(ststus1, cmac1) ∈ client1
∧ (ststus1,cmac1,indices,t,ch11) ∈ sends ∧
∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MCAC.(ststus1, smac) ∈ server
∧ (ststus1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>(indices1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11)
∧ (ststus1,ch11) ∈ ch1 ) =>∃ smac1:MCAC.(ststus1, smac1) ∈ server
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∧ (ststus1,smac1,indices1,t1,ch11) ∈ receives ∧
( ∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MCAC.(ststus2, cmac) ∈ client2
∧ (ststus2,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>(letters = d11) ∧ (t2 = t11)
∧ (ststus2,ch11) ∈ ch2 ) =>∃ cmac2:MCAC.(ststus2, cmac2) ∈ client2
∧ (ststus2,cmac2,letters,t2,ch11) ∈ sends ∧
∀ d11:Data, t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MCAC.(ststus2, smac) ∈ server
∧ (ststus2,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>(letters1 = d11) ∧ (t3 = t11)
∧ (ststus2,ch11) ∈ ch2 ) =>∃ smac2:MCAC.(ststus2, smac2) ∈ server
∧ (ststus2,smac2,letters1,t2,ch11) ∈ receives ) ∧
(t 6= t1) ∨ (t2 6= t3) ∧ (t = t1) ∨ (t2 = t3) ∧ (t = t1) =>
(indices = indices1) ∧ (letters = letters1))))
The formula F1 specifies constraints that: for all status1 and Communication-
Status in status1 ; t, t1, t2, and t3 in Time; indices, indices1, letters, an letters1 in
Data, for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a cmac
in MAC, such that status1 and cmac belong to client1 and status1, cmac, d11,
t11, and ch11 belong to sends then indices equals d11, t equals t11 ,and ststus1,
ch11 belong to ch1, then if there exists a cmac1 in MAC, such that status1 and
cmac1 belong to client1 and status1, cmac1, indices, t, and ch11 belong to sends.
Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
smac in MAC, such that status1 and smac belong to server and status1, smac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then indices1 equals d11, t1 equals t11 ,and
ststus1, ch11 belong to ch1, then if there exists a smac1 in MAC, such that status1
and smac1 belong to server and status1, smac1, indices1, t1, and ch11 belong to
receives.
Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
cmac in MAC, such that status2 and cmac belong to client2 and status2, cmac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends then letters equals d11, t2 equals t11 ,and
ststus2, ch11 belong to ch2, then if there exists a cmac2 in MAC, such that status2
and cmac2 belong to client2 and status2, cmac2, letters, t2, and ch11 belong to
sends.
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Then for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time, and ch11 in Channel, if there exists a
smac in MAC, such that status2 and smac belong to server and status2, smac,
d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then letters1 equal d11, t3 equal t11 ,and
ststus2, ch11 belong to ch2, then if there exists a smac2 in MAC, such that status2
and smac2 belong to server and status2, smac2, letters1, t3, and ch11 belong to
receives, and if times for sending and receiving indices are not equal, and times for
sending and receiving letters are equal, or times for sending and receiving indices
are equal, and times for sending and receiving letters are not equal, or times for
sending and receiving indices are equal, and times for sending and receiving letters
are equal, then sent and received indices are equal, and sent and received letters
are equal.
The third fact as seen below are expressed in formula G1 below:
Third fact:
(forall ((s CommunicationStatus)(s1 CommunicationStatus)(mac1 MAC)
(mac2 MAC)(mac3 MAC)(mac4 MAC))
(and (=>(and(client1 s mac1)(server s mac2))(not(= mac1 mac2)))
(=>(and(client2 s mac1)(server s mac2))(not(= mac1 mac2)))
(=>(and(client1 s mac1)(client2 s1 mac2))(not(= mac1 mac2)))
(=>(and(client1 s mac1)(client1 s1 mac2))(= mac1 mac2))
(=>(and(server s mac3)(server s1 mac4))(= mac3 mac4))))
Formula G1:
∀ s,s1:CommunicationStatus,mac1, mac2, mac3, mac4.((s,mac1)
∈ client1 ∧ (s,mac2) ∈ server =>mac1 6= mac2 ∧
((s,mac1) ∈ client2 ∧ (s,mac2) ∈ server =>mac1 6= mac2 ∧
((s,mac1) ∈ client1 ∧ (s1,mac2) ∈ client2 =>mac1 6= mac2 ∧
((s,mac1) ∈ client1 ∧ (s1,mac2) ∈ client1 =>mac1 = mac2 ∧
((s,mac3) ∈ server ∧ (s1,mac4) ∈ server =>mac3 = mac4
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The formula G1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms s and s1 in Commu-
nicationStatus, and mac1 ; mac2 ; mac3 ; and mac4 in MAC such that mac1 and s
belong to client1 and s, mac2 belong to server then, mac1 does not equal mac2 ;
and s, mac1 belong to client2, and s, mac2 belong to the server then, mac1 does
not equal mac2 ; and s, mac1 belong to client1, and s1, mac2 belong to the client2
then, mac1 does not equal mac2 ; and s, mac1 belong to client1, and s1, mac2
belong to the client1 then, mac1 equals mac2 ; and s, mac3 belong to server, and
s1, mac4 belong to the server then, mac3 equals mac4.
7.1.2.6 Relation Declarations
Relations are translated to Boolean-valued, uninterpreted, membership func-
tions. As seen in Appendix (F.2), these functions are declared over top-level types
because only top-level types are declared as sorts.
Lines (1-15) Appendix (F.2) declare functions of relations. These relations are
the same as the relations in the first protocol. However, more relations are re-
quired for developing from the first protocol to the second protocol. These rela-
tions are: client1 and client2, which are declared as Boolean-valued function over
CommunicationStatus and MAC (Lines 3,4); ispA andispB, which are declared as
Boolean-valued function over CommunicationStatus and ISP (Lines 6-8); channel,
ch1, and ch2 which are declared as boolean-valued functions over ConnectionSta-
tus and Channel (Lines 11-13).
Lines (1-12) Appendix (F.9) declare constraints guaranteeing that each relation
is defined for its specific types considering the multiplicity keywords constraints.
The relations visitors:set MAC, serviceProvider: set ISP, and channel: set
Channel are not required to be translated to formulas to show constraints as
the set keyword constrains and allows any number of elements. Thus, its defined
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Boolean-valued function (Lines 1, 2, and 11) Appendix (F.2) are equivalent to
their meanings.
Line (1) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula H1 below:
client1: one MAC
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and(exists ((mac1 MAC))(client1 cs mac1))
(forall ((mac3 MAC)(mac2 MAC))(=>(and(client1 cs mac2)(client1 cs mac3))
(= mac2 mac3)))))
Formula H1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ mac1:MAC.(status,mac1) ∈
client1 ∧ ∀ mac3,mac2:MAC.(status,mac3) ∈ client1
∧ (status,mac2) ∈ client1 =>mac2 = mac3
The formula H1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status in Communi-
cationStatus, if there exists mac1 in MAC, such that the status and mac1 belong
to the first client client1, and for all mac3 and mac2 :MAC such that mac3 and
status belong to the first client (client1) and status and mac2 belong to the first
client (client1) then mac2 equals mac3. To restrict the multiplicity to be one, we
suppose that if there are two macs belonging to the first client client1, these two
macs are equal.
Line (2) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula I1 below:
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client2: one MAC
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and(exists ((mac1 MAC))(client2 cs mac1))
(forall ((mac3 MAC)(mac2 MAC))(=>(and(client2 cs mac2)(client2 cs mac3))
(= mac2 mac3)))))
Formula I1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ mac1:MAC.(status,mac1) ∈
client2 ∧ ∀ mac3,mac2:MAC.(status,mac3) ∈ client2
∧ (status,mac2) ∈ client2 =>mac2 = mac3
The formula I1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status in Communica-
tionStatus, if there exists mac1 in MAC, such that the status and mac1 belong to
the second client client2, and for all mac3 and mac2 :MAC such that mac3 and
status belong to the second client (client2) and status and mac2 belong to the
second client (client2) then mac2 equals mac3. To restrict the multiplicity to be
one, we suppose that if there are two macs belonging to the second client client1,
these two macs are equal.
Line (5) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula J1 below:
ispA:one ISP
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and (exists ((isp1 ISP))(ispA cs isp1))
(forall ((isp2 ISP)(isp3 ISP))(=>(and (ispA cs isp2)(ispA cs isp3))
(= isp2 isp3)))))
Formula J1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ isp1:ISP.(status,isp1) ∈ ispA ∧
∀ isp3,isp2:ISP.(status,isp3) ∈ isbA ∧ (status,isb2) ∈ isbA =>isp2 = isp3
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The formula J1 specifics constraints that: for all atoms status in Communi-
cationStatus, if there exists isp1 in ISP, such that the status and isp1 belong to
isbA and for all isp3 and isp2 in ISP, such that the status and isp3 belong to
ispA and status and isb2 belong to ispA then isp2 equals isp3. To restrict the
multiplicity to be one, we suppose that if there are two isps belonging to the ISP,
these two isps are equal.
Line (6) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula K1 below:
ispB:one ISP
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and (exists ((isp1 ISP))(ispB cs isp1))
(forall ((isp2 ISP)(isp3 ISP))(=>(and (ispB cs isp2)(ispB cs isp3))
(= isp2 isp3)))))
Formula K1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ isp1:ISP.(status,isp1) ∈
isbB ∧ ∀ isp3,isp2:ISP.(status,isp3) ∈ isbB
∧ (status,isb2) ∈ isbB =>isp2 = isp3
The formula K1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status in Communi-
cationStatus, if there exists isp1 in ISP, such that the status and isp1 belong to
ispB and for all isp3 and isp2 in ISP, such that the status and isp3 belong to
ispB and status and isb2 belong to ispB then isp2 equals isp3. To restrict the
multiplicity to be one, we suppose that if there are two isps belonging to the ISP,
these two isps are equal.
Line (9) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula L1 below:
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ch1: one Channel
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and(exists ((ch11 Channel))(ch1 cs ch11))
(forall ((ch22 Channel)(ch33 Channel))(=>(and (ch1 cs ch22)(ch1 cs ch33))
(= ch22 ch33)))))
Formula L1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ ch11:Channel.(status,ch11) ∈ ch1
∧ ∀ ch22,ch33:Channel.(status,ch22) ∈ ch1 ∧
(status,ch33) ∈ ch1 =>(ch33 = ch22)
The formula L1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status in Communica-
tionStatus, if there exists ch11 in Channel, such that the status and ch11 belongs
to ch1 ; and for all ch22 and ch33 in Channel, such that, the status and ch22 be-
long to ch1 and ch33 and status belong to ch1 then ch33 equals ch22. To restrict
the multiplicity to be one, we suppose that if there are two channels belonging to
the ch1, two channels are equal.
Line (10) for the relation below and as seen in Appendix (F.9) is expressed in
formula M1 below:
ch2: one Channel
(forall ((cs CommunicationStatus))(and(exists ((ch11 Channel))(ch2 cs ch11))
(forall ((ch22 Channel)(ch33 Channel))(=>(and (ch2 cs ch22)(ch2 cs ch33))
(= ch22 ch33)))))
Formula M1:
∀ status:CommunicationStatus ∃ ch11:Channel.(status,ch11) ∈ ch2
∧ ∀ ch22,ch33:Channel.(status,ch22) ∈ ch2 ∧
(status,ch33) ∈ ch2 =>(ch33 = ch22)
The formula M1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms status in Communica-
tionStatus, if there exists ch11 in Channel, such that the status and ch11 belongs
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to ch2 ; and for all ch22 and ch33 in Channel, such that, the status and ch22 be-
long to ch2 and ch33 and status belong to ch2 then ch33 equals ch22. To restrict
the multiplicity to be one, we suppose that if there are two channels belonging to
the ch2, two channels are equal.
7.1.2.7 Predicates
A predicate is a logical formula with declaring parameters used to specified
operations. As seen in Appendix (F.11), the translation focuses on “inlining ”
of the predicate MultiChannel. As the multichannel protocol passes through two
statuses, we illustrate each status individually:
Line (1) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula N1
below:
pred MultiChannel [t,t’,t”,t”’:Time,indices,indices’,
letters,letters’:Data,isp:ISP,status1,status2:Communication Status]
(forall ((status1 CommunicationStatus)(isp ISP)(status2 CommunicationStatus)
(mac MAC) (t Time)(t1 Time)(t2 Time)(t3 Time)(indices Data)(indices1 Data)
(letters Data)(letters1 Data))
Formula N1:
∀ status1,status2:CommunicationStatus , indices,indices1,letters,letters1:Data,
t,t1,t2,t3:Time, isp:ISP, mac:MAC
The formula N1 declared all variables to be used in the predicate and assertion:
status1 and status2 for the first and second status; indices and indices1 for data
have been sent and received in the first status; letters and letters1 for data have
been sent and received in the second status; t and t1 times are for sending and
receiving indices in the first status; t2 and t3 times are for sending and receiving
letters in the second status; isp for the internet server provider that the server
connects with; and mac for the set of macs that belong to the visitors.
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These variables will be used directly in the predicates and assertion below with-
out the need for redeclaration.
Line (2) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula O1
below:
status1.client1.(status1.status) =
First Communication And Exchanging Indices and
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus)(cmac MAC))
(=>(and (client1 status1 cmac)(status status1 cmac cs1))
(isFirst Communication And Exchanging Indices cs1))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus))(cmac MAC))
(=>(isFirst Communication And Exchanging Indices cs2)
(and (client1 status1 cmac)(status status1 cmac cs2)))
Formula O1:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices =>(status1,cmac) ∈ client1
∧ (status1,cmac,cs2)∈ status)
The formula O1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in ConnectionSta-
tus, and cmac in MAC, such that status1 and cmac belong to client1 ; and status1,
cmac, and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isFirstCommunicationAndEx-
changingIndices. It follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus, and cmac
in MAC, such that cs1 belongs to isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices
then status1 and cmac belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac, and cs1 belong to
status.
Line (3) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula P1
below:
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status1.server.(status1.status) =
First Communication And Exchanging Indices and
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus)(smac MAC))
(=>(and (server status1 smac)(status status1 smac cs1))
(isFirst Communication And Exchanging Indices cs1))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus))(exists ((smac MAC))
(=>(isFirst Communication And Exchanging Indices cs2)
(and (server status1 smac)(status status1 smac cs2)))
Formula P1:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices =>(status1,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status1,smac,cs2)∈ status)
The formula P1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in ConnectionSta-
tus, and smac in MAC, such that status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1,
smac, and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isFirstCommunicationAndEx-
changingIndices. It follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus, and smac
in MAC, such that cs1 belongs to isFirstCommunicationAndExchangingIndices
then status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1, smac, and cs1 belong to
status.
Line (4) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula Q1
below:
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status1.server in status1.visitors
(forall ((smac MAC))(=>(server status1 smac)(visitors status1 smac)))
Formula Q1:
( ∀ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server =>(status1,smac) ∈ visitors
The formula Q1 specifies constraints that: for all smac in MAC, such that the
status1 and smac belong to server then status1 and smac belong to visitors.
Line (5) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula R1
below:
status1.client1.(status1.connection) =status1.ispA and
(forall ((isp11 ISP))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(connection status1 cmac isp11)))(ispA status1 isp11))(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and
(client1 status1 cmac1)(connection status1 cmac1 isp11)))))
Formula R1:
(∀ isp11:ISP (∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac,isp11) ∈ connection =>(status1,isp11) ∈ ispA)) =>
(∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,cmac1,isp11) ∈ connection
The formula R1 specifies constraints that: for all isp11 in ISP such that the
status1 and cmac belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac, and isp11 belong to
connection then status1 and isp11 belong to ispA. It follows that there exists
cmac1 in MAC such that the status1 and cmac1 belong to client1 ; and status1,
cmac1, and isp11 belong to connection.
Line (6) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula S1
below:
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status1.ispA in status1.serviceProvider and
(forall ((ispa ISP))(=>(ispA status1 ispa)(serviceProvider status1 ispa)))
Formula S1:
( ∀ ispa:ISP.(status1,ispa) ∈ ispA =>
(status1,ispa) ∈ serviceProvider
The formula S1 specifies constraints that: for all ispa in ISP, such that the
status1 and ispa belong to ispA then status1 and ispa belong to serviceProvider.
Line (7) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula T1
below:
status1.ispB 6in status1.serviceProvider and
(forall ((ispb ISP))(=>(not(ispB status1 ispb))(serviceProvider status1 ispb)))
Formula T1:
( ∀ ispb:ISP.(status1,ispb) /∈ ispB =>(status1,ispb) ∈ serviceProvider
The formula T1 specifies constraints that: for all ispb in ISP, such that the
status1 and ispb do not belong to ispB then status1 and ispb belong to service-
Provider.
Line (8) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula U1
below:
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status1.server.(status1.connection)= isp and
(forall ((isp11 ISP))(=>(=>(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(connection status1 smac isp11)))(= isp isp11))
(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(connection status1 smac1 isp)))))
Formula U1:
(∀ isp11:ISP ∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac,isp11) ∈ connection =>(= isp isp11))
=>(∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,isp) ∈ connection
The formula U1 specifies constraints that:for all isp11 in ISP, if there exist
smac in MAC such that the status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1,
smac, and isp11 belong to connection then isp equals isp11. It follows that there
exists smac1 in MAC such that the status1 and smac1 belong to server ; and
status1, smac1, and isp belong to connection
Line (9) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula V1
below:
status1.ch1 in status1.channel and
(forall ((ch Channel))(=>(ch1 status1 ch)(channel status1 ch)))
Formula V1:
( ∀ ch:Channel.(status1,ch) ∈ ch1 =>(status1,ch) ∈ channel
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The formula V1 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, such that the
status1 and ch belong to ch1 then status1 and ch belong to Channel.
Line (10) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
W1 below:
status1.ch2 6in status1.channel and
(forall ((ch Channel))(=>(not (ch2 status1 ch))(channel status1 ch)))
Formula W1:
( ∀ ch:Channel.(status1,ch) /∈ ch2 =>(status1,ch) ∈ channel)
The formula W1 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, such that the
status1 and ch do not belong to ch2 then status1 and ch belong to Channel.
Line (11) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula X1
below:
no status1.client2.(status1.connection) and
(forall ((cmac MAC))(not(and(client2 status1 cmac)(connection status1 cmac isp))))
Formula X1:
(∀ cmac:MAC. ¬ ((status1,cmac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,cmac,isp) ∈ connection))
The formula X1 specifies constraints that: for all cmac in MAC, such that
there is not status1 and cmac belong to client2 and; status1,cmac, and isp belong
to connection.
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Line (12) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula Y1
below:
status1.client1.(status1.sends)= indices ->t ->status1.ch1 and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices d11)(= t t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))
(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(sends status1 cmac1 indices t ch11)))))
Formula Y1:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac)
∈ client1 ∧ (status1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(indices = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (status1,ch11) ∈ ch1)
(∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac1,indices,t,ch11) ∈ sends
The formula Y1 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that the status1 and
cmac belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends
then indices equals d11, t equals t11, and status1, ch11 belong to ch1. It follows
that if there exists cmac1 in MAC such that the status1 and cmac1 belong to
client1 ; and status1, cmac1, indices, t, and ch11 belong to sends.
Line (13) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula Z1
below:
status1.client1.(status1.sends) 6= letters ->t ->status1.ch1 and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac)
(sends status1 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters d11)(= t t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))
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(exists ((cmac1 MAC))(and (client1 status1 cmac1)
(not(sends status1 cmac1 letters t ch11))))))
Formula Z1:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MAC.(status1,cmac)
∈ client1 ∧ (status1,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(letters = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (status1,ch11) ∈ ch1)
(∃ cmac1:MAC.(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,cmac1,letters,t,ch11) /∈ sends
The formula Z1 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that the status1 and
cmac belong to client1 ; and status1, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends
then letters equals d11, t equals t11, and status1, ch11 belong to ch1. It follows
that if there exists cmac1 in MAC such that the status1 and cmac1 belong to
client1 ; and status1, cmac1, letters, t, and ch11 do not belong to sends.
Line (14) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula A2
below:
status1.server.(status1.receives) 6= letters’ ->t’ ->status1.ch1 and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters1 d11)(= t1 t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))
(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(not(receives status1 smac1 letters1 t1 ch11))))))
Formula A2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac)
∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(letters1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧ (status1,ch11) ∈ ch1) ∧
(∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,letters1,t1,ch11) /∈ receives)
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The formula A2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists smac in MAC such that the status1 and smac
belong to server ; and status1, smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then
letters1 equals d11, t1 equals t11, and status1, ch11 belong to ch1. It follows that
if there exists smac1 in MAC such that the status1 and smac1 belong to server ;
and status1, smac1, letters1, t1, and ch11 do not belong to receives.
Line (15) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula B2
below:
status1.server.(status1.receives)= indices’ ->t’ ->status1.ch1 and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status1 smac)
(receives status1 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices1 d11)(= t1 t11)(ch1 status1 ch11)))
(exists ((smac1 MAC))(and (server status1 smac1)
(receives status1 smac1 indices1 t1 ch11)))))
Formula B2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MAC.(status1,smac)
∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(indices1 = d11) ∧ (t1 = t11) ∧ (status1,ch11) ∈ ch1) t11
(∃ smac1:MAC.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,indices1,t1,ch11) ∈ receives)
The formula B2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists smac in MAC such that the status1 and smac
belong to server ; and status1, smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then
indices1 equals d11, t1 equals t11, and status1, ch11 belong to ch1. It follows
that if there exists smac1 in MAC such that the status1 and smac1 belong to
server ; and status1, smac1, indices1, t1, and ch11 belong to receives.
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Line (16) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula C2
below:
no status1.server.(status1.sends) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac indices t ch)))
(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac indices1 t ch)))
(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac letters t ch)))
(not(and(server status1 smac)(sends status1 smac letters1 t ch)))))
Formula C2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac,indices,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,indices1,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,letters,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status1,smac,letters1,t,ch) in sends) ∧
The formula C2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac
in MAC, such that not status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1, smac,
indices, t, and ch belong to sends ; and not status1 and smac belong to server ;
and status1, smac, indices1, t, and ch belong to sends ; and not status1 and smac
belong to server ; and status1, smac, letters, t, and ch belong to sends ; and not
status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1, smac, letters1, t, and ch belong
to sends.
Line (17) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula D2
below:
no status1.client1.(status1.receives) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client1 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac indices t1 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac indices1 t1 ch)))
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(not(and(client1 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac letters t1 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac letters1 t1 ch)))))
Formula D2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status1,smac,indices,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,smac,indices1,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,smac,letters,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status1,smac,letters1,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
The formula D2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status1 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status1, smac,
indices, t1, and ch belong to receives ; and status1 and smac do not belong to
client1 ; and status1, smac, indices1, t1, and ch belong to receives ; and status1
and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status1, smac, letters, t1, and ch belong
to receives ; and status1 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status1, smac,
letters1, t1, and ch belong to receives.
Line (18) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula E2
below:
no status1.client2.(status1.receives) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac indices t1 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac indices1 t1 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac letters t1 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(receives status1 smac letters1 t1 ch)))))
Formula E2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧
(status1,smac,indices,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,indices1,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,letters,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,letters1,t1,ch) in receives) ∧
232
Chapter 7: Multichannel Security Protocol Proving Using Z3
The formula E2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status1 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac,
indices, t1, and ch belong to receives ; and status1 and smac do not belong to
client2 ; and status1, smac, indices1, t1, and ch belong to receives ; and status1
and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac, letters, t1, and ch belong
to receives ; and status1 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac,
letters1, t1, and ch belong to receives.
Line (19) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula F2
below:
no status1.client2.(status1.sends) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(sends status1 smac indices t ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(sends status1 smac indices1 t ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(sends status1 smac letters t ch)))
(not(and(client2 status1 smac)(sends status1 smac letters1 t ch)))))
Formula F2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧
(status1,smac,indices,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,indices1,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,letters,t,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status1,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status1,smac,letters1,t,ch) in sends) ∧
The formula F2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status1 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac,
indices, t, and ch belong to sends ; and status1 and smac do not belong to client2 ;
and status1, smac, indices1, t, and ch belong to sends ; and status1 and smac do
not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac, letters, t, and ch belong to sends ; and
status1 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status1, smac, letters1, t, and ch
belong to sends.
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Line (20) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
G2 below:
status2.client2.(status2.status) =
Second Communication And Exchanging Letters and
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus)(cmac MAC))
(=>(and (client2 status2 cmac)(status status2 cmac cs1))
(isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs1))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus))(cmac MAC))
(=>(isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs2)
(and (client2 status2 cmac)(status status2 cmac cs2)))
Formula G2:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(status2,cmac) ∈ client2
∧ (status2,cmac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,cmac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters =>(status2,cmac) ∈ client2
∧ (status2,cmac,cs2)∈ status)
The formula G2 specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in Connection-
Status, and cmac in MAC, such that status2 and cmac belong to client2 ; and
status2, cmac, and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isSecondCommunica-
tionAndExchangingLetters. It follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus,
and cmac in MAC, such that cs1 belongs to isSecondCommunicationAndExchang-
ingLetters then status2 and cmac belong to client2 ; and status2, cmac, and cs1
belong to status.
Line (21) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula H2
below:
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status2.server.(status2.status) =
Second Communication And Exchanging Letters and
(=>(forall ((cs1 ConnectionStatus)(smac MAC))
(=>(and (server status2 smac)(status status2 smac cs1))
(isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs1))
(forall ((cs2 ConnectionStatus))(smac MAC))
(=>(isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs2)
(and (server status2 cmac)(status status2 smac cs2)))
Formula H2:
( ∀ cs1:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(status2,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status2,smac,cs1)∈ status =>(cs1) ∈
isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters ) =>
( ∀ cs2:ConnectionStatus,smac:MAC.(cs2) ∈
isSecondCommunicationAndExchangingLetters =>(status2,smac) ∈ server
∧ (status2,smac,cs2)∈ status)
The formula H2 specifies constraints that: for all atoms cs1 in Connection-
Status, and smac in MAC, such that status2 and smac belong to server ; and
status2, smac, and cs1 belong to status then cs1 belongs to isSecondCommunica-
tionAndExchangingLetters. It follows that for all atoms cs2 in ConnectionStatus,
and smac in MAC, such that cs1 belongs to isSecondCommunicationAndExchang-
ingLetters then status2 and smac belong to server ; and status2, smac, and cs1
belong to status.
Line (22) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula I2
below:
status2.server in status2.visitors
(forall ((smac MAC))(=>(server status2 smac)(visitors status2 smac)))
Formula I2:
( ∀ smac:MAC.(status2,smac) ∈ server =>(status2,smac) ∈ visitors
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The formula I2 specifies constraints that: for all smac in MAC, such that the
status2 and smac belong to server then status2 and smac belong to visitors.
Line (23) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula J2
below:
status2.ispA 6in status2.serviceProvider and
(forall ((ispa ISP))(=>(not(ispA status2 ispa))(serviceProvider status2 ispa)))
Formula J2:
( ∀ ispa:ISP.(status2,ispa) /∈ ispA =>(status2,ispa) ∈ serviceProvider
The formula J2 specifies constraints that: for all ispa in ISP, such that status2
and ispa do not belong to ispA then status2 and ispa belong to serviceProvider.
Line (24) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula K2
below:
status2.ispB in status2.serviceProvider and
(forall ((ispb ISP))(=>((ispB status2 ispb)(serviceProvider status2 ispb)))
Formula K2:
( ∀ ispb:ISP.(status2,ispb) ∈ ispB =>(status2,ispb) ∈ serviceProvider
The formula K2 specifies constraints that: for all ispb in ISP, such that status2
and ispb belong to ispB then status2 and ispb belong to serviceProvider.
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Line (25) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula L2
below:
status2.ch1 6in status2.channel and
(forall ((ch Channel))(=>(not(ch1 status2 ch))(channel status2 ch)))
Formula L2:
( ∀ ch:Channel.(status2,ch) /∈ ch1 =>
(status2,ch) ∈ channel
The formula L2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, such that
status2 and ch do not belong to ch1 then status2 and ch belong to Channel.
Line (26) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
M2 below:
status2.ch2 in status2.channel and
(forall ((ch Channel))(=>(ch2 status2 ch)(channel status2 ch)))
Formula M2:
( ∀ ch:Channel.(status2,ch) ∈ ch2 =>(status2,ch) ∈ channel)
The formula M2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, such that
status2 and ch belong to ch2 then status2 and ch belong to Channel.
Line (27) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula N2
below:
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no status2.client1.(status2.connection) and
(forall ((cmac MAC))(not(and(client1 status2 cmac)(connection status2 cmac isp))))
Formula N2:
(∀ cmac:MAC. ¬ ((status2,cmac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,cmac,isp) ∈ connection))
The formula N2 specifies constraints that: for all cmac in MAC, status2 and
cmac do not belong to client1 and status2,cmac, and isp belong to connection.
Line (28) shows the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
O2 below:
status2.client2.(status2.connection) =status2.ispB and
(forall ((isp11 ISP))(=>(=>(exists ((cmac MAC))
(and (client2 status2 cmac)(connection status2 cmac isp11)))(ispB status2 isp11))
(exists ((cmac2 MAC))(and(client2 status2 cmac2)(connection status2 cmac2 isp11)))))
Formula O2:
(∀ isp11:ISP (∃ cmac:MAC.(status2,cmac) ∈ client2 ∧
(status2,cmac,isp11) ∈ connection =>(status2,isp11) ∈ ispB)) =>
(∃ cmac2:MAC.(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 ∧ (status2,cmac2,isp11) ∈ connection
The formula O2 specifies constraints that: for all isp11 in ISP such that status2
and cmac belong to client2 ; and status2, cmac, and isp11 belong to connection
then status2 and isp11 belong to ispB, follows that if there exist cmac2 in MAC
such that status2 and cmac2 belong to client2 ; and status2, cmac2, and isp11
belong to connection.
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Line (29) shows the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
P2 below:
status2.server.(status2.connection)= status1.server.(status1.connection) and
(forall ((smac MAC)(isp11 ISP))(=>
(and (server status2 smac)(connection status2 smac isp11))
(and (server status1 smac)(connection status1 smac isp11))))
(forall ((smac1 MAC)(isp12 ISP))(=>
(and (server status1 smac1)(connection status1 smac1 isp12))
(and (server status2 smac1)(connection status2 smac1 isp12))))
Formula P2:
(∀ smac:MAC, isp11:ISP.(status2,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status2,smac,isp11) ∈ connection =>
(status1,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac,isp11) ∈ connection
(∀ smac1:MAC, isp12:ISP.(status1,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status1,smac1,isp12) ∈ connection =>
(status2,smac1) ∈ server ∧
(status2,smac1,isp12) ∈ connection
The formula P2 specifies constraints that: for all smac in MAC, and isp11 in
ISP such that status2 and smac belong to server ; and status2, smac, and isp11
belong to connection then status1 and smac belong to server ; and status1, smac,
and isp11 belong to connection. For all smac1 in MAC, and isp12 in ISP such
that status1 and smac1 belong to server ; and status1, smac1, and isp12 belong
to connection then status2 and smac1 belong to server ; and status2, smac1, and
isp12 belong to connection.
Line (30) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula Q2
below:
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status2.client2.(status2.sends)=letters->t”->status2.ch2 and
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client2 status2 cmac)
(sends status2 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters d11)(= t2 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))
(exists ((cmac2 MAC))(and (client2 status2 cmac2)
(sends status2 cmac2 letters t2 ch11)))))
Formula Q2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MAC.(status2,cmac)
∈ client2 ∧ (status2,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(letters = d11) ∧ (t = t11) ∧ (status2,ch11) ∈ ch2) ∧
(∃ cmac1:MAC.(status2,cmac1) ∈ client2 ∧
(status2,cmac1,letters,t,ch11) ∈ sends)
The formula Q2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that the status2 and
cmac belong to client2 ; and status2, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends
then letters equals d11, t2 equals t11, and status2, ch11 belong to ch2, follows that
there exists cmac2 in MAC such that the status2 and cmac2 belong to client2 ;
and status2, cmac2, letters, t2, and ch11 belong to sends.
Line (31) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula R2
below:
status2.client2.(status2.sends) 6= indices->t”->status2.ch2
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((cmac MAC))(and (client2 status2 cmac)
(sends status2 cmac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices d11)(= t2 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))
(exists ((cmac2 MAC))(and (client2 status2 cmac2)
(not(sends status2 cmac2 indices t2 ch11))))))
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Formula R2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ cmac:MAC.(status2,cmac)
∈ client2 ∧ (status2,cmac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ sends =>
(indices = d11) ∧ (t2 = t11) ∧ (status2,ch11) ∈ ch2) =>
(∃ cmac2:MAC.(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 ∧
(status2,cmac2,indices,t2,ch11) /∈ sends)
The formula R2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists cmac in MAC such that status2 and cmac
belong to client1 ; and status2, cmac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to sends then
indices equals d11, t2 equals t11, and status2, ch11 belong to ch2, follows that
there exists cmac2 in MAC such that status2 and cmac2 belong to client1 ; and
status2, cmac2, indices, t2, and ch11 do not belong to sends.
Line (32) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula S2
below:
status2.server.(status2.receives)=letters’->t”’->status2.ch2
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status2 smac)
(receives status2 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= letters1 d11)(= t3 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))
(exists ((smac2 MAC))(and (server status2 smac2)
(receives status2 smac2 letters1 t3 ch11)))))
Formula S2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MAC.(status2,smac)
∈ server ∧ (status2,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(letters1 = d11) ∧ (t3 = t11) ∧ (status1,ch11) ∈ ch2) =>
(∃ smac2:MAC.(status2,smac2) ∈ server ∧
(status2,smac2,letters1,t3,ch11) ∈ receives)
The formula S2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
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and ch11 in Channel, if there exists smac in MAC such that status2 and smac
belong to server ; and status2, smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then
letters1 equals d11, t3 equals t11, and status2, ch11 belong to ch2, follows that if
there exists smac2 in MAC such that status2 and smac2 belong to server ; and
status2, smac2, letters1, t3, and ch11 belong to receives.
Line (33) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula T2
below:
status2.server.(status2.receives) 6= indices’->t”’->status2.ch2
(forall ((d11 Data)(t11 Time)(ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
(exists ((smac MAC))(and (server status2 smac)
(receives status2 smac d11 t11 ch11)))
(and(= indices1 d11)(= t3 t11)(ch2 status2 ch11)))
(exists ((smac2 MAC))(and (server status2 smac2)
(not(receives status2 smac2 indices1 t3 ch11))))))
Formula T2:
(∀ d11:Data,t11:Time,ch11:Channel (∃ smac:MAC.(status2,smac)
∈ server ∧ (status2,smac,d11,t11,ch11) ∈ receives =>
(indices1 = d11) ∧ (t3 = t11) ∧ (status2,ch11) ∈ ch1) =>
(∃ smac2:MAC.(status2,smac2) ∈ server ∧
(status2,smac2,indices1,t3,ch11) /∈ receives)
The formula T2 specifies constraints that: for all d11 in Data, t11 in Time,
and ch11 in Channel, if there exists smac in MAC such that status2 and smac
belong to server ; and status2, smac, d11, t11, and ch11 belong to receives then
indices1 equals d11, t3 equals t11, and status2, ch11 belong to ch1, follows that
if there exists smac2 in MAC such that status2 and smac2 belong to server ; and
status2, smac2, indices1, t3, and ch11 do not belong to receives.
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Line (34) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula U2
below:
no status2.server.(status2.sends) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(server status2 smac)(sends status2 smac indices t2 ch)))
(not(and(server status2 smac)(sends status2 smac indices1 t2 ch)))
(not(and(server status2 smac)(sends status2 smac letters t2 ch)))
(not(and(server status2 smac)(sends status2 smac letters1 t2 ch)))))
Formula U2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ server ∧
(status2,smac,indices,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status2,smac,indices1,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status2,smac,letters,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ server ∧ (status2,smac,letters1,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
The formula U2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status2 and smac do not belong to server ; and status2, smac,
indices, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and status2 and smac do not belong to server ;
and status2, smac, indices1, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and status2 and smac do
not belong to server ; and status2, smac, letters, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and
status2 and smac do not belong to server ; and status2, smac, letters1, t2, and ch
belong to sends.
Line (35) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula V2
below:
no status2.client1.(status2.receives) and
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac indices t3 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac indices1 t3 ch)))
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(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac letters t3 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac letters1 t3 ch)))))
Formula V2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status2,smac,indices,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,indices1,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,letters,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,letters1,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
The formula V2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status2 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac,
indices, t3, and ch belong to receives ; and status2 and smac do not belong to
client1 ; and status2, smac, indices1, t3, and ch belong to receives ; and status2
and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac, letters, t3, and ch belong
to receives ; and status2 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac,
letters1, t3, and ch belong to receives.
Line (36) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula
W2 below:
no status2.client2.(status2.receives)
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client2 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac indices t3 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac indices1 t3 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac letters t3 ch)))
(not(and(client2 status2 smac)(receives status2 smac letters1 t3 ch)))))
Formula W2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client2 ∧
(status2,smac,indices,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status2,smac,indices1,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status2,smac,letters,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client2 ∧ (status2,smac,letters1,t3,ch) in receives) ∧
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The formula W2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status2 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status2, smac,
indices, t3, and ch belong to receives ; and status2 and smac do not belong to
client2 ; and status2, smac, indices1, t3, and ch belong to receives ; and status2
and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status2, smac, letters, t3, and ch belong
to receives ; and status2 and smac do not belong to client2 ; and status2, smac,
letters1, t3, and ch belong to receives.
Line (37) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula X2
below:
no status2.client1.(status2.sends)
(forall ((ch Channel)(smac MAC))
(and(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(sends status2 smac indices t2 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(sends status2 smac indices1 t2 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(sends status2 smac letters t2 ch)))
(not(and(client1 status2 smac)(sends status2 smac letters1 t2 ch)))))
Formula X2:
(∀ ch:Channel ,smac:MAC. ¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧
(status2,smac,indices,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,indices1,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,letters,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
¬ ((status2,smac) ∈ client1 ∧ (status2,smac,letters1,t2,ch) in sends) ∧
The formula X2 specifies constraints that: for all ch in Channel, and smac in
MAC, such that status2 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac,
indices, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and status2 and smac do not belong to client1 ;
and status2, smac, indices1, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and status2 and smac do
not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac, letters, t2, and ch belong to sends ; and
status2 and smac do not belong to client1 ; and status2, smac, letters1, t2, and ch
belong to sends.
245
Chapter 7: Multichannel Security Protocol Proving Using Z3
Line (38) for the predicate below in Appendix (F.11) is expressed in formula Y2
below:
status1.client1 in status1.visitors and status1.client2
6in status1.visitors and
status2.client1 6in status2.visitors and status2.client2
in status2.visitors and
((status1.client1) in status1.interseptMacs and (status2.client2)
6in status2.interseptMacs
or (status1.client1) 6in status1.interseptMacs and (status2.client2)
in status2.interseptMacs
or (status1.client1) 6in status1.interseptMacs and (status2.client2)
6in status2.interseptMacs)
(forall ((cmac1 MAC)(cmac2 MAC))(and(and (=>
(client1 status1 cmac1)(visitors status1 cmac1))(=>(client2 status1 cmac2)
(not(visitors status1 cmac2)))(=>(client1 status2 cmac1)(not(visitors status2 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(visitors status2 cmac2)))
(or (and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(interseptMacs status1 cmac1))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2))))
(and (=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))
(and(=>(client1 status1 cmac1)(not(interseptMacs status1 cmac1)))
(=>(client2 status2 cmac2)(not(interseptMacs status2 cmac2)))))))
Formula Y1:
∀ cmac1, cmac2:MAC.((status1,cmac1) ∈ client1
=>(status1,cmac1) ∈ visitors ∧ (status1,cmac2) /∈ client2
=>(status1,cmac2) /∈ visitors ∧ (status2,cmac1) /∈ client1
=>(status2,cmac1) /∈ visitors ∧ (status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2)
∈ visitors ∧((status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) ∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs ∨
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) ∈ interseptMacs ∨
(status1,cmac1) ∈ client1 =>(status1,cmac1) /∈ interseptMacs ∧
(status2,cmac2) ∈ client2 =>(status2,cmac2) /∈ interseptMacs)
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The formula Y1 specifies constraints that: for all atoms cmac1, cmac2 in MAC,
such that if the first client belongs to the client1 in status1, the first client belongs
to visitors in status1, and if the second client does not belong to client2 in status1,
the second client does not belong to visitors in status1, and if the first client does
not belong to client1 in status2, the first client does not belong to visitors in
status2, and if the second client belongs to client2 in status2, the second client
belongs to visitors in status2.
And, if the first client belongs to client1 in status1, the first client belongs to
interseptMacs in status1, and if the second client belongs to client2 in status2, the
second client does not belong to interseptMacs in status2. Or, if the first client
belongs to client1 in status1, the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in
status1, and if the second client belongs to client2 in status2, the second client
belongs to the interseptMacs in status2. Or, if the first client belongs to client1
in status1, the first client does not belong to interseptMacs in status1, and if the
second client belongs to client2 in status2, the second client does not belong to
interseptMacs in status2.
7.1.2.8 Assertion
Lines (39) in Appendix (F.11) is expressed to formula Z2 below:
MultiChannel implies indices = indices1 and letters = letters1
(and(= indices indices1)(= letters letters1))
Formula Z2:
indices = indices1 ∧ letters = letters1
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The formula Z2 specifies constraints that: sending and receiving indices should
be equal and sending and receiving letters should be equal.
7.2 Results
The negation of the assertion introduces that: the truth of the predicate and
the achieved properties do not imply that data received equals data sent under all
provided axioms, which conflicts our hypothesis.
We used check-sat as seen in Appendices (D.10,F.12) (Line 1) to ask the SMT
solver to check whether the negation of the implication of the provided assertions
is unsatisfiable or not. The SMT solver spent 0.09s and 0.039s to try to find a
model that satisfied the negation of the set of formula but it did not find any.
However, without writing logical formulas as in Appendices (D.8, F.10) which
restricted the properties of the first and the second protocol, the SMT solver
provides SAT result in 0.015s for the first protocol and 0.65s for the second pro-
tocol. So that the instance found by the SMT solver is a counterexample to the
assertion.
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7.3 Discussion
Our goal from using Z3 SMT solver is to be more confident by proving the
correctness of the results that we have achieved from the Alloy SAT solver. We
will now compare the two approaches. First of all we compare the static size of
specifications in Figure 7.1 in terms of the number of lines, the number of words,
the number of characters for each component of our case studies in using both
Alloy and Z3,and the time that SAT4J and SMT solvers spent to either generate
a counterexample (CE), or no counterexample (no-CE).
Figure 7.1: Size and Time of Specifications
In general the number of lines, the number of words, and the number of char-
acters for proving using Z3 is larger than using Alloy for all case studies whether
there is a counterexample or not. The main reason for that is Alloy uses declara-
tions to show the relations between entities and uses the multiplicity keywords to
restrict the type of the relation, while Z3 uses functions and formulas to build the
relations and specify them as functions.
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In Alloy we see that the number of lines, the number of words, the number of
characters, and and the time spent to generate a counterexample increase based on
increasing the number of entities, the number of relations, the number of facts, the
number of statuses in a predicate, and the number of properties in an assertion.
In Z3 we see that the number of lines, the number of words, and the number of
characters increases based on increasing the number of: (1) extensions required to
formulate how they are disjoint and to adjust return types (oneOf) as constants;
(2) entities required to formulate how the abstract holds an extended entity. (3)
multiplicity keywords. (4) relations, the number of facts, the number of statuses
in a predicate, and the number of properties in an assertion.
Proving the ATM case study requires two abstracts and each abstract has at
most six extensions. Also proving the multichannel protocol, requires one abstract
and each abstract has at most two extensions increasing the number of lines, the
number of words, and the number of characters.
As seen in Figure 6.2 Alloy and Z3 complement each other for several reasons:
• 1- Time for generating or solving a counterexample
Z3 is faster in searching for a counterexample as it spent 0.022s for proving the
properties of the ATM model, while the SAT solver spent 0.187s for translation
and checking the properties of the ATM model. Z3 spent 0.09s for solving the
first protocol model and 0.139s for solving the second protocol model, while the
SAT solver spent 0.211s for translation and checking the first protocol model and
1.594s for translation and solving the second protocol model.
In contrast, increasing the analysis scope to include more than one card, slows
down the analysis in the Alloy Analyser. We find the same argument in [18] as
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when we model single channel and multichannel protocols which duplicates the
scopes.
Moreover, when we increased the number of scopes from one channel to two
channels, one ISP to two ISP, two datum to 4 datum, two times to four times, and
one status to two statuses, the Alloy Analyser became slower and took longer in
analysing the multichannel taking 1.703s compared to 0.409s for the single channel.
To solve this disadvantage, [39] supposed that reducing the number of variables
and increasing the number of constraints tends to reduce the solving time because
it reduces the search space that the SAT solver must explore.
However, the Z3 SMT solver spent 0.015s for the first protocol and 0.65s for the
second protocol. As seen in Figure 6.1, increasing the number of variables, the
number of scopes, the number of properties, and the complexity lead to increasing
the time that both the Alloy Analyser and Z3 spend to generate a counterexample.
• 2- Detecting, visualizing and understanding a counterexample
The common strength between Alloy and Z3 is providing a counterexample. How-
ever, in Alloy we could visualize the counterexample very easily. For example, in
Figures 3.4, 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 when the SAT solver generated counterexamples which
are instances that satisfy all the constraints, but violate the assertion. From this
visualization we got the benefit to follow the flaws in the model and put more con-
strains until all instances satisfy the constraints, and do not violate the assertion
as seen in Figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 6.6, 6.7, 6.8. Visualising the model using Alloy may
help us to find more constraints corresponding with the behaviour of the model
that may not be taken in our account. For example, in the protocols model, we
noticed that the model visualized that the client has an ability to receive and the
server has an ability to send. However, in our model this is not allowed to be
visualized. On the other hand, Z3 provides the counterexample as a formula and
that requires expert understanding to extract and understand.
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• 3- Limiting scopes of each type for checking the model
Alloy has the capability of limiting the state space that we need to look for a
counterexample. For example, in the ATM system we needed to check the size of
1 atom for each signature except ATM 6 atoms. In the single channel protocol,
we needed to check the size of 3 atoms for MAC, 2 atoms for Time, 2 atoms for
ISP, 2 atoms for Data, 1 atom for ConnectionStatus, 1 atom for Channel, 1 atom
for Communication Statu. In the multichannel protocol, we needed to check the
size of 3 atoms of MAC, 4 atoms of Time, 2 atoms of ISP, 2 atoms of Channel,
4 atoms of Data, 1 atom of ConnectionStatus, 2 atoms of Communication Status.
So, limiting scopes helps to detect any errors simply before developing the model
to be complex with increasing the number of scopes gradually. Also it makes the
Alloy analysis is noticeably faster. Moreover reducing the size of the model helps
to accelerate and make more confident finding a counterexample.
• 4- Scanning all instances to get a counterexample
In Alloy we don’t know where to stop increasing the scope to get a counterexam-
ple. So, we need to increase the size of scope and check each time. Consequently,
we turned to Z3 as it checks the satisfiability for unbounded scope. For example,
before restricting the properties of the ATM system, we checked the scopes from
1 to 4 and the analyser always said there was not a counterexample. When we
turned to Z3, the counterexample appeared in one check. This advantage for Z3
also suggest to us that there is a counterexample in Alloy.
• 5- Confidence to begin with
Modelling a problem and then turning to prove it is useful because if the ease
of using modelling with visualizing then turning to prove the result makes us feel
more confident, especially when we got the same result in both formal methods.
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• 6- Possibility of checking arbitrary relations
Z3 has an advantage in checking arbitrary sizes of relations. In Alloy when the
universe contains more than 19 atoms as limited scope, the relations of arity 8
cannot be represented and the translation capacity will be exceeded.
• 7- Mistake percentage
In Alloy, the percentage of mistakes is higher because with limiting scope there
may be an instance that causes a counterexample in a large scope. Also, with
increasing the size of scope, there is an instance may be lost if the restriction in
the relation between entities using the multiplicity keyword was not accurate.
• 8- An unrecognisable result
When running to check the satisfiability of a property, Z3 may return as a result
the keyword "unknown". So the property may or may not be valid so Z3 does not
guarantee a complete analysis [63].
• 9- Syntax
Alloy provides a syntax which is easy to use directly without requiring one to
write formulas to specify relations, extensions, abstracts, and multiplicity key-
words.
• 10- Reason of model consistency
The common weakness, between Alloy and Z3 is that both do not tell why the
model is inconsistent if it is inconsistent.
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We conclude that, based on the results we achieved from analysing our protocol
we cannot say that Alloy is the best choice for analysing a complex protocol
compared to Z3 or vice versa. We noticed that both solvers complement each
other.
When AA took a long time to generate a counterexample in limited scope,
we found that Z3 is 11 times faster than AA. However, manually translating
Alloy into a Z3 satisfiability-equivalent formulation took much more lines, words,
and characters as seen in Figure 6.1. We tried to translate each line in Alloy
into Z3 manually following the rules that will be provided that in next chapter
covering Alloy syntax as seen in Figure 3.2 which Z3 does not have. We noticed
that, after making the corresponding transformation, each part which causes a
counterexample in Alloy also causes it in Z3 and if each restriction put in Alloy to
solve the counterexample, is asserted in Z3 we got the same result. However, the
manually translation takes long time and requires the user to be expert in relational
logic to write accurate formulas corresponding Alloy formula to Z3 formulas.
Moreover, AA has a strength in visualizing the instances of the model and fol-
lowing the flows if there is a counterexample. This was a big advantage for Alloy as
it gave us the ability to visualize mappings between variables and values to looking
at counterexamples. In contrast, Z3 lacks that and presents the counterexample
as a formula. Providing the syntax in Alloy and the advantage of visualizing the
counterexample made us confident to begin with Alloy although the percentage of
mistakes is higher.
In chapter 8 we show how a small portion of Alloy may be translated manually
into a large amount of less readable Z3 including declaring types, subtypes, ab-
straction, extension, multiplicity constraints, relations, facts, assertions, formulas,
and analysis.
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Figure 7.2: Comparison
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Chapter 8
Systematic Translation Rules: A
First Step Towards An
Automated Translator
8.1 Introduction
In this chapter we show how to translate a specification performed with Alloy
into a satisfiability-equivalent SMT problem using Z3 SMT logic and solved by
an SMT solver such that if there is a counterexample in Alloy in finite scopes, it
supposed to be a counterexample in Z3 in infinite scopes and vice versa.
We clarify the translation from Alloy into Z3 including type declaration, rela-
tion declaration, multiplicity keywords, fact, assertion, predicate, expressions, and
Formula.
This chapter has significance in:
• Helping researchers to understand how to express the same property in both
Alloy and Z3.
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• Guiding researchers to study the translation rules for each portion of the
syntax of Alloy as seen in Figure 8.1 into Z3.
• Motivating researchers to build an automated tool to facilitate the transla-
tion operation from Alloy into Z3, saving time, effort and expert.
• Helping the interested researchers to combine model checkers and theorem
provers and to harness their complementary strengths.
Figure 8.1: Abstract Syntax For The Core Alloy Logic [62]
8.2 The Alloy Syntax
A seen in Figure 8.1, the abstract syntax for the core Alloy logic contains three
main parts: problem, expression, and formula.
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• Problem is a collection of type declaration, relation declaration, fact, as-
sertion, and predicate.
• Type declaration: declares all signatures of systems which represent sets
of atoms. These signatures are for a top-level type and, a type subset of a
type. For example, the signature declaration sig X declares a top-level type
named X whereas the signature declaration
sig Y extends X{...}
sig Y in X{...}
declares a type Y as a subtype (subset) of the type X.
• Relation declaration and multiplicity keywords: a relation is declared
as a field of signatures. For example,
sig A{}, sig B{}, sig C r : B m −> n A}
which declares a ternary relation named
• Fact, assertion, and predicate: have been discussed in chapter 3 section
3.4.5.
• Expressions: Alloy expressions represent the fundamental buildings blocks
of Alloy formula; they always evaluate to relations. There are two kinds
of relational expressions, basic and complex. Basic Alloy expressions are
constant relations; this includes all declared signatures and relations as well
as the built-in constants: sets are unary relations, scalars are singleton
unary relations, the built-in relation none denotes the empty set, and none
for the unary empty set. Complex Alloy expressions are generated from
basic expressions using Alloy’s relational operators such as r + s (union),
r++s (override), r & s (intersection), and r - s (difference) of same arity
258
Chapter 8: Systematic Translation Rules: A First Step Towards An Automated
Translator
relations r and s. Also, r ->s for Cartesian product and r.s for relational
join of arbitrary relations r and s.
Another expression provided in Alloy is integer expressions. An integer expres-
sion is different from relational expression. Integer value is not considered as in
atom; however, utilizing an integer in relational expression, Alloy provides for ev-
ery integer x value, Int contains exactly one atom that identifies that value [60].
They indicate rudimentary integers. The type Int represents the set of all atoms
carrying rudimentary integers. The expression Int x denotes the atom carrying
the integer denoted by the integer expression x, whereas int y denotes the integer
value of the atom represented by the variable y. Integer expressions are obtained
from an infinite set of Z numbers (. . . , -1, 0, 1, . . . ), and combined using
arithmetic operators ( + , - ).
• Formula: fundamental Alloy formulas are formed from Alloy expressions
utilizing the subset operator in, the equality operator =, the integer com-
parison operators less than < and greater than >, and the integer equality
=. Fundamental formulas can be merged using logical connectivities includ-
ing conjunction (and or && ), disjunction (or or | ), implication (implies
or => ), and negation (not or ¬).
The quantified formula’s form is Q A:b | Formula. Q denotes one of
the all, some, no, lone, and one. The unary expression b bounds the quan-
tification variable A, and Formula considered to be formula depends on A.
However the expression b may not be begins with a multiplicity keyword.
This is called a first order quantification, so A points to a single element of
b. However, every Alloy expressions is considered relational, meaning that
A is a singleton subset of b.
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8.3 Z3 SMT solver
The Z3 SMT solver supports the SMT2 language which is the SMT-LIB stan-
dard version 2.0 [138]. Our formulas utilize the quantified theories of sorts, and
uninterpreted functions with equality [138].
• Declarations: the logic of SMT2 language depends on a numerous sorted
FOL with equality. It supports Integer, Real, and Boolean types, and enables
users to declare new sorts (types) utilizing the command
declare-sort
Functions are the main structures of SMT formulas. SMT2 enables users to
declare function utilizing the command
(declare-fun f (arguments) Type)
This command declares a function with a name f, that receives arguments
(A1, .... , An−1) , and returns type (An).
I.e,
(declare− fun f (A1, ...., An−1)An) declares f : A1 × ....× An−1 −>An
All functions are considered as total which means they are defined for every
element of their domain.
Constants are also considered as functions that do not take arguments.
SMT2 enables users to declare function utilizing the command
(declare-fun f () Type)
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to declare a constant, where f is the name of the constant, and Type is the
constant type.
• Assertions: the command (assert f) asserts a formula f in the present
logical context. The main formulas are functions and can be connected
utilizing the boolean operators and (conjunction), or (disjunction ), not
(negation), and = > (implies).
The universal quantifier is indicated by
(forall (a1 A1)...(an An)f)
whereas the existential quantifier is indicated by
(exists (a1 A1)...(an An)f)
as where a1 is a variable and A1 is the type of this variable.
• Analysis: we utilize the check-sat command to ask the SMT solver to check
if the conjunction of the provided assertions is satisfiable or unsatisfiable.
8.4 Tool Integration and Methodology
Our framework provides seven stages for checking a property of an Alloy specifi-
cation as seen in the section below. Checking Alloy specification within a bounded
scope means finding counterexamples for the model in this bounded scope. How-
ever, no existence of a counterexample does not mean proof; it only means that
non counterexample exists within the bounded scope.
Our framework also provides an SMT solver. If Z3 outputs unsat, the prop-
erty has been proven correct, and if it outputs sat, a valid counterexample has
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been found. However, Z3 does not guarantee a complete analysis: it may output
unknown, implying that the property may or may not be valid, or time out.
Section 8.5, describes the translation rules using a running example. It focuses
on the main ideas in the translation involved in each stage to clarify their differ-
ences.
Our translation includes Alloy type declaration, relation declaration, fact, asser-
tion, multiplicity keywords (one, lone, set), extension, abstract, and expressions
such as conjunction, Cartesian product and relational join, and formulas.
8.4.1 Constructing Alloy Models
The Alloy modelling stages are:
• The first stage is determining the properties to be achieved in the system.
second stage is to identify the main entities that interact in the system as
signatures.
• The third stage is determining and constraining how the entities are related
to each other. i.e, how many atoms on one side are related with an atom on
the other side by constraining the sizes of the sets.
• The fourth stage involves constructing a predicate that describes the dy-
namic behaviour of the system.
• The fifth stage is to restrict the specification using facts. Facts are assumed
to be true.
• The sixth stage is to build a formula as an assertion to check the validity of
the model.
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• The seventh stage is limiting the scope to gain more confidence about the
correctness of a property.
8.4.2 Constructing Z3 Models
We have build our Z3 model by closely following the same stages as for Alloy
except the seventh stage as Z3 is unbounded. Each stage in Alloy has been trans-
lated into its equivalent in Z3 to achieve the scale of the model as seen below. As
the Z3 tool set has no editor, we begin by writing logical formulas representing the
three properties of an Alloy model in the set of FOL formulas and declarations,
and a sequence of commands in the Z3 stack.
8.5 Systematic Translation Rules
8.5.1 Type Declarations
This section gives the translation rules for Alloy type, subtype/extension, and
abstraction which are represented in Figure 8.2. D in the figure defines Alloy type
declarations, AT Alloy type, and SV SMT variables.
8.5.1.1 Signature Identifier
SMT2 enables users to declare a type declaration utilizing the command
declare-sort type
Each Top-level types in Alloy is translated to uninterpreted SMT2 sorts to identify
atomic entities with no parameters as seen in Figure 8.2, line number 1.1. For
example: the top-level type (Card):
sig Card{}
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Figure 8.2: Translation Rules for Alloy Type Declarations
in Alloy is translated into Z3 to be declared as an uninterpreted sort:
(declare− sortCard)
8.5.1.2 Abstraction
Abstraction is not supported by SMT2. Thus, abstract signatures are required
to be translated into SMT2 only through axioms as seen in Figure 8.2, line number
2.1, formulating that the abstract type has no elements except those which are
extended AT1 which constraints each element SV of this type to belong to one of
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its extending subtypes AT2, AT3, ...., AT n using the general form
(forall((this SuperType))(or(isSubtype1 SV )(isSubtype2 SV )...(isSubtypen SV )))
For example the abstract signature:
abstract sig Operations{}
one sig EnterCard, TypeP in,RequistCash,
ReceiveCashAndCard,ReceiveCard extends Operations{}
in Alloy is translated into Z3 using an assertion that all sub sorts in the sort
Operation should be one of them.
(forall((o Operations))(or(isEnterCard o)(isTypeP in o)
(isRequistCash o)(isReceiveCashAndCard o)(isReceiveCard o)))
8.5.1.3 Subtype/Extension
Subtype declarations are not supported by SMT2. Thus, we translate Alloys
hierarchical type system implicitly through axioms. To do that we need to use a
Boolean valued function to declare an uninterpreted membership function called
is to identify all sub sorts as seen in Figure 8.2, line number 3.1. An uninterpreted
membership function is important to determine the semantics of subtypes for each
Alloy type to represent the subtypes making all elements of the subtype belong
to their supertype. A membership function takes the form of a command:
(declare-fun isSub-type (supertype) Bool)
The membership function takes only one parameter which is the extended sort AT1
(superType) and returns the result as a Boolean to expresses a subset between
two sorts AT2, AT3,...., ATn (subTypes) and AT1 (superType ).
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For example: the subtype EnterCard ⊆ its supertype (Operations):
sig Operations{}
sig EnterCard extends Operations{}
in Alloy is translated into Z3 as a membership function using the command:
(declare-fun isEnterCard (Operations) Bool)
Extension between two types to make them disjoint is not supported by SMT2.
Thus, extension signatures are required to be translated into SMT2 through ax-
ioms formulating that the extending subtypes AT2, AT3,...., ATn are disjoint as
seen in Figure 8.2, line number 3.1 by using not and and, using the general form:
(forall((SV superType))(not(and(subType1 SV )(subType2 SV )...(subTypen SV )))
For example the extension signatures:
abstract sig Operations{}
one sig EnterCard, TypeP in,RequistCash,
ReceiveCashAndCard,ReceiveCard extends Operations{}
in Alloy is translated into Z3 using an assertion that all sub sorts in the sort
Operation are disjoint:
(forall((o Operations))(not(and(isEnterCard o)(isTypeP in o))))
and that means all element o belongs to the super type Operations, o either
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belongs to subtype isEnterCard or subtype isTypePin.
8.5.2 Relation Declarations
8.5.2.1 Relation
An Alloy relation is translated to a Boolean-valued SMT2 function. This func-
tion is declared over top-level types because only top-level types are declared as
sorts. As seen in Figure 8.3, a relation can be constraint in different domain.
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Figure 8.3: Translation Rules for Alloy Relation Declarations
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In the first relation (1) in Figure 8.3, a relation has no multiplicity constraint
and in this case the constraints by default is set. In this relation, we need to assert
that all variables belong to the top-levels, every tuple of a top-level is mapped to
set of tuples of the related top-level.
8.5.2.2 Multiplicity
The general form of the function for multiplicities is
(declare− fun|oneOfsubType|() supertype)
For example the multiplicity keyword one before the sub signature EnterCard :
one sig EnterCard extends Operations{}
is translated into Z3 as:
(declare− fun|oneOfEnterCard|() Operations)
After declaring the function we need to adjust return types of the "oneOf"
functions to match each element is declared in function oneOf with its corre-
sponding Operation and to avoid making Z3 returns incorrect operation when it
is called. So the adjustment return types of the "oneOf" functions are declared
as:
(isSubType|oneOfsubType|)
meaning that any element returned by oneOf is always one, and its type is sub-
Type.
Multiplicity keyword lone forces the existence of two elements of a supertype to
be equal. The general form of the function is
(forall ((this1 supertype)(this2 supertype))
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(= >(and(issubType this1)(issubType this2))(= this1 this2)))
For example:
(forall ((o1 Operations)(o2 Operations))
(= >(and(isEnterCard o1)(isEnterCard o2))(= o1 o2)))
In the second relation (2) in Figure 8.3, has a relation has one multiplicity
constraint. In this relation, we need to assert that for all variables belonging to
the top-level.
Every tuple is mapped to exactly one tuple of the related top-level using the
there exists quantifier.
In the third relation (3) in Figure 8.3, a relation has a lone multiplicity con-
straint. In this relation, we need to assert that for all variables belonging to
the top-level, every tuple is mapped to at most one tuple of the related top-level
restricting that if two different variables belong to the relation, they should be
equal.
In the fourth relation (4) in Figure 8.3, a relation has set multiplicity constraint.
In this relation, we only need to declare a relation with no need to write axioms
as set may be empty.
In the fifth and sixth relations (5,6) in Figure 8.3, a relation has multiple re-
lations. In this relation, we need to assert that the existence relation maps to
an already existing relation first and then applying the constraints (set, one, and
lone) as mentioned above.
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For example in modelling the ATM system the relation money in Alloy:
sig ATM{money : cards −> lone Int}
is translated into Z3 as:
(declare− fun money(ATM Card Int)Bool)
In Alloy we placed the restriction that requiring the money for a card does not
take place in the second status but in the fourth status as seen in the predicate
below:
atm4.inCard.(atm4.money) = mon
This is translated into Z3 to be asserted as:
(and(inCard atm4 c9)(money atm4 c9 i3)) (1)
and:
no atm2.money
is translated into Z3 as:
(not(money atm2 c9 m)) (2)
Then, to get the expressive power of the relation, the function returning Boolean
controls the existence or non existence of a tuple in a relation money, by returning
true making the tuple (atm4, c9, i3) exist in the relation money as seen in (1)
above, and false making the tuple (atm2, c9, m) not exist in the relation money as
seen in (2) above. The Boolean valued function method is applied to all relations.
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8.5.3 Facts and Assertions
Figure 8.4 gives the translation rules for Alloy facts that are assumed to be true,
and assertions that are intended to be checked. As seen in Figure 8.4, line 2.1, the
assertion is negated, so when the SMT solver found any instance, this instance
will be a counterexample to the assertion. Thus, if the solver does not find any
instances, the assertion is correctly proven.
Figure 8.4: Translation Rules for Fact and Assertion Formulas
8.5.4 Expression:
8.5.4.1 Cartesian Product
An expression expression1 ->expression2 contains a tuple
(t1, .., tn, .., tn+m)
iff expression1 contains
(t1, .., tn)
and expression2 contains (tn+1, .., tn+m) where n is the arity of expression1 and
m is the arity of expression2 as seen in line 5 Figure 8.5.
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8.5.4.2 Relational Join
An expression expression1 ...... expression2 contains a tuple
{(expression1, .., expression1m−1, expression2, .., expression2n)
|(expression1, .., expressionm) ∈ expression1 ∧
(expression21, .., expression2n) ∈ expression2 ∧ expression1m = expression21}
Relational join needs a quantified variable for the combined column of the two
relations as seen in line 4 Figure 8.5.
8.5.5 Formulas
In Alloy formulas are formed using the subset operator in and the integer com-
parison operators such as greater than >, less than <, and equalities =, and
combined using logical operators such as negation not, conjunction and, and dis-
junction or, relational join, and Cartesian product which are mapped to those in
SMT2. As seen in Figure 8.5, an Alloy formula operates is for translated relational
logic to correspond with Z3.
8.5.5.1 Subset
The Alloy formula (expression1 in expression2 ) is well-formed only when the
arity of expression1 equals the arity of expression2 and is translated by specifying
that each element of expression1 is included in expression2 as seen in line 3 Figure
8.5.
8.5.5.2 Negation
The Alloy formula (not expression1) is translated into Z3 by negating expres-
sions making the new formula empty as seen in line 6 Figure 8.5.
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8.5.5.3 Conjunction
The Alloy formula (expression1 and expression2) is translated into Z3 by joining
expression1 and expression2 making the new formula includes all variables of the
two expressions together as seen in line 1 Figure 8.5.
8.5.5.4 Disjunction
The Alloy formula (expression1 or expression2) is translated into Z3 by joining
expression1 or expression2 making the new formula includes the variables of one
of the two expressions which one achieved the condition as seen in line 2 Figure
8.5.
8.5.5.5 All
As seen in line 7 Figure 8.5, for all x e, if the expression for e achieved for all
x, then the function f is true.
Figure 8.5: Formulas Constraints
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8.5.6 The general form for translation
The general form for translating Alloy problem into Z3 is expressed as:
(not ( = > (A B)))
A includes all declared sorts; sub sorts; constraints; facts; and relations, and
predicates, while B includes the assertions. So, if the SMT solver found any
instance that achieved the validity of the general form that we used, it will be
a counterexample to the assertion. However, if the SMT solver did not find any
instance, the negation of the assertion is proven correct.
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9.1 Conclusion
We have presented an approach for analysing single and multichannel protocols
expressed in Alloy and Z3. We presented an approach to translate specifications of
the protocols that were performed with Alloy into a satisfiability-equivalent SMT
problem using Z3. We presented seven stages that we have used to model the
protocols using Alloy. We showed how these seven stages have been translated
into Z3.
The contributions of this thesis have been as follows:
• Modelling three case studies using Alloy.
• Checking the validity of their properties to see if they satisfy their require-
ments using the SAT solver.
• Gaining confidence in the correctness of the properties by modelling the case
studies using Z3.
• Proving the correctness of the properties of the case studies using the SMT
solver.
• Comparing the results that were achieved through Alloy and Z.
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• Determining and comparing the strengths, limitations, and advantages of
using these formal methods.
These case studies are an ATM system, which uses as an example to introduce
Alloy and Z3, followed by two security protocols of transmitting data over a single
channel and multichannel.
The thesis also offers an approach to manually building satisfiability-equivalent
SMT problem of the specification of the case studies that were performed first
with Alloy by proving the same model properties as in Alloy and searching for a
counterexample using Z3 in infinite scopes which is supposed to be equivalent to
Alloy in finite scopes and vice versa.
Throughout this thesis we have tried to identify the strengths, weaknesses and
the limitations of Alloy and Z3 to decide which method is strong enough to depend
on to achieve confidence in results. However, during the work we noticed that the
formal methods complemented each other: Alloy for modelling properties and Z3
for proving the properties and we turned from one to another to get the benefit
from one we did not find it in the other.
Since AA could find small a counterexamples well, we suggest that the user
begins by using Alloy to check the validity of the assertion and then turns to Z3
to prove the validity of the assertion.
We found that Alloy facilitated building the restricted relations between inter-
acting entities using constraints already provided such as multiplicities keyword,
abstract, and extends. Also, after building the models, the Alloy Analyser has an
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advantage in determining if the model is consistent or not if it finds instances of
a model automatically by search within scope.
However, this advantage turned into a disadvantage if the Alloy Analyser returns
that the model is inconstant because it did not show or say why. When we turn
to Z3, it has no advantage in saying why the model is inconsistent as well. The
consistency of a model is very important before checking the assertions because if
a model is inconsistent, the Alloy Analyser could not find instances to visualize.
As a result, the SAT solver could not generate a counterexample.
The SAT solver in Alloy also has an advantage in requiring a limited scope
for each type of search for a counterexample to accelerate detecting flaws and
generating a counterexample if one exists. However, this advantage in Alloy turned
into a disadvantage as we could not recognize how many scopes we had to inspect
to see if there is a counterexample. It may be found in a larger scopes, and the
absence of an instance does not include checking of satisfiability. In addition, the
more the number of scopes is increased, the slower becomes detecting flaws and
generating a counterexample. So, we needed to turn to the unbounded SMT solver
to be more confident in covering all instances and providing a counterexample more
quickly than with the SAT solver.
Alloy also has an advantage in visualized a counterexample to detect and follow
the flaws easily and thus, add more restrictions, and properties. However, the
SAT solver could not prove why the counterexample existed. So, we needed to
turn to the unbounded SMT solver to prove that. As a result we conclude that
both Alloy and Z3 are required to model and prove the properties of a problem
as we noticed that any counterexample provided in Alloy, is provided in Z3 under
the same restrictions.
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When we used Alloy and Z3 to model an ATM system we have noticed that
Alloy has advantage in helping non experts understand the problem well through
visualizing a counterexample, saving time and effort. Moreover, Alloy visualizes
why the system is incorrect and from that the user can learn what caused the
problem in the specification and how to fix the problem.
Also we noticed that Z3 increased our confidence about getting results from
Alloy when it gave the same results. Furthermore, it could provide the results
faster than Alloy regardless of the number of scopes or if the model is becoming
more complicated.
The results we achieved from modelling the ATM system using Alloy and Z3,
encouraged us to use them to model our protocols. As a result we did not see
any difference in the protocol results compared to the ATM system results. Alloy
helped in understanding the flaws in the protocols and expressed why the first
protocol was insecure using a single channel and how to develop it; from that the
user can learn what caused an insecurity in the specification and how to fix it.
9.2 Future Work
In the future work we planned to:
• Translate Alloy specifications into satisfiability-equivalent SMT problems
using SMT-based Bounded Verification.
We found that the bounded SAT solver which is decidable and the SMT solver
which is undecidable complemented each other as the first is for modelling the
satisfiability problem for bounded scope and the other is for proving the satisfia-
bility problem for unbounded scopes. However, we wish to study whether using
a bounded SAT solver which is decidable and a bounded SMT solver which lies
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within QBVF (quantified bit-vector formula), and thus is decidable [155] comple-
ment each other as well as an unbounded SMT solver. Do the the top-level types
of an Alloy problems that are translated into SMT bitvectors, according to the
scope information, provide the same results as the bounded SAT solver does?. Or
do we really need an unbounded SMT solver to get the confidence?.
• Add more properties to the protocol and study if Alloy and Z3 still have the
same power and still complement each other. Such properties might include:
– Developing the multichannel protocol to be more complicated by en-
crypting data.
– Increasing the number of MitM and their abilities to intercept both
channels.
We showed that for Alloy, as the number of scopes increased more as increasing ,
the more time as is needed to get the results. Also, as the complexity of the model
increased, the relations become more complicated. Therefore with complicated
relations and increasing the number of scopes the translation capacity may be
exceeded because the universe contains excessive atoms, and relations of a huge
arity cannot be represented. So, could Z3 solve the state space explosion problem
that is caused by Alloy when a model becomes bigger?
• Developing a new application using the same method
In future, if we develop a new security protocol we will follow as same method-
ology, using same the formal methods we have used in our studied protocol to see
if they still keep their power in working together.
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• Tool support for working between Alloy and Z3
Alloy and Z3 have their own advantages. So, designing an automated transla-
tor tool to translate the relational logic from Alloy into Z3 using our systematic
translation rules may combine their advantages. The translator works as bridge
which converts a problem from Alloy into Z3 easily.
The tool would save time, effort and expertise of the user.
As Z3 SMT provides the counterexample as formulas and AA provides it as
visualization, we suggest that the tool will be more valuable if it could convert the
counterexample from formula into visualization the same as AA does. We did not
offer a methodology for this suggestion in our thesis.
As a result, we will have a tool that includes all the advantages of Alloy and Z3
which may help in achieving stronger results combining between modelling and
proving.
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ATM Model Using Alloy
Listing A.1: Signatures
1 module examples / systems /ATM System
2 abs t r a c t s i g Operat ions {}
3 one s i g EnterCard , TypePin , RequistCash , ReceiveCashAndCard ,
ReceiveCard extends Operat ions {}
4 abs t r a c t s i g ATM Status {}
5 one s i g WaitingCard , WaitingPin , WaitingMoney ,
WaitingReceiveCashAndCard , WaitingReceiveCard , Update
extends ATM Status{}
6 s i g Card{}
7 s i g ATM {
Listing A.2: Relations Declaration
1 cards : s e t Card ,
2 inCard : lone cards ,
3 pin : cards −> one Int ,
4 balance : cards −> one Int ,
5 money : cards −> l one Int ,
6 atmStatuse : one ATM Status ,
7 op : lone Operat ions }
Listing A.3: Facts
1 f a c t { a l l atm1 , atm2 : ATM| atm2 . cards=atm1 . cards and atm2 . pin =
atm1 . pin}
2 f a c t { a l l atm1 :ATM, card : atm1 . cards | card . ( atm1 . balance)>=0 and
card . ( atm1 . pin )>0}
Listing A.4: Predicates
1 pred ATMTransaction [ atm1 , atm2 , atm3 , atm4 , atm5 , atm6 :ATM,
crd : Card , pn , mon : Int ]{
2 ( atm1 . atmStatuse)= WaitingCard and
3 crd in atm1 . cards and
4 no atm1 . inCard and no atm1 . op and no atm1 . money
5 and atm2 . op= EnterCard and
6 atm2 . inCard = crd and
7 atm2 . balance = atm1 . balance and
8 ( atm2 . atmStatuse ) = WaitingPin and no atm2 . money
9 and atm3 . op= TypePin and
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10 atm3 . inCard = atm2 . inCard and
11 atm3 . inCard . ( atm3 . pin)=pn and
12 atm3 . balance = atm2 . balance and
13 ( atm3 . atmStatuse ) = WaitingMoney and no atm3 . money
14 and atm4 . op= RequistCash and
15 atm4 . balance = atm3 . balance and
16 atm4 . inCard = atm3 . inCard and atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . money)=mon
17 and atm5 . inCard = atm4 . inCard and
18 ( ( ( mon > atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) or mon <0) and
19 ( atm5 . inCard . ( atm5 . balance ) = atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) and
20 atm5 . op= ReceiveCard and ( atm4 . atmStatuse)= WaitingReceiveCard ) )
21 or
22 ( ( mon <= atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) and mon >0) and
23 ( atm5 . inCard . ( atm5 . balance)=atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) . minus [mon ]
24 and atm5 . op= ReceiveCashAndCard and
25 ( atm4 . atmStatuse)=WaitingReceiveCashAndCard ) ) ) and
26 ( atm5 . atmStatuse ) = Update and
27 no atm6 . inCard and ( atm6 . atmStatuse)=WaitingCard and no atm6 . op}
Listing A.5: Assertion
1 a s s e r t prop1 {
a l l atm1 , atm2 , atm3 , atm4 , atm5 , atm6 : ATM, pn ,mon : Int , crd : Card |
2 mon <= crd . ( atm1 . balance ) and mon >0 and
ATMTransaction [ atm1 , atm2 , atm3 , atm4 , atm5 , atm6 , crd , pn ,mon ]
3 i m p l i e s crd . ( atm5 . balance ) = crd . ( atm1 . balance ) . minus [mon ] }
Listing A.6: Commands
1 check prop1 f o r 1 but 6 ATM
2 run ATMTransaction f o r 1 but 6 ATM
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ATM Proving Using Z3 Theorem
Prover
Listing B.1: Sorts
1 ( dec la re−s o r t Operat ions )
2 ( dec la re−s o r t ATM Status )
3 ( dec la re−s o r t Card )
4 ( dec la re−s o r t ATM )
Listing B.2: Functions
1 ( dec la re−fun cards (ATM Card ) Bool )
2 ( dec la re−fun inCard (ATM Card ) Bool )
3 ( dec la re−fun pin (ATM Card Int ) Bool )
4 ( dec la re−fun balance (ATM Card Int ) Bool )
5 ( dec la re−fun money (ATM Card Int ) Bool )
6 ( dec la re−fun atmStatuse (ATM ATM Status ) Bool )
7 ( dec la re−fun op (ATM Operat ions ) Bool )
8 ( dec la re−fun isEnterCard ( Operat ions ) Bool )
9 ( dec la re−fun isTypePin ( Operat ions ) Bool )
10 ( dec la re−fun isRequistCash ( Operat ions ) Bool )
11 ( dec la re−fun isReceiveCashAndCard ( Operat ions ) Bool )
12 ( dec la re−fun i sRece iveCard ( Operat ions ) Bool )
13 ( dec la re−fun isWaitingCard ( ATM Status ) Bool )
14 ( dec la re−fun isWait ingPin ( ATM Status ) Bool )
15 ( dec la re−fun isWaitingMoney ( ATM Status ) Bool )
16 ( dec la re−fun isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard ( ATM Status ) Bool )
17 ( dec la re−fun isWait ingReceiveCard ( ATM Status ) Bool )
18 ( dec la re−fun isUpdate ( ATM Status ) Bool )
Listing B.3: Some Property
1 ; ; the some property o f the s i g n a t u r e s <EnterCard>, <TypePin>,
;<RequistCash>, <ReceiveCashAndCard>, <ReceiveCard>
2 ( dec la re−fun oneOf EnterCard ( ) Operat ions )
3 ( dec la re−fun oneOf TypePin ( ) Operat ions )
4 ( dec la re−fun oneOf RequistCash ( ) Operat ions )
5 ( dec la re−fun oneOf ReceiveCashAndCard ( ) Operat ions )
6 ( dec la re−fun oneOf ReceiveCard ( ) Operat ions )
7 ; ; the some property o f the s i g n a t u r e s <WaitingCard>, <WaitingPin>,
;<WaitingMoney>, <WaitingReceiveCashAndCard>,<WaitingReceiveCard>,
;<Update>
8 ( dec la re−fun oneOf WaitingCard ( ) ATM Status )
9 ( dec la re−fun oneOf WaitingPin ( ) ATM Status )
10 ( dec la re−fun oneOf WaitingMoney ( ) ATM Status )
11 ( dec la re−fun oneOf WaitingReceiveCashAndCard ( ) ATM Status )
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12 ( dec la re−fun oneOf WaitingReceiveCard ( ) ATM Status )
13 ( dec la re−fun oneOf Update ( ) ATM Status )
Listing B.4: Negation Of The Implication Of The Assertion
1 ( a s s e r t
2 ( not
3 (=>
4 ( and
Listing B.5: Return Types Of The ”oneOf” Functions/Constants
1 ( isEnterCard | oneOf EnterCard | )
2 ( isTypePin | oneOf TypePin | )
3 ( i sRequistCash | oneOf RequistCash | )
4 ( isReceiveCashAndCard | oneOf ReceiveCashAndCard | )
5 ( i sRece iveCard | oneOf ReceiveCard | )
6 ( isWaitingCard | oneOf WaitingCard | )
7 ( i sWait ingPin | oneOf WaitingPin | )
8 ( isWaitingMoney | oneOf WaitingMoney | )
9 ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard | oneOf WaitingReceiveCashAndCard | )
10 ( isWait ingReceiveCard | oneOf WaitingReceiveCard | )
11 ( isUpdate | oneOf Update | )
Listing B.6: The Lone Property Of The Signatures
1 ; ; the lone property o f the s i g n a t u r e s : <EnterCard>, <TypePin>,
;<RequistCash>, <ReceiveCashAndCard>, <ReceiveCard>
2 ( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ) ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( isEnterCard o1 ) ( isEnterCard o2 ))(= o1 o2 ) ) )
3 ( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ) ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( isTypePin o1 ) ( isTypePin o2 ))(= o1 o2 ) ) )
4 ( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ) ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( i sRequistCash o1 ) ( i sRequistCash o2 ) ) (= o1 o2 ) ) )
5 ( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ) ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( isReceiveCashAndCard o1 ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o2 ) )
(= o1 o2 ) ) )
6 ( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ) ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( i sRece iveCard o1 ) ( i sRece iveCard o2 ))(= o1 o2 ) ) )
7
8 ; ; The lone property o f the s i g n a t u r e s : <WaitingCard>,
<WaitingPin>,<WaitingMoney>,<WaitingReceiveCashAndCard>,
;<WaitingReceiveCard>,<Update>
9 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( isWaitingCard a1 ) ( isWaitingCard a2 ) ) (= a1 a2 ) ) )
10 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( i sWait ingPin a1 ) ( i sWait ingPin a2 ) ) (= a1 a2 ) ) )
11 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( isWaitingMoney a1 ) ( isWaitingMoney a2 ))(= a1 a2 ) ) )
12 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a1 )
( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a2 ))(= a1 a2 ) ) )
13 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( isWait ingReceiveCard a1 )
( isWait ingReceiveCard a2 ) ) (= a1 a2 ) ) )
14 ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status))(=>
( and ( isUpdate a1 ) ( isUpdate a2 ))(= a1 a2 ) ) )
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Listing B.7: Abstract and Extension property
1 ; ; ab s t r a c t property o f s i g na tu r e <Operations>
( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( or ( isEnterCard o ) ( isTypePin o )
( i sRequistCash o ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o )
( i sRece iveCard o ) ) )
2
3 ; ; the extends property o f the s i g n a t u r e s <EnterCard>,
;<TypePin>, <RequistCash>, <ReceiveCashAndCard>,
;<ReceiveCard> to the s i g na tu r e <Operations>
4 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isEnterCard o ) ( isTypePin o ) ) ) )
5 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isEnterCard o ) ( i sRequistCash o ) ) ) )
6 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isEnterCard o ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o ) ) ) )
7 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isEnterCard o ) ( i sRece iveCard o ) ) ) )
8 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isTypePin o ) ( i sRequistCash o ) ) ) )
9 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isTypePin o ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o ) ) ) )
10 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isTypePin o ) ( i sRece iveCard o ) ) ) )
11 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( i sRequistCash o ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o ) ) ) )
12 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( i sRequistCash o ) ( i sRece iveCard o ) ) ) )
13 ( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( and
( isReceiveCashAndCard o ) ( i sRece iveCard o ) ) ) )
14
15 ; ; the ab s t r a c t property o f s i g na tu r e <ATM Status>
( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( or ( isWaitingCard a )
( i sWait ingPin a ) ( isWaitingMoney a )
( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a )
( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) )
16
17 ; ; the extends property o f the s i g n a t u r e s <WaitingCard>,
;<WaitingPin>, <WaitingMoney>,<WaitingReceiveCashAndCard>,
;<WaitingReceiveCard>,<Update> to the s ignature<ATM Status>
18 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingCard a ) ( i sWait ingPin a ) ) ) )
19 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingCard a ) ( isWaitingMoney a ) ) ) )
20 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingCard a ) ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a ) ) ) )
21 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingCard a ) ( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ) ) )
22 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingCard a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) ) )
23 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWait ingPin a ) ( isWaitingMoney a ) ) ) )
24 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWait ingPin a ) ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a ) ) ) )
25 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWait ingPin a ) ( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ) ) )
26 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWait ingPin a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) ) )
27 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingMoney a ) ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a ) ) ) )
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28 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingMoney a ) ( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ) ) )
29 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingMoney a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) ) )
30 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a ) ( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ) ) )
31 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) ) )
32 ( f o r a l l ( ( a ATM Status ) ) ( not ( and
( isWait ingReceiveCard a ) ( isUpdate a ) ) ) )
Listing B.8: Relations
1 ; ; r e l a t i o n s o f the s i gn a t u r e <ATM>
; ; inCard : lone cards ,
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ) ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( c1 Card))(=>
( inCard t h i s c1 ) ( cards t h i s c1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c3 Card ) ( c2 Card)(=>(and ( inCard t h i s c2 )
( inCard t h i s c3 ) ) (= c2 c3 ) ) ) ) )
2 ; ; pin : cards −> one Int ,
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ) ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( c1 Card ) ( i Int ) )
(=> ( pin t h i s c1 i ) ( cards t h i s c1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a1 Card))(=> ( cards t h i s a1 ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( i 1 Int ) ) ( pin t h i s a1 i 1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i 3 Int ) ( i 2 Int ))(=>(and ( pin t h i s a1 i 2 )
( pin t h i s a1 i 3 ))(= i 2 i 3 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
3 ; ; ba lance : cards −> one Int ,
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ) ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( c1 Card ) ( i Int ))(=>
( ba lance t h i s c1 i ) ( cards t h i s c1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a1 Card ) ) (=>( cards t h i s a1 ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( i 1 Int ) ) ( ba lance t h i s a1 i 1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i 3 Int ) ( i 2 Int ) ) (=> ( and ( balance t h i s a1 i 2 )
( ba lance t h i s a1 i 3 ))(= i 2 i 3 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
4 ; ; money : cards −> l one Int ,
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ) ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( c1 Card ) ( i Int ))(=>
(money t h i s c1 i ) ( cards t h i s c1 ) ) ) ( f o r a l l ( ( a1 Card )
( i 3 Int ) ( i 2 Int ))(=>(and (money t h i s a1 i 2 ) ( money t h i s a1 i 3 ) )
(= i 2 i 3 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
5 ; ; atmStatuse : one ATM Status ,
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ) ( and ( e x i s t s ( ( a1 ATM Status ) )
( atmStatuse t h i s a1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a3 ATM Status ) ( a2 ATM Status ) ) (=> ( and
( atmStatuse t h i s a2 ) ( atmStatuse t h i s a3 ))(= a2 a3 ) ) ) ) )
6 ; ; op : l one Operat ions
( f o r a l l ( ( t h i s ATM) ( o2 Operat ions ) ( o1 Operat ions ))(=>
( and ( op t h i s o1 ) ( op t h i s o2 ))(= o1 o2 ) ) )
Listing B.9: Facts
1 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f the f i r s t f a c t
( f o r a l l ( ( atm1 ATM) ( atm2 ATM) ) ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( c1 Card ) )
(=> ( cards atm2 c1 ) ( cards atm1 c1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c2 Card))(=> ( cards atm1 c2 ) ( cards atm2 c2 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c3 Card ) ( i Int ))(=>
( pin atm2 c3 i ) ( pin atm1 c3 i ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c4 Card ) ( i 1 Int ))(=>
( pin atm1 c4 i 1 ) ( pin atm2 c4 i 1 ) ) ) ) )
2 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f the second f a c t
( f o r a l l ( ( atm1 ATM) ( card Card ) ) (=> ( cards atm1 card )
( and
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; ; card . ( atm1 . balance)>=0
( f o r a l l ( ( i Int ))(=>( balance atm1 card i )(>= i 0 ) ) )
; ; card . ( atm1 . pin)> 0
( f o r a l l ( ( i 1 Int ))(=>( pin atm1 card i 1 )(> i 1 0 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
Listing B.10: Predicate and Assertion
1 ; ; ” i n l i n e d ” t r a n s l a t i o n o f the p r e d i c a t e <ATMTransaction>.
; I n l i n e d means : without e x p l i c i t d e c l a r t i o n
2
3 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f the a s s e r t i o n <prop1>
( f o r a l l ( ( atm1 ATM) ( atm2 ATM) ( atm3 ATM) ( atm4 ATM)
( atm5 ATM) ( atm6 ATM) ( pn Int ) (mon Int ) ( crd Card ) )
(=> ( and
; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : mon <= crd . ( atm1 . balance ) and 0 < mon
; ; This assumption i s mandatory o f the c o r r e c t i o n o f the a s s e r t i o n
<prop1>
; ; I f i t i s out−commented the SMT s o l v e r should re turn
; ; a counterexample ( i . e . , s a t ) ,
; ; o the rw i s e i t should prove the a s s e r t i o n c o r r e c t ( i . e . , unsat )
4 ( f o r a l l ( ( i Int ))(=>( balance atm1 crd i )
(<= mon i )))(< 0 mon)
5 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( atm1 . atmStatuse)= WaitingCard
( f o r a l l ( ( a1 ATM Status))(=>
( atmStatuse atm1 a1 ) ( isWaitingCard a1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w ATM Status))(=>
( isWaitingCard w) ( atmStatuse atm1 w) ) )
6 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : crd in atm1 . cards
( cards atm1 crd )
7 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : no atm1 . inCard and no atm1 . op
( f o r a l l ( ( c2 Card ) ) ( not ( inCard atm1 c2 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( o Operat ions ) ) ( not ( op atm1 o ) ) )
8 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : no atm1 . money
( f o r a l l ( (m Int ) ( c9 Card ) ) ( not (money atm1 c9 m) ) )
9 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : no atm2 . money
( f o r a l l ( (m Int ( c9 Card ) ) ) ( not (money atm2 c9 m) ) )
10 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm2 . op= EnterCard
( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Operat ions ))(=>
( op atm2 o1 ) ( isEnterCard o1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( e Operat ions ))(=>
( isEnterCard e ) ( op atm2 e ) ) )
11 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm2 . inCard = crd
( f o r a l l ( ( c3 Card ) ) (=> ( inCard atm2 c3 )
(= crd c3 ) ) ) ( inCard atm2 crd )
12 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm2 . balance = atm1 . balance
( f o r a l l ( ( c5 Card ) ( i 1 Int ))(=>
( ba lance atm2 c5 i 1 ) ( ba lance atm1 c5 i 1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c6 Card ) ( i 2 Int ))(=>
( ba lance atm1 c6 i 2 ) ( ba lance atm2 c6 i 2 ) ) )
13 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( atm2 . atmStatuse ) = WaitingPin
( f o r a l l ( ( a15 ATM Status))(=>
( atmStatuse atm2 a15 ) ( i sWait ingPin a15 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w1 ATM Status))(=>
( i sWait ingPin w1) ( atmStatuse atm2 w1 ) ) )
14 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm3 . op = TypePin
( f o r a l l ( ( o2 Operat ions ))(=>(op atm3 o2 ) ( isTypePin o2 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( t Operat ions ))(=>( isTypePin t ) ( op atm3 t ) ) )
15 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm3 . inCard = atm2 . inCard
( f o r a l l ( ( c7 Card))(=>( inCard atm3 c7 ) ( inCard atm2 c7 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c8 Card))(=>( inCard atm2 c8 ) ( inCard atm3 c8 ) ) )
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16 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm3 . inCard . ( atm3 . pin ) = pn
( f o r a l l ( ( i 3 Int ))(=>( e x i s t s ( ( c9 Card ) )
( and ( inCard atm3 c9 ) ( pin atm3 c9 i 3 )))(= pn i 3 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( c10 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm3 c10 ) ( pin atm3 c10 pn ) ) )
17 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm3 . balance = atm2 . balance
( f o r a l l ( ( c11 Card ) ( i 5 Int ))(=>
( ba lance atm3 c11 i 5 ) ( ba lance atm2 c11 i 5 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c12 Card ) ( i 6 Int ))(=>
( ba lance atm2 c12 i 6 ) ( ba lance atm3 c12 i 6 ) ) )
18 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( atm3 . atmStatuse ) = WaitingMoney
( f o r a l l ( ( a32 ATM Status))(=>
( atmStatuse atm3 a32 ) ( isWaitingMoney a32 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w2 ATM Status))(=>
( isWaitingMoney w2) ( atmStatuse atm3 w2 ) ) )
19 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : no atm3 . money
( f o r a l l ( (m Int ) ( c9 Card ) ) ( not (money atm3 c9 m) ) )
20 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm4 . op= RequistCash
( f o r a l l ( ( o3 Operat ions ))(=>(op atm4 o3 ) ( i sRequistCash o3 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( r Operat ions ))(=>( i sRequistCash r ) ( op atm4 r ) ) )
21 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm4 . balance = atm3 . balance
( f o r a l l ( ( c13 Card ) ( i 7 Int ))(=>( balance atm4 c13 i 7 )
( ba lance atm3 c13 i 7 ) ) ) ( f o r a l l ( ( c14 Card ) ( i 8 Int ))(=>
( ba lance atm3 c14 i 8 ) ( ba lance atm4 c14 i 8 ) ) )
22 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm4 . inCard = atm3 . inCard
( f o r a l l ( ( c15 Card))(=>( inCard atm4 c15 ) ( inCard atm3 c15 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c16 Card))(=>( inCard atm3 c16 ) ( inCard atm4 c16 ) ) )
23 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . money) = mon
( f o r a l l ( ( i 3 Int ))(=>( f o r a l l ( ( c9 Card ) )
( and ( inCard atm4 c9 ) ( money atm4 c9 i 3 )))(= mon i 3 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c10 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm4 c10 ) ( money atm4 c10 mon) ) )
24 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : atm5 . inCard = atm4 . inCard
( f o r a l l ( ( c17 Card))(=> ( inCard atm5 c17 ) ( inCard atm4 c17 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c18 Card))(=>( inCard atm4 c18 ) ( inCard atm5 c18 ) ) )
25 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( mon<=atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) and 0<mon)
; and
; ( atm5 . inCard . ( atm5 . balance)=atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance)− mon
; and atm5 . op= ReceiveCashAndCard and ( atm4 . atmStatuse ) =
; WaitingReceiveCashAndCard )
( or ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( i 9 Int ))(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( c19 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm4 c19 )
( balance atm4 c19 i 9 )))(<= mon i 9 ) ) )
(< 0 mon) ( f o r a l l ( ( i 10 Int ) ( i 11 Int ) )
(=(and ( e x i s t s ( ( c20 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm5 c20 )
( balance atm5 c20 i10 ) ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( c21 Card ) )
( and ( inCard atm4 c21 ) ( balance atm4 c21 i11 ) ) ) )
(= i10 (− i 11 mon ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( o4 Operat ions ))(=>
( op atm5 o4 ) ( isReceiveCashAndCard o4 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( r1 Operat ions ) ) (=>
( isReceiveCashAndCard r1 ) ( op atm5 r1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a57 ATM Status ) )
(=> ( atmStatuse atm4 a57 ) ( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard a57 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w3 ATM Status))(=>
( isWaitingReceiveCashAndCard w3) ( atmStatuse atm4 w3 ) ) ) )
26 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( mon>atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) or mon<0)
; and
; ; ; ( atm5 . inCard . ( atm5 . balance ) = atm4 . inCard . ( atm4 . balance ) and
; atm5 . op= ReceiveCard and ( atm4 . atmStatuse)=WaitingReceiveCard )
( and ( or ( f o r a l l ( ( i 12 Int ))(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( c22 Card ) ) ( and
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( inCard atm4 c22 ) ( balance atm4 c22 i12 ) ) )
(< i 12 mon)))(< mon 0) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i 13 Int ))(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( c23 Card ) )
( and ( inCard atm5 c23 ) ( balance atm5 c23 i13 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( c24 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm4 c24 )
( balance atm4 c24 i13 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i 14 Int ) ) (=> ( e x i s t s ( ( c25 Card ) ) ( and
( inCard atm4 c25 ) ( balance atm4 c25 i14 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( c26 Card ) ) ( and ( inCard atm5 c26 )
( balance atm5 c26 i14 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( o5 Operat ions ))(=>
( op atm5 o5 ) ( i sRece iveCard o5 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( r2 Operat ions ))(=>
( i sRece iveCard r2 ) ( op atm5 r2 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a72 ATM Status))(=>
( atmStatuse atm4 a72 ) ( isWait ingReceiveCard a72 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w4 ATM Status ) ) (=>
( i sWait ingReceiveCard w4) ( atmStatuse atm4 w4 ) ) ) ) )
27 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : ( atm5 . atmStatuse ) = Update
( f o r a l l ( ( a75 ATM Status ) ) (=>
( atmStatuse atm5 a75 ) ( isUpdate a75 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( u ATM Status))(=>
( isUpdate u ) ( atmStatuse atm5 u ) ) )
28 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : no atm6 . inCard and ( atm6 . atmStatuse ) =
; ; WaitingCard and no atm6 . op
( f o r a l l ( ( c27 Card ) ) ( not ( inCard atm6 c27 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a79 ATM Status))(=>
( atmStatuse atm6 a79 ) ( isWaitingCard a79 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( (w5 ATM Status ) ) (=>
( isWaitingCard w5) ( atmStatuse atm6 w5 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( o6 Operat ions ) ) ( not ( op atm6 o6 ) ) ) )
29 ; ; t r a n s l a t i o n o f : crd . ( atm5 . balance)=crd . ( atm1 . balance)− mon
( f o r a l l ( ( i 15 Int ) ( i 16 Int ) )
(=> ( and ( balance atm5 crd i15 ) ( ba lance atm1 crd i16 ) )
(= i15 (− i 16 mon) ) )
30 ) ) ) ) ) )
31 (= d d1 ) ) ) ) ) )
Listing B.11: Commands
1 ( check−sa t )
2 ; ( get−model )
3 ( e x i t )
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Transmitting Data Over Single
Channel Model Using Alloy
(Second Protocol) in Secure/
Insecure Scope
Listing C.1: Signatures
1 s i g Time{}
2 s i g Channel{}
3 s i g ISP{}
4 s i g Data {}
5 abs t r a c t s i g Connect ionStatus {}
6 one s i g Connection And Exchanging Data extends Connect ionStatus {}
7 s i g MAC{}
8 s i g Communication Status {
Listing C.2: Relations Declaration
1 s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r : s e t ISP ,
2 v i s i t o r s : s e t MAC,
3 c l i e n t : one MAC,
4 s e r v e r : one MAC,
5 mitmIntercepts : l one MAC − s e rve r ,
6 connect ion : MAC −> l one s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ,
7 opens :MAC−> s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r −> Channel ,
8 s t a t u s :MAC −> one ConnectionStatus ,
9 sends : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
10 r e c e i v e s : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel}
Listing C.3: Facts
1 : FIRST FACT
2 f a c t {
a l l s : Communication Status |
( s . mitmIntercepts ! in s . v i s i t o r s or
( s . mitmIntercepts in s . v i s i t o r s and s . c l i e n t ! in s . mitmIntercepts ) )
i m p l i e s ( a l l t , t ’ : Time , d , d ’ : Data , ch : Channel |
s . c l i e n t . ( s . sends ) =d −>t−>ch and
s . s e r v e r . ( s . r e c e i v e s ) =d ’ −>t ’−>ch
i m p l i e s t= t ’ )}
3 SECOND FACT
4 f a c t {
a l l t , t ’ : Time , d , d ’ : Data , s : Communication Status , ch : Channel |
( s . c l i e n t . ( s . sends ) =d −>t−>ch and
s . s e r v e r . ( s . r e c e i v e s ) =d ’ −>t ’−>ch and t =t ’ )
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5 i m p l i e s ( ( d = d ’ ) and no s . mitmIntercepts . ( s . sends ) and
no s . mitmIntercepts . ( s . r e c e i v e s ) )}
6 ;THIRD FACT
7 f a c t {
a l l s : Communication Status | s . c l i e n t != s . s e r v e r }
Listing C.4: Predecates
1 pred SingleChannel [ t , t ’ : Time , d , d ’ : Data , i sp , i s p ’ : ISP ,
s t a tu s1 : Communication Status , ch : Channel ]{
2 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a t u s ) =Connection And Exchanging Data and
3 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a t u s ) =Connection And Exchanging Data and
4 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
5 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
6 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)= i s p and
7 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)= i s p ’ and
8 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . opens)=
s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)−>ch and
9 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . opens)=
s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)−>ch and
10 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . sends)=d−>t−>ch and
11 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )=d ’−>t ’−>ch and
12 no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s ) and
13 no s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . sends ) and
14 // No CE secure scope ( no Mitm at a l l )
15 // s ta tu s1 . mitmIntercepts ! in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s
16 // or
17 //MITM INTERCEPTION (NO CE) S t s t i c and dynamic mitm
18 ( ( ( s t a tu s1 . mitmIntercepts in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s ) and
( s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t ) ! in s ta tu s1 . mitmIntercepts ) )}
Listing C.5: Assertion
1 a s s e r t DataSecure {
2 a l l i sp , i s p ’ : ISP , d , d ’ : Data , t , t ’ : Time , ch : Channel ,
s t a tu s1 : Communication Status |
3 ( SingleChannel [ t , t ’ ,d , d ’ , i sp , i s p ’ , s tatus1 , ch ] )
4 i m p l i e s (d=d ’ )}
Listing C.6: Commands
1 check DataSecure f o r 3 MAC, 2 Time , 1 ISP , 2 Data ,
1 ConnectionStatus , 1 Channel , 1 Communication Status
2 run SingleChannel f o r 3 MAC, 2 Time , 1 ISP , 2 Data ,
1 ConnectionStatus , 1 Channel , 1 Communication Status
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Listing D.1: Sorts
1 ( dec la re−s o r t Time)
2 ( dec la re−s o r t Channel )
3 ( dec la re−s o r t ISP )
4 ( dec la re−s o r t Data )
5 ( dec la re−s o r t Connect ionStatus )
6 ( dec la re−s o r t MAC)
7 ( dec la re−s o r t CommunicationStatus )
Listing D.2: Functions
1 ( dec la re−fun s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ( CommunicationStatus ISP ) Bool )
2 ( dec la re−fun v i s i t o r s ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
3 ( dec la re−fun c l i e n t 1 ( CommunicationStatus MAC ) Bool )
4 ( dec la re−fun s e r v e r ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
5 ( dec la re−fun mitmIntercepts ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
6 ( dec la re−fun connect ion ( CommunicationStatus MAC ISP ) Bool )
7 ( dec la re−fun opens ( CommunicationStatus MAC ISP Channel ) Bool )
8 ( dec la re−fun s t a t u s ( CommunicationStatus MAC Connect ionStatus ) Bool )
9 ( dec la re−fun sends ( CommunicationStatus MAC Data Time Channel ) Bool )
10 ( dec la re−fun r e c e i v e s ( CommunicationStatus MAC Data Time Channel )
Bool )
11 ( dec la re−fun isConnection And Exchanging Data ( Connect ionStatus )
Bool )
Listing D.3: Some Property
1 ; ; the some property o f the s i g n a t u r e s
; Connection And Exchanging Data
( dec la re−fun | oneOf Connection And Exchanging Data | ( )
Connect ionStatus )
Listing D.4: Negation Of The Implication Of The Assertion
1 ( a s s e r t
2 ( not
3 (=>
4 ( and
Listing D.5: Return Types Of The ”oneOf” Functions/Constants
1 ( isConnection And Exchanging Data |
oneOf Connection And Exchanging Data | )
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Listing D.6: The Lone Property Of The Signatures
1 ; ; the lone property o f the s i g n a t u r e s :
; Connection And Exchanging Data
( f o r a l l ( ( o1 Connect ionStatus ) ( o2 Connect ionStatus ))(=>
( and ( isConnection And Exchanging Data o1 )
( isConnection And Exchanging Data o2 ))(= o1 o2 ) ) )
Listing D.7: Relations
1 ; c l i e n t 1 : one MAC,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) )
( and ( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) ) ( c l i e n t 1 cs mac1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC) )
(=> ( and ( c l i e n t 1 cs mac2 ) ( c l i e n t 1 cs mac3 ) )
(= mac2 mac3 ) ) ) ) )
2 ; s e r v e r : one MAC,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) )
( and ( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) ) ( s e r v e r cs mac1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC) )
(=>(and ( s e r v e r cs mac2 ) ( s e r v e r cs mac3))(= mac2 mac3 ) ) ) ) )
3 ; mitmIntercepts : l one MAC − s e rve r ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC))(=>
( and ( mitmIntercepts cs mac3 ) ( mitmIntercepts cs mac2))(= mac2 mac3 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) )
( not ( mitmIntercepts cs mac1 ) ) ) )
4 ; connect ion : MAC −> l one s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ) ( and
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>( connect ion cs mac i sp11 )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r cs i sp11 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp12 ISP ) ( i sp13 ISP))(=> ( and ( connect ion cs mac i sp12 )
( connect ion cs mac i sp13 ))(= i sp12 i sp13 ) ) ) ) )
5 ; s t a t u s :MAC −> one ConnectionStatus ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) )
( and ( e x i s t s ( ( co Connect ionStatus ) ) ( s t a t u s cs mac co ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a3 Connect ionStatus ) ( a2 Connect ionStatus ) )
(=> ( and ( s t a tu s cs mac a2 ) ( s t a t u s cs mac a3 ))(= a2 a3 ) ) ) ) )
6 ; opens :MAC−> s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r −> Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ( i s p ISP )
( ch Channel ))(=>( opens cs mac i s p ch ) ( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r cs i s p ) ) )
7 ; sends : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ( ch Channel )
( d1 Data ) ( d2 Data ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) )
(=>(and ( sends cs mac d1 t ch ) ( sends cs mac d2 t1 ch ) )
( and(= d1 d2)(= t t1 ) ) ) )
8 ; r e c e i v e s : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ( ch Channel )
( d1 Data ) ( d2 Data ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) )
(=>(and ( r e c e i v e s cs mac d1 t ch )
( r e c e i v e s cs mac d2 t1 ch ) ) ( and(= d1 d2)(= t t1 ) ) ) )
Listing D.8: Facts
1 ; FIRST FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus ) ) ( i m p l i e s
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC) (mmac MAC) ) ( or(=>(mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 mmac)
( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 mmac) ) )
( and(=>(mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 mmac) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 mmac) )
(=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( not ( mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 cmac ) ) ) ) ) )
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( f o r a l l ( ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) ( d Data ) ( d1 Data ) ( ch1 Channel ) )
( i m p l i e s ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d d11)(= t t11 )(= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 d t ch1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=>( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11 ) (= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1 ) ) ) ) (= t t1 ) ) ) ) )
2 ;SECOND FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time)
(d Data ) ( d1 Data ) ( ch1 Channel ) ) ( i m p l i e s ( and
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=>( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d d11)(= t t11 )(= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 d t ch1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=>( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11 )(= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1 )))(= t t1 ))(= d d1 ) ) )
3 ;THIRD FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s CommunicationStatus ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac1 MAC) (mac2 MAC))(=> ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s mac1)
( s e r v e r s mac2 ) ) not(= mac1 mac2 ) ) ) ) )
Listing D.9: Predicate and Assertion
1 ( f o r a l l ( ( i s p ISP ) ( i sp1 ISP ) ( d Data ) ( d1 Data ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time)
( ch1 Channel ) ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus ))(=>(and
2 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a t u s )=isConnection And Exchanging Data
(=>( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC) )
(=> ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 cmac cs1 ) )
( isConnection And Exchanging Data cs1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC) )
(=> ( isConnection And Exchanging Data cs2 )
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 cmac cs2 ) ) ) ) )
3 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a tu s )=isConnection And Exchanging Data
(=>( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC) )
(=> ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 smac cs1 ) )
( isConnection And Exchanging Data cs1 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC) )
(=> ( isConnection And Exchanging Data cs2 )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 smac cs2 ) ) ) ) )
4 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC))(=> ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 cmac ) ) )
5 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s
( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC))(=> ( s e r v e r s t a tu s1 smac )
( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 smac ) ) )
6 ; no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
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( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac d1 t1 ch1 ) ) ) ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac d t1 ch1 ) ) ) ) )
7 ; no s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )
( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( sends s ta tu s1 smac d t ch1 ) ) ) ( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( sends s ta tu s1 smac d1 t ch1 ) ) ) ) )
8 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )= i s p
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) )
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac i sp11 ) ) )
(= i s p i sp11 ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) )
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac1 i s p ) ) ) ) )
9 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )= isp ‘
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac i sp11 ) ) )
(= i sp1 i sp11 ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac1 i sp1 ) ) ) ) )
10 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . opens)=
; s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)−>ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP ) ( ch Channel ))(=>( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC))(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac i sp11 ) )
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( opens s ta tu s1 cmac i sp11 ch ) ) ) )
( and(= i s p i sp11 )(= ch1 ch ) ) ) ) ( f o r a l l ( ( cmac1 MAC))(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac1 i s p ) )
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( opens s ta tu s1 cmac1 i s p ch1 ) ) ) )
11 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . opens)=
; s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)−>ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP ) ( ch Channel ))(=>( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC))(=>
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac i sp11 ) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( opens s ta tu s1 smac i sp11 ch ) ) ) )
( and(= i sp1 i sp11 )(= ch1 ch ) ) ) ) ( f o r a l l ( ( smac1 MAC))(=>
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac1 i sp1 ) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 ) ( opens s ta tu s1 smac1 i sp1 ch1 ) ) ) )
12 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends)=d−>t−>ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d d11)(= t t11 )(= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 d t ch1 ) ) )
13 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )=d ’−>t ’−>ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= d1 d11)(= t1 t11 )(= ch1 ch11 ) ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 d1 t1 ch1 ) ) )
14 ; s t a tu s1 . mitmIntercepts ! in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s or
15 ; ( ( ( s t a tu s1 . mitmIntercepts in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s ) and
; ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t ) ! in s ta tu s1 . mitmIntercepts ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC) (mmac MAC) ) ( or(=>(mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 mmac)
( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 mmac) ) )
( and(=>(mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 mmac) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 mmac) )
(=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( not ( mitmIntercepts s t a tu s1 cmac ) ) ) ) ) )
16 ;ASSERTION (= d d1 ) ) ) ) ) )
Listing D.10: Commands
1 ( check−sa t ) ; ( get−model ) ( e x i t )
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Listing E.1: Signatures
1 s i g Time{}
2 s i g Channel{}
3 s i g ISP{}
4 s i g Data{}
5 abs t r a c t s i g Connect ionStatus {}
6 one s i g First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices ,
7 Second Communication And Exchanging Letters extends Connect ionStatus
{}
8 s i g MAC{}
9 s i g Communication Status {
Listing E.2: Relation Declaration
1 v i s i t o r s : s e t MAC,
2 c l i e n t 1 : one MAC, // each v i s i t o r ( c l i e n t ) has one MAC
3 c l i e n t 2 : one MAC ,
4 s e r v e r : one MAC,
5 inter septMacs : l one MAC − s e rve r , // no need to i n t e r c e p t s e r v e r
6 s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r : s e t ISP ,
7 ispA : one ISP ,
8 ispB : one ISP ,
9 connect ion : MAC −> l one s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ,
10 s t a t u s :MAC −> one ConnectionStatus ,
11 channel : s e t Channel ,
12 ch1 : one Channel ,
13 ch2 : one Channel ,
14 sends :MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
15 r e c e i v e s :MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel}
Listing E.3: Facts
1 ; FIRST FACT
f a c t { a l l s , s ’ : Communication Status |
/∗∗ In case the f i r s t channel has been i n t e r c e p t e d ∗/
( ( s . c l i e n t 1 in s . v i s i t o r s and s . c l i e n t 2 ! in s . v i s i t o r s ) and
( s ’ . c l i e n t 1 ! in s ’ . v i s i t o r s and s ’ . c l i e n t 2 in s ’ . v i s i t o r s )
2 and ( ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) in s . inter septMacs and ( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in
s ’ . in ter septMacs or ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s . inter septMacs and
( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) in s ’ . inte r septMacs or ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in
s . inte r septMacs and ( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in s ’ . inter septMacs ) i m p l i e s
3 ( a l l s , s ’ : Communication Status , t , t ’ , t ’ ’ , t ’ ’ ’ : Time ,
i nd i c e s , i n d i c e s ’ , l e t t e r s , l e t t e r s ’ : Data |
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( s . c l i e n t 1 . ( s . sends ) = ind i c e s−>t−>s . ch1 and
s . s e r v e r . ( s . r e c e i v e s ) = i n d i c e s ’−>t ’−>s . ch1 and
s ’ . c l i e n t 2 . ( s ’ . sends)= l e t t e r s−>t ’ ’−>s ’ . ch2 and
s ’ . s e r v e r . ( s ’ . r e c e i v e s )= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s ’ . ch2 )
4 i m p l i e s ( ( t ’ ’ != t ’ ’ ’ and t=t ’ ) and ( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) in
s ’ . in ter septMacs and ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s . inter septMacs or
( t ’ ’= t ’ ’ ’ and t != t ’ ) and ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) in s . inter septMacs and
( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in s ’ . in ter septMacs or ( t ’ ’= t ’ ’ ’ and t=t ’ )
5 and ( s . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s . inter septMacs and ( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in
s ’ . in ter septMacs ) ) }
6 ;SECOND FACT
f a c t { a l l s , s ’ : Communication Status , t , t ’ , t ’ ’ , t ’ ’ ’ : Time , i nd i c e s ,
i n d i c e s ’ , l e t t e r s , l e t t e r s ’ : Data | ( ( s . c l i e n t 1 . ( s . sends ) =
ind i c e s−>t−>s . ch1
7 and s . s e r v e r . ( s . r e c e i v e s ) = i n d i c e s ’−>t ’−>s . ch1 ) and
( s ’ . c l i e n t 2 . ( s ’ . sends)= l e t t e r s−>t ’ ’−>s ’ . ch2
8 and s ’ . s e r v e r . ( s ’ . r e c e i v e s )= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s ’ . ch2 ) and
( ( t ’ ’ != t ’ ’ ’ and t=t ’ ) or ( t ’ ’= t ’ ’ ’ and t=t ’ ) or
( t ’ ’= t ’ ’ ’ and t != t ’ ) ) )
i m p l i e s ( l e t t e r s=l e t t e r s ’ and i n d i c e s=i n d i c e s ’ )}
9 ;THIRD FACT
f a c t { a l l s ’ , s : Communication Status | s . c l i e n t 1 != s . s e r v e r
10 and s ’ . c l i e n t 2 != s . s e r v e r and s . c l i e n t 1 != s ’ . c l i e n t 2
and s . c l i e n t 1=s ’ . c l i e n t 1 and s . s e r v e r = s ’ . s e r v e r }
Listing E.4: Predicates
1 pred MultiChannel [ t , t ’ , t ’ ’ , t ’ ’ ’ : Time , i nd i c e s , i n d i c e s ’ ,
l e t t e r s , l e t t e r s ’ : Data , i s p : ISP , status1 , s t a tu s2 : Communication Status ]
2 { s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a tu s ) =
First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices and
3 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a t u s ) =
First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices and
4 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
5 s ta tu s1 . ispA in s ta tu s1 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r and
6 s ta tu s1 . ispB ! in s ta tu s1 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r and
7 no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )
8 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion ) =s ta tu s1 . ispA and
9 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion)= i s p and
10 s ta tu s1 . ch1 in s ta tu s1 . channel and
11 s ta tu s1 . ch2 ! in s ta tu s1 . channel and
12 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends)= ind i c e s−>t−>s t a tu s1 . ch1 and
13 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )!= l e t t e r s−>t−>s t a tu s1 . ch1 and
14 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )= i n d i c e s ’−>t ’−>s t a tu s1 . ch1 and
15 s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )!= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’−>s t a tu s1 . ch1 and
16 no s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . sends ) and
17 no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s ) and
18 no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s ) and
19 no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )
20 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . s t a t u s ) =
Second Communication And Exchanging Letters and
21 s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . s t a t u s ) =
Second Communication And Exchanging Letters and
22 s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s2 . v i s i t o r s and
23 s ta tu s2 . ispA ! in s ta tu s2 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r and
24 s ta tu s2 . ispB in s ta tu s2 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r and
25 no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion ) and
26 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion )= s ta tu s2 . ispB and
27 s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion)=
s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion ) and
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28 s ta tu s2 . ch1 ! in s ta tu s2 . channel and
29 s ta tu s2 . ch2 in s ta tu s2 . channel and
30 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends)= l e t t e r s−>t ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2 and
31 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends )!= ind i c e s−>t ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2 and
32 s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2 and
33 s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )!= i n d i c e s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2 and
34 no s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . sends ) and
35 no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s ) and
36 no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends ) and
37 no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s ) and
38 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
39 s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 ! in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
40 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 ! in s ta tu s2 . v i s i t o r s and
41 s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 in s ta tu s2 . v i s i t o r s and (
42 ;NO CE in case the f i r s t channel i s i n t e r c e p t e d OR
; in case the second channel i s i n t e r c e p t e d
;OR n e i t h e r
43 // ( s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and
( s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs
44 // or ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and
( s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 ) in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs
45 // or ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and
( s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs )}
Listing E.5: Assertion
1 a s s e r t DataSecure {
a l l i s p : ISP , status1 , s t a tu s2 : Communication Status ,
i nd i c e s , i n d i c e s ’ , l e t t e r s , l e t t e r s ’ : Data , t , t ’ , t ’ ’ , t ’ ’ ’ : Time |
MultiChannel [ t , t ’ , t ’ ’ , t ’ ’ ’ , i nd i c e s , i n d i c e s ’ ,
l e t t e r s , l e t t e r s ’ , i s p , s tatus1 , s t a tu s2 ]
i m p l i e s i n d i c e s = i n d i c e s ’ and l e t t e r s = l e t t e r s ’}
Listing E.6: Commands
1 check DataSecure f o r 3 MAC, 4 Time , 2 ISP , 2 Channel ,
4 Data , 1 ConnectionStatus , 2 Communication Status
2 run MultiChannel f o r 3 MAC, 4 Time , 2 ISP , 2 Channel ,
4 Data , 1 ConnectionStatus , 2 Communication Status
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Listing F.1: Sorts
1 ( dec la re−s o r t Time)
2 ( dec la re−s o r t Channel )
3 ( dec la re−s o r t ISP )
4 ( dec la re−s o r t Data )
5 ( dec la re−s o r t Connect ionStatus )
6 ( dec la re−s o r t MAC)
7 ( dec la re−s o r t CommunicationStatus )
Listing F.2: Functions
1 ( dec la re−fun s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ( CommunicationStatus ISP ) Bool )
2 ( dec la re−fun v i s i t o r s ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
3 ( dec la re−fun c l i e n t 1 ( CommunicationStatus MAC ) Bool )
4 ( dec la re−fun c l i e n t 2 ( CommunicationStatus MAC ) Bool )
5 ( dec la re−fun s e r v e r ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
6 ( dec la re−fun inter septMacs ( CommunicationStatus MAC) Bool )
7 ( dec la re−fun ispA ( CommunicationStatus ISP ) Bool )
8 ( dec la re−fun ispB ( CommunicationStatus ISP ) Bool )
9 ( dec la re−fun connect ion ( CommunicationStatus MAC ISP ) Bool )
10 ( dec la re−fun s t a t u s ( CommunicationStatus MAC Connect ionStatus ) Bool )
11 ( dec la re−fun channel ( CommunicationStatus Channel ) Bool )
12 ( dec la re−fun ch1 ( CommunicationStatus Channel ) Bool )
13 ( dec la re−fun ch2 ( CommunicationStatus Channel ) Bool )
14 ( dec la re−fun sends ( CommunicationStatus MAC Data Time Channel ) Bool )
15 ( dec la re−fun r e c e i v e s ( CommunicationStatus MAC Data Time Channel )
Bool )
16 ( dec la re−fun isFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices
( Connect ionStatus ) Bool )
17 ( dec la re−fun isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters
( Connect ionStatus ) Bool )
Listing F.3: Some Property
1 ; ; the some property o f the s i g na tu r e
;<First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices>
( dec la re−fun | oneOf First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices | ( )
Connect ionStatus )
2 ; ; the some property o f the s i g na tu r e
;<Second Communication And Exchanging Letters>
( dec la re−fun | oneOf Second Communication And Exchanging Letters | ( )
Connect ionStatus )
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Listing F.4: Negation Of The Implication Of The Assertion
1 ( a s s e r t
2 ( not
3 (=>
4 ( and
Listing F.5: Return Types Of The ”oneOf” Functions/Constants
1 ( i sFirs t Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices |
oneOf First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices | )
2 ( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters |
oneOf Second Communication And Exchanging Letters | )
Listing F.6: The Lone Property Of The Signatures
1 ; the lone property o f the s i g na tu r e :
;<First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices>
( f o r a l l ( ( f 1 Connect ionStatus ) ( f 2 Connect ionStatus ))(=>(and
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices f 1 )
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices f 2 ))(= f1 f2 ) ) )
2 ; the lone property o f the s i g na tu r e :
;<Second Communication And Exchanging Letters>
( f o r a l l ( ( s1 Connect ionStatus ) ( s2 Connect ionStatus ))(=>(and
( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters s1 )
( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters s2 ))(= s1 s2 ) ) )
Listing F.7: Abstract Property Of Signature ConnectionStatus
1 ( f o r a l l ( ( co Connect ionStatus ) ) ( or
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices co )
( Second Communication And Exchanging Letters co ) ) )
Listing F.8: The Extends Property Of The Signatures
1 ; s i g n a t u r e s <First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices >,
;<Second Communication And Exchanging Letters>
( f o r a l l ( ( co Connect ionStatus ) ) ( not ( and
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices co )
( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters co ) ) ) )
Listing F.9: Relations
1 ; c l i e n t 1 : one MAC,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) ) ( c l i e n t 1 cs mac1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC))(=>(and
( c l i e n t 1 cs mac2 ) ( c l i e n t 1 cs mac3))(= mac2 mac3 ) ) ) ) )
2 ; c l i e n t 2 : one MAC,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) ) ( c l i e n t 2 cs mac1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC))(=>(and
( c l i e n t 2 cs mac2 ) ( c l i e n t 2 cs mac3))(= mac2 mac3 ) ) ) ) )
3 ; s e r v e r : one MAC,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) ) ( s e r v e r cs mac1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC))(=>(and
( s e r v e r cs mac2 ) ( s e r v e r cs mac3))(= mac2 mac3 ) ) ) ) )
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4 ; mitmIntercepts : l one MAC − s e rve r ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac3 MAC) ( mac2 MAC) )
(=>(and ( mitmIntercepts cs mac3 ) ( mitmIntercepts cs mac2 ) )
(= mac2 mac3 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( mac1 MAC) )
( not ( mitmIntercepts cs mac1 ) ) ) )
5 ; ispA : one ISP ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( i sp1 ISP ) ) ( ispA cs i sp1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp2 ISP ) ( i sp3 ISP))(=>(and
( ispA cs i sp2 ) ( ispA cs i sp3 ))(= i sp2 i sp3 ) ) ) ) )
6 ; ispB : one ISP ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and
( e x i s t s ( ( i sp1 ISP ) ) ( ispB cs i sp1 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp2 ISP ) ( i sp3 ISP))(=>(and
( ispB cs i sp2 ) ( ispB cs i sp3 ))(= i sp2 i sp3 ) ) ) ) )
7 ; connect ion : MAC −> l one s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ) ( and
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>( connect ion cs mac i sp11 )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r cs i sp11 ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp12 ISP ) ( i sp13 ISP))(=> ( and ( connect ion cs mac i sp12 )
( connect ion cs mac i sp13 ))(= i sp12 i sp13 ) ) ) ) )
8 ; s t a t u s :MAC −> one ConnectionStatus ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) )
( and ( e x i s t s ( ( co Connect ionStatus ) ) ( s t a t u s cs mac co ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( a3 Connect ionStatus ) ( a2 Connect ionStatus ) )
(=> ( and ( s t a tu s cs mac a2 ) ( s t a t u s cs mac a3 ) )
(= a2 a3 ) ) ) ) )
9 ; ch1 : one Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and ( e x i s t s
( ( ch11 Channel ) ) ( ch1 cs ch11 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch22 Channel ) ( ch33 Channel))(=>
( and ( ch1 cs ch22 ) ( ch1 cs ch33 ))(= ch22 ch33 ) ) ) ) )
10 ; ch2 : one Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ) ( and ( e x i s t s
( ( ch11 Channel ) ) ( ch2 cs ch11 ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch22 Channel ) ( ch33 Channel ))(=>(and
( ch2 cs ch22 ) ( ch2 cs ch33 ))(= ch22 ch33 ) ) ) ) )
11 ; sends : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ( ch Channel )
( d1 Data ) ( d2 Data ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) )
(=>(and ( sends cs mac d1 t ch ) ( sends cs mac d2 t1 ch ) )
( and(= d1 d2)(= t t1 ) ) ) )
12 ; r e c e i v e s : MAC −>l one ( Data −> Time)−> Channel ,
( f o r a l l ( ( c s CommunicationStatus ) ( mac MAC) ( ch Channel )
( d1 Data ) ( d2 Data ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) )
(=>(and ( r e c e i v e s cs mac d1 t ch )
( r e c e i v e s cs mac d2 t1 ch ) ) ( and(= d1 d2)(= t t1 ) ) ) )
Listing F.10: Facts
1 ; FIRST FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus )
( s t a tu s2 CommunicationStatus ) ) ( i m p l i e s
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac1 MAC) ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and
( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 cmac1 ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac2 ) ( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 cmac2 ) ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac1 ) ( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s2 cmac1 ) ) )
(=>( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s2 cmac2 ) ) )
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( or ( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1)))(=>
( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) )
( and(=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1)))(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus ) ( s t a tu s2 CommunicationStatus )
( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) ( t2 Time ) ( t3 Time ) ( i n d i c e s Data )
( i n d i c e s 1 Data ) ( l e t t e r s Data ) ( l e t t e r s 1 Data ) )
( i m p l i e s ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time)
( ch11 Channel))(=>(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s d11)(= t t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 i n d i c e s t ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s 1 d11)(= t1 t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 i n d i c e s 1 t1 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s d11)(= t2 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac2 l e t t e r s t2 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s 1 d11)(= t3 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac2 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac2 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac2 l e t t e r s 1 t3 ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac1 MAC) ( cmac2 MAC) )
( or ( and ( and(= t2 t3 ) ( not(= t t1 ) ) ) ( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) )
( and ( and ( not(= t2 t3 ))(= t t1 ) )
( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ) )
(=>( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ( and ( and(= t t1 )(= t2 t3 ) )
( and(=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ) ) (=>( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) )
2 ;SECOND FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus )
( s t a tu s2 CommunicationStatus ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time ) ( t2 Time ) ( t3 Time)
( i n d i c e s Data ) ( i n d i c e s 1 Data ) ( l e t t e r s Data ) ( l e t t e r s 1 Data ) )
( i m p l i e s ( and ( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time)
( ch11 Channel))(=>(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s d11)(= t t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 i n d i c e s t ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
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( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s 1 d11)(= t1 t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 i n d i c e s 1 t1 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s d11)(= t2 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac2 l e t t e r s t2 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s 1 d11)(= t3 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac2 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac2 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac2 l e t t e r s 1 t3 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
( or ( and(= t t1 ) ( not(= t2 t3 ) ) )
( and(= t2 t3 ) ( not(= t t1 ) ) ) ( and(= t2 t3 )(= t t1 ) ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s i n d i c e s 1 )(= l e t t e r s l e t t e r s 1 ) ) ) )
3 ;THIRD FACT
( f o r a l l ( ( s CommunicationStatus ) ( s1 CommunicationStatus )
( mac1 MAC) (mac2 MAC) ( mac3 MAC) ( mac4 MAC) ) ( and(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s mac1 ) ( s e r v e r s mac2 ) ) ( not(= mac1 mac2 ) ) )
( =>(and ( c l i e n t 2 s mac1 ) ( s e r v e r s mac2 ) ) ( not(= mac1 mac2)))(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s mac1 ) ( c l i e n t 2 s1 mac2 ) ) ( not(= mac1 mac2 ) ) )
( => ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s mac1 ) ( c l i e n t 1 s1 mac2))(= mac1 mac2
(=> ( and ( s e r v e r s mac3 ) ( s e r v e r s1 mac4))(= mac3 mac4 ) )
) ; ends o f and )
Listing F.11: Predicate and Assertion
1 ( f o r a l l ( ( s t a tu s1 CommunicationStatus ) ( i s p ISP )
( s ta tu s2 CommunicationStatus ) ( t Time ) ( t1 Time)
( t2 Time ) ( t3 Time ) ( i n d i c e s Data ) ( i n d i c e s 1 Data )
( l e t t e r s Data ) ( l e t t e r s 1 Data))(=>(and
2 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a t u s ) =
; i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices
(=>( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC))(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 cmac cs1 ) )
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices cs1 ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC) )
(=>( i sFirs t Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices cs2 ) ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac ) ( s t a tu s s ta tu s1 cmac cs2 ) ) ) ) )
3 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . s t a tu s ) =
; First Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices
(=> ( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC))(=>
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 smac cs1 ) )
( i sFirst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices cs1 ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC) )
(=> ( i sFi rst Communicat ion And Exchanging Indices cs2 ) ( and
( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s1 smac cs2 ) ) ) ) )
4 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s
( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC))(=> ( s e r v e r s t a tu s1 smac )
( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 smac ) ) )
5 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion ) =s ta tu s1 . ispA
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=> (=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac i sp11 ) ) )
( ispA s ta tu s1 i sp11 ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and
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( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac1 i sp11 ) ) ) ) )
6 ; s t a tu s1 . ispA in s ta tu s1 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r
( f o r a l l ( ( i spa ISP))(=> ( ispA s ta tu s1 i spa )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r s ta tu s1 i spa ) ) )
7 ; s t a tu s1 . ispB ! in s ta tu s1 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r
( f o r a l l ( ( i spb ISP))(=>( not ( ispB s ta tu s1 i spb ) )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r s ta tu s1 i spb ) ) )
8 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )= i s p
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>(=> ( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac i sp11 ) ) )
(= i s p i sp11 ) ) ( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac1 i s p ) ) ) ) )
9 ; s t a tu s1 . ch1 in s ta tu s1 . channel
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel))(=> ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch )
( channel s t a tu s1 ch ) ) )
10 ; s t a tu s1 . ch2 ! in s ta tu s1 . channel
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ))(=>( not ( ch2 s ta tu s1 ch ) )
( channel s t a tu s1 ch ) ) )
11 ; no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( connect ion s ta tu s1 cmac i s p ) ) ) )
12 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends)= ind i c e s−>t−>s t a tu s1 . ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s d11)(= t t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 i n d i c e s t ch11 ) ) ) ) )
13 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )!= l e t t e r s−>t−>s t a tu s1 . ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=> (=>( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s d11 ) (= t t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac1 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( not ( sends s ta tu s1 cmac1 l e t t e r s t ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
14 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )!= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’−>s t a tu s1 . ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=> (=>( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s 1 d11)(= t1 t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( not ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 l e t t e r s 1 t1 ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
15 ; s t a tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )= i n d i c e s ’−>t ’−>s t a tu s1 . ch1
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s 1 d11)(= t1 t11 ) ( ch1 s ta tu s1 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac1 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 smac1 i n d i c e s 1 t1 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
16 ; no s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( smac MAC) )
( and ( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( sends s ta tu s1 smac i n d i c e s t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( sends s ta tu s1 smac i n d i c e s 1 t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( sends s ta tu s1 smac l e t t e r s t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
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( sends s ta tu s1 smac l e t t e r s 1 t ch ) ) ) ) )
17 ; no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) )
( and ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t1 ch ) ) ) ) )
18 ; no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . r e c e i v e s )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) )
( and ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s t1 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t1 ch ) ) ) ) )
19 ; no s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s1 . sends )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) )
( and ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s t ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s1 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t ch ) ) ) ) )
20 ; s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . s t a t u s ) =
; Second Communication And Exchanging Letters
(=>( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC))(=>
( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s2 cmac cs1 ) )
( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs1 ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( cmac MAC) )
(=> ( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs2 ) ( and
( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( s t a tu s s ta tu s2 cmac cs2 ) ) ) ) ) )
21 ; s t a tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . s t a tu s ) =
; Second Communication And Exchanging Letters
(=> ( f o r a l l ( ( cs1 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC) )
(=> ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s2 smac cs1 ) )
( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs1 ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( cs2 Connect ionStatus ) ( smac MAC) )
(=> ( isSecond Communication And Exchanging Letters cs2 )
( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac ) ( s t a t u s s ta tu s2 smac cs2 ) ) ) ) ) )
22 ; s t a tu s2 . s e r v e r in s ta tu s2 . v i s i t o r s
( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC))(=> ( s e r v e r s t a tu s2 smac )
( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s2 smac ) ) )
23 ; s t a tu s2 . ispA ! in s ta tu s2 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r
( f o r a l l ( ( i spa ISP))(=>( not ( ispA s ta tu s2 i spa ) )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r s ta tu s2 i spa ) ) )
24 ; s t a tu s2 . ispB in s ta tu s2 . s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r
( f o r a l l ( ( i spb ISP))(=>( ispB s ta tu s2 i spb )
( s e r v i c e P r o v i d e r s ta tu s2 i spb ) ) )
25 ; s t a tu s2 . ch1 ! in s ta tu s2 . channel
( f o r a l l ( ( ch22 Channel ))(=>( not ( ch1 s ta tu s2 ch22 ) )
( channel s t a tu s2 ch22 ) ) )
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26 ; s t a tu s2 . ch2 in s ta tu s2 . channel
( f o r a l l ( ( ch22 Channel ) ) (=>(ch2 s ta tu s2 ch22 )
( channel s t a tu s2 ch22 ) ) )
27 ; no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( connect ion s ta tu s2 cmac i s p ) ) ) )
28 ; s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion )= s ta tu s2 . ispB
( f o r a l l ( ( i sp11 ISP))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( connect ion s ta tu s2 cmac i sp11 ) ) ) ( ispB s ta tu s2 i sp11 ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( connect ion s ta tu s2 cmac2 i sp11 ) ) ) ) )
29 ; s t a tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . connect ion )=
; s ta tu s1 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s1 . connect ion )
( f o r a l l ( ( smac MAC) ( i sp11 ISP))(=> ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( connect ion s ta tu s2 smac i sp11 ) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac )
( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac i sp11 ) ) ) )
( f o r a l l ( ( smac1 MAC) ( i sp12 ISP))(=> ( and
( s e r v e r s ta tu s1 smac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s1 smac1 i sp12 ) ) ( and
( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac1 ) ( connect ion s ta tu s2 smac1 i sp12 ) ) ) )
30 ; s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends)= l e t t e r s−>t ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s d11)(= t2 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac2 l e t t e r s t2 ch11 ) ) ) ) )
31 ; s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends )!= ind i c e s−>t ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel ) )
(=> (=>( e x i s t s ( ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s d11)(= t2 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( sends s ta tu s2 cmac2 i n d i c e s t2 ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
32 ; s t a tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )= l e t t e r s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=>(=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= l e t t e r s 1 d11)(= t3 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac2 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac2 )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac2 l e t t e r s 1 t3 ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
33 ; s t a tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )!= i n d i c e s ’−>t ’ ’ ’−>s t a tu s2 . ch2
( f o r a l l ( ( d11 Data ) ( t11 Time ) ( ch11 Channel))(=> (=>
( e x i s t s ( ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac d11 t11 ch11 ) ) )
( and(= i n d i c e s 1 d11)(= t3 t11 ) ( ch2 s ta tu s2 ch11 ) ) )
( e x i s t s ( ( smac2 MAC) ) ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac2 )
( not ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 smac2 i n d i c e s 1 t3 ch11 ) ) ) ) ) )
34 ; no s ta tu s2 . s e r v e r . ( s t a tu s2 . sends )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( smac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and
( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac ) ( sends s ta tu s2 smac i n d i c e s t2 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( sends s ta tu s2 smac i n d i c e s 1 t2 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac )
( sends s ta tu s2 smac l e t t e r s t2 ch ) ) ) ( not ( and
( s e r v e r s ta tu s2 smac ) ( sends s ta tu s2 smac l e t t e r s 1 t2 ch ) ) ) ) )
35 ; no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and
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( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s t3 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t3 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s t3 ch ) ) ) ( not ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t3 ch ) ) ) ) )
36 ; no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 . ( s t a tu s2 . r e c e i v e s )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and
( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s t3 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t3 ch ) ) ) ( not ( and
( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s t3 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( r e c e i v e s s t a tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t3 ch ) ) ) ) )
37 ; no s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 . ( s t a tu s2 . sends )
( f o r a l l ( ( ch Channel ) ( cmac MAC) ) ( and ( not ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( sends s ta tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s t2 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac i n d i c e s 1 t2 ch ) ) ) ( not ( and
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac ) ( sends s ta tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s t2 ch ) ) )
( not ( and ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac )
( sends s ta tu s2 cmac l e t t e r s 1 t2 ch ) ) ) ) )
38 ; s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 in s ta tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and s ta tu s1 . c l i e n t 2 ! in
; s t a tu s1 . v i s i t o r s and
; s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 1 ! in s ta tu s2 . v i s i t o r s and s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 in
; s t a tu s2 . v i s i t o r s and (
; ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and ( s ta tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 )
; ! in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs
; or ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and
; ( s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 ) in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs
; or ( s t a tu s1 . c l i e n t 1 ) ! in s ta tu s1 . inter septMacs and
; ( s t a tu s2 . c l i e n t 2 ) ! in s ta tu s2 . inter septMacs )
( f o r a l l ( ( cmac1 MAC) ( cmac2 MAC) ) ( and ( and (=>
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 cmac1 ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s1 cmac2 ) ( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s1 cmac2 ) ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s2 cmac1 ) ( not ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s2 cmac1 ) ) )
(=>( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ( v i s i t o r s s t a tu s2 cmac2 ) ) )
( or ( and (=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) )
(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ( and (=>
( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1 ) ) )
(=>( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) )
( and(=>( c l i e n t 1 s ta tu s1 cmac1 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s1 cmac1)))(=> ( c l i e n t 2 s ta tu s2 cmac2 )
( not ( inter septMacs s ta tu s2 cmac2 ) ) ) ) ) ) )
39 ; Asse r t i on
( and(= i n d i c e s i n d i c e s 1 )(= l e t t e r s l e t t e r s 1 ) )
) ; ends o f => ) ; ends o f f o r a l l ) ) )
Listing F.12: Commands
1 ( check−sa t )
2 ; ( get−model )
3 ( e x i t )
Listing F.13: Commands
1 ( check−sa t ) ; ( get−model ) ( e x i t )
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